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Over the past decades, substantial changes have occurred in the European financial system. 
Technological advances have spurred financial innovations. The process of financial 
integration and deregulation has affected the organizational structure of markets, increasing 
banking consolidation and market shares of foreign banks. This financial development came 
along with an increase in prudential regulation. Taking into account the important role 
banking institutions play, their systemic importance and their tight interconnection with the 
real sector, banks are subject to more stringent regulations than non-financial firms. In 
addition to capital requirements, Basel II and Basel III accords were designed to encourage 
banks to exert sound practices and provide enhanced risk management.  
Financial integration and deregulation enable new profit opportunities through decreasing 
costs, accessing new markets or expending access to capital. European integration has also 
fostered competition among financial institutions, which has had either positive or negative 
impacts on banks. On one hand, changes in the European banking industry have stressed the 
necessity for banks to expand and divert their activities in order to improve their performance 
relative to their peers (Goddard et al. (2007)): banks adjust their structures and their strategies 
to optimally respond to this new environment. On the other hand, following the financial 
globalization, the induced losses in market power may have resulted in reinforced moral 
hazard incentives and increased risk taking (Salas and Saurina (2003), Rajan (2005)). In the 
absence of an efficient risk management, this shift towards risk would increase the likelihood 
of financial crises (Mishkin (2005)). Overall in the new financial environment, the quality of 
banking risk management is assigned to play a preeminent role.    
The evaluation and the management of risks are ones of the main functions of banking 
institutions. Risk management is the process by which banks’ managers identify, assess and 
monitor banking risk. Risk management does not necessarily imply a decrease of the risk 
taken by banks: a lower risk may not be beneficial as it prevents managers investing in more 
profitable projects at the expense of shareholders wealth. On the contrary, a higher risk allows 
for more valuable projects but make banks more vulnerable. Consequently, the cost of taking 
on new risks that increases the bank’s total risk should be traded off against the potential gain 
from taking the risk (Pyle (1997)). In that way, the purpose of risk management is to promote 
efficient risk-taking. A good management of risks will then lead to choose the risk-return 
couple that maximizes shareholders’ wealth according to managers’ appetite for risk and 
regulatory capital requirements (Stultz (2014)). Yet, all banks may not reach this objective. 
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A first factor likely to affect the success of risk management is directly attributable to 
managers’ ability. This ability depends on managers’ talent, knowledge, leadership etc... (see 
Demerjian et al. (2012)). More able managers are better to assess risks, to manage their 
portfolios, to identify the optimal amount of risk and to adopt the best practices in order to 
make an efficient use of risk-taking. Managers who suffer from a lack of expertise misallocate 
banking resources which can result in excessive risks if, for example, they allocate fewer 
personnel and resources to risk analysis and monitoring activities. Compared to their peers, 
banks that fail to turn risk-taking into optimal return are considered as risk-return inefficient 
according to a so-called measure of risk-return efficiency (DeYoung et al. (2001)). 
In addition to managers’ ability, banks’ ownership structure may also influence the risk taking 
behavior of banks (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Saunders et al. (1990), Laeven and Levine 
(2008)) and affect the way risk is managed. When banks’ franchise value is low 1 , 
shareholders, who hold diversified portfolios and take the advantage of limited liability, have 
stronger incentives than non-shareholding managers to increase risk in order to maximize 
banks’ value2. Indeed, without additional incentives, managers may be too risk-adverse to 
select these risky projects that potentially affect their invested wealth, human capital or 
reputation (Demsetz et al. (1997)). When the ownership is diffuse, the interests of bank 
managers may diverge from those of shareholders in terms of risk-taking. On the contrary, in 
the case of a concentrated ownership alike the European banking system, controlling 
shareholders, those with large ownership stakes, obtain an effective control of banks, the later 
exhibiting in this case a higher risk-taking behavior (Saunders et al. (1990)). According to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), shareholders have strong incentive to engage in assets 
substitution after raising debt. Assets substitution is an investment strategy that involves 
changes in portfolio assets allocation in order to invest in excessively risky projects that 
promise very high payoff but with a very low probability of success. This risk-taking strategy 
increases the probability of bank failure (Keeley (1990)) and diverges from the risk-
management incentive to avoid costly financial distress. 
 
                                                     
1
 For example, banks’ franchise value decreased after the wave of bank mergers and acquisitions that went along 
with the financial development of the European banking system (DeJonghe and Vander Vennet (2008)). 
2
 On the contrary, a high franchise value limits banks’ risk-taking incentives because the interest of shareholders 
and managers are likely to be aligned as they both suffer high costs associated with financial distress (Demsetz et 
al. (1997)). 
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Overall, even if banks' managers have a wide experience of risk management, they might fail 
in this exercise because of impaired managerial decisions or agency conflicts that may get 
banks into trouble 3 . Weak management in banking institutions may indeed have severe 
consequences such as an increased banking financial instability, which may impact the whole 
financial and economic systems. Altunbas et al. (2011) highlight that bank risks highly 
increased during the financial crisis, alongside the materialization of these risks, and banks’ 
default risk has never been more credible than during this period. Banks’ mismanagement of 
risk may be partly responsible for this situation. The huge accumulation of risks that 
subsequently materialized raises significant doubts to whether banks manage risk efficiently 
and gives even more incentives to study the quality of banks' risk management, especially 
during the financial crisis. Accordingly, the assessment and the analysis of banks’ risk-return 
efficiency is the first objective of the thesis. 
 
It is of particular interest for bank regulators to assess the quality of bank risk management in 
order to prevent a potential ensuing risk of insolvency and to improve banks’ behavior4. 
However, regulators are not the only actors potentially interested in bank risk management. 
Bank mismanagement of risk is also likely to affect other banks’ stakeholders such as, in 
particular, bondholders. Bondholders are mainly worried about the risk that the issuer will not 
be able to pay the interest and/or the principal of the bond, and thus the risk to lose their 
investment (Merton (1974)). Bondholders are then concerned about the risk of issuers’ 
default. If they anticipate a high probability of failure, bondholders would require an 
appropriate default premium, increasing the cost of debt of banks. Theoretically, the risk 
premium required by bondholders to fully compensate for the expected losses should take into 
account, among others, the weak risk management. Empirically, the literature questions the 
accurateness of traditional default proxies and underlines their deficiency to fully explain the 
default risk premium contained in bond prices. For example, whereas they should be already 
integrated into the measure of default, the inclusion of accounting data (Demirovic et al. 
(2015)) or equity volatility (Campbell and Taksler (2003)) as determinants of the bond spread 
                                                     
3
 According to Williams (2004), one of the management problems for European banks directly stems from 
managers’ behavior. However, other factors are likely to affect positively or negatively the quality of risk 
management that are beyond managers’ control such as an exogenous shock. Notice that the chance that a bad 
outcome takes place with an efficient risk-return project is small but increases with inefficient ones.  
4
 For instance, on one hand, regulators may allow a greater flexibility for better-managed banks. On the other 
hand, banks with less ability to manage their risks may be penalized for taking higher risks in order to give them 
the incentives to improve their risk-return efficiency (DeYoung et al. (2001)). 
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in addition to a default measure brings incremental information in explaining the default risk 
premium. On these grounds, we investigate, as a second objective, whether the quality of 
bank management conveys additional information to default risk proxies. 
 
More, bondholders are also concerned about the risk of wealth extraction and are directly 
affected when shareholders invest in high-risk projects that increase the probability of default 
on their debts without potential benefits (the asset substitution problem). This strategy stems 
from the existence of a conflict of interests between shareholders and debtholders. When the 
ownership is concentrated, bank managers and controlling shareholders have aligned 
incentives that diverge from the best interests of minority shareholders (Claessens et al. 
(1999, 2002)) but also from those of bondholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that 
the potential conflict between shareholders and debtholders is reflected in terms of wealth 
expropriation and risk-shifting. While shareholders invest in these excessively risky projects, 
they shift the risk to bondholders. Indeed, shareholders benefit from upside returns when 
high-risk projects succeed and are protected from downside risk when those projects fail 
whereas, in that case, bondholders bear part of the cost. Anticipating such a behavior, 
bondholders require a higher premium that increases the bank cost of debt (Klock et al. 
(2005))5. More, this risk-shifting conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors may 
be strengthened if controlling shareholders hold control rights (the right to vote and therefore 
to control) in excess of cash-flow rights (the right to receive dividends) as in pyramid 
ownership structure6. They can achieve the control of a bank by committing low equity 
investment that allows them to extract wealth without bearing excessive costs. Boubakri and 
Gouma (2010) provide evidence for such a behavior during normal times for non-financial 
firms. However, the question of the impact of such agency costs on debt pricing in the 
specific case of banking institutions (and especially during distress times) is not addressed in 
the current literature; this will be the third and last objective of this thesis. 
  
                                                     
5
 This moral hazard problem of asset substitution by shareholders is more likely to occur since the reduction of 
banks' market power induced by the financial development and shareholders may be tempted to take on a higher 
risk to compensate for the lost profitability. 
6
 A pyramid ownership structure is based on the fact that a firm is controlled by an ultimate owner who controls 
the firm through at least another corporation that it does not wholly control. 
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Structure of the thesis 
According to the previous overview, we evaluate first the quality of banks’ risk management. 
Second, we investigate whether bondholders price this quality of banks’ risk management. 
Finally, we analyze the question of conflicts of interests between controlling shareholders and 
bondholders within banks’ pyramids ownership structure.  
More precisely, we aim at a contribution to the banking literature thanks to three empirical 
investigations on bank risk-return efficiency and bond pricing. Chapter 1 assesses and 
examines the relative efficiency of a homogeneous sample of European listed banks in terms 
of risk-return trade-off. Despite an abundant literature related to banks' efficiency, there are, at 
our knowledge, a very few attempts to evaluate bank risk-return efficiency of European 
banks. Chapter 2 investigates the determinants of bank bond spread and asks whether bank 
managerial ability, proxied by bank risk-return efficiency, improves the prediction of the 
default premium required by bondholders. Finally, Chapter 3 analyzes whether divergence 
between control rights and cash-flow rights of ultimate owners in pyramid ownership 
structure affects the pricing of banking bonds.  
 
First, given the impact of banks' risk management in terms of financial stability, Chapter 1 
addresses, for a set of European banks, the matter of the empirical measurement and analysis 
of managerial efficiency defined as a risk-return trade-off. Changes that happened in the 
European banking industry let managers a greater freedom to allocate asset portfolios and to 
modify their strategies. They have incentives to operate more cost efficiently and/or to take on 
more risk to enhance their profitability. However, some banks are worse at risk-taking than 
others: they take additional risks that only increase their probability of experiencing financial 
distress and then may potentially threaten the safety of the financial system (DeYoung et al. 
(2001)). Most studies that have paid attention to bank efficiency in terms of cost or profit 
(Weill (2004, 2009), Altunbas et al. (2001a), Maudos et al. (2002)) disregard possible 
differences in managers’ risk preferences (McAllister and McManus (1993)). Bank risk-return 
efficiency, as measured by Hughes et al. (1996), allows managers to trade return for a reduced 
risk and turns out to be a relevant proxy for the quality of bank risk management. To our 
knowledge, none of the studies that estimate bank efficiency with this method run 
comparisons across a large set of European banks or investigate whether this efficiency was 
affected by the financial crisis. We extend the established literature in this way.  
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Hence, to evaluate the performance of managers in terms of bank risk-taking practices, we 
assess the relative efficiency of banks' risk-return choices. The first step is to estimate each 
bank expected return and risk that directly and solely stem from the ex-ante portfolio choices 
made by bank managers. These ex-ante portfolio choices, which are distinct from realized 
ones, have to be disclosed. We borrow from Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Hughes et al. 
(1995) a methodology which enables this assessment of ex-ante portfolio choices. By means 
of a stochastic frontier model, we then assess precisely the relative bank risk-return efficiency. 
Beyond this assessment of bank risk-return efficiency, this chapter is devoted to four main 
issues. First, we confirm that some banks are inefficiently managed because of impaired 
managerial decisions and we take care to ensure that this result is robust. Second, we 
underline that the level of bank risk-return efficiency is relatively stable in the short term, 
whereas in the long term low performing banks are not condemned to remain inefficient. 
Third, we find some common characteristics for the most risk-return efficient banks by 
conducting mean equality tests. Fourth, we show that, when credit ratings do not account for 
potential public support, rating agencies assign a more attractive rating for the most risk-
return efficient banks. 
 
Second, the pricing of default risk has received much attention from regulators, supervisors 
and academics because they have strong interest to accurately measure it (Duffee (1999)). 
Investors such as bondholders are mainly worried about the risk that the issuer will not be 
able to pay the interest and/or the principal of the bond (Merton (1974)). They require a 
default premium to adequately compensate for the expected losses they may suffer. This 
premium is reflected in the bond spread defined as the difference between the bond yield to 
maturity at issuance and the yield of a same currency and maturity Treasury bond. To 
investigate how bondholders price the default risk, previous empirical studies model this 
premium by using commonly used credit default measures: credit or bank ratings (Elton et al. 
(2001), Sironi (2002), Sironi (2003), Pop (2006), Güntay and Hackbarth (2010)), market-
based measures such as the distance to default (Tsuji (2005), Das et al. (2009), Demirovic et 
al. (2015)), and accounting-based ones like Z-Score (Balasubramnian and Cyree (2014), and 
Kavussanos and Tsouknidis (2014)). Although these approaches have delivered some 
important findings, the accurateness of these proxies to completely appreciate the default risk 
premium have been questioned (Jones et al. (1983), Das et al. (2009), Campbell and Taksler 
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(2003)). What arises from these studies is that, empirically, additional data bring incremental 
information in explaining the default premium. 
From this perspective, Chapter 2 investigates whether the assessment of the default premium 
required by bondholders can be improved by adding additional information, and, more 
specifically, the bank managerial ability measured as risk-return efficiency as a determinant. 
We test directly the effect of bank managerial ability on the bank bond spread, and we find 
that well-managed banks benefit from lower credit spread. We deepen our analysis by asking 
whether the impact of bank managerial ability on bond spread is the same during normal and 
distress times and on more restrictive subsets relating to ratings categories, payment ranks and 
maturities. The relationship holds whatever the studied period or bonds’ characteristics. The 
results confirm that the default proxy does not entirely reflect the default premium, and we 
conclude that managerial ability is a determinant of bondholders’ confidence in the measure 
of default risk. 
 
Finally, some papers highlight that the cost of debt of banks can be influenced by additional 
factors beyond expected default (Elton et al. (2001)). Bliss (2001) underlines that while bond 
yields react to default risk, they may also be affected by other factors and considering bond 
yields as a basically measure of default risk is mistaken. Indeed, bondholders are also 
concerned about the risk of wealth extraction arising from agency problems (Klock et al. 
(2005)). The aforementioned agency problem between controlling shareholders and 
bondholders could even be accentuated in the case of pyramid ownership structure. This 
structure enables controlling shareholders to achieve control of a firm by committing low 
equity investment creating a divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights. 
Controlling shareholders have incentives to use their effective control rights to divert the 
upside gains for private benefits while leaving largely the costs of failure to bondholders. If 
bondholders anticipate that expropriation by controlling shareholders is likely to occur, they 
will require an additional premium when they price the debt.  
The literature that empirically investigates the effect of controlling shareholders with excess 
control rights in the banking industry is scarce. Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi (2015) highlights that 
the divergence between ultimate owner’s control and cash-flow rights affects bank 
profitability and risk in a different way during normal and distress times. Excess control rights 
are negatively associated with bank profitability and positively with risk before (2002-2006) 
and after (2009-2010) the financial crisis. On the contrary, excess control rights contribute to 
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improve bank profitability and to reduce earnings volatility without impacting default risk 
during the financial crisis years (2007-2008). Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) examine the 
potential existence of conflicts between controlling shareholders and bondholders; they 
explore the effect of expropriation likelihood on firms’ bond yield-spreads. They show that, in 
normal times, this expropriation by controlling shareholders affects bond yield-spreads, 
bondholders requiring a higher spread from firms controlled by an ultimate owner with excess 
control rights. However, during distress periods, controlling shareholders may change their 
behavior. As highlighted by Friedman et al. (2003)), firms that are subject to expropriation 
during upturns may profit from propping-up during downturns. Entrenched controlling 
shareholders may intervene to refund the failing firm in order to prevent all the firms inside 
the pyramid from financial distress and expropriate them in the future. If this mechanism is 
applied, bondholders may require a lower spread in turmoil compared to sound period. 
Therefore, Chapter 3 raises the question of the impact of such agency cost on debt pricing in 
the specific case of banking institutions as this issue is not addressed in the current literature 
and during distress times. The findings indicate that, before the crisis, the presence of excess 
control rights does not affect bank bond yield spread. On the contrary, during downturns, 
bondholders require a lower spread from banks controlled by an ultimate owner with excess 
control rights. Finally, we find that holders of secured or high rated bonds disregard the 
presence or the absence of excess control rights during both normal and distress times. On the 
contrary, holders of low rated and unsecured/subordinated bonds pay attention to excess 
control rights exclusively during distress times. 
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1.1. Introduction 
Over the last decades, the evolution of the European financial environment has led to 
technological innovations, banking deregulation and consolidation that favor financial 
integration and competition among banks (Goddard et al. (2007)). The several changes that 
happened in regulatory and supervisory policies let banks’ managers greater freedom to 
allocate asset portfolios and encourage them to optimally adapt their strategies and enhance 
their efficiency (Chortareas et al. (2012)). Efficiency turns out to be a key factor for banks to 
stay competitive especially with the entry of new foreign competitors (Weill (2009)), a key 
determinant of bank failures that worry banking supervisors (Podpiera and Weill (2008)), and 
a policy objective of the European regulators to foster financial stability (European Central 
Bank (2006)). This context has renewed interest for regulators and policy-makers in 
identifying banks operating at low levels of efficiency which could affect the stability of the 
whole financial system. 
The empirical measurement of efficiency in European banks has received wide attention from 
researchers. Management behavior is likely to play a large role in determining bank efficiency 
(Williams (2004)). The challenge to estimate bank efficiency stems in that case from the 
assessment of managers’ production decisions. Most studies performed on a large set of 
European banks focused on either cost efficiency (e.g. Weill (2004, 2009), Chortareas et al. 
(2012)) and/or profit efficiency (e.g. Altunbas et al. (2001a), Maudos et al. (2002), Bos and 
Schmiedel (2007), Fiordelisi et al. (2011)). It should be noticed that cost and profit efficiency 
estimates assume that managers are risk-neutral. However, because of the specificity of 
banking activities, taking into account managers’ risk preferences is essential to assess banks’ 
efficiency. On one side, under the assumption of risk neutrality, banks operating with higher 
costs for a given bundle of outputs turn out to be inefficient compare to their peers ceteris 
paribus. On the other side, if banks are risk-adverse, these so-called inefficient banks may 
actually operate optimally according to their own level of risk adversity (McAllister and 
McManus (1993)). They increase their expenses to reduce their risk: they earn a lower profit 
but at a lower level of risk that reflects banks’ risk aversion rather than inefficiency. Cost and 
profit efficiency measures may be misleading. 
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An extensive literature suggests that accounting for risk is important while analyzing 
managers’ production decision-making and assessing bank efficiency7. Accordingly, Hughes 
and Moon (1995) and Hughes et al. (1995) suggest a function such as managers choose a 
most preferred production plan that maximize their utility: this model allows for the 
possibility that bank managers pursue alternative objectives, such as trading return for a 
reduced risk. The estimation of this model yields measures of bank expected return and risk 
from which Hughes et al. (1996) evaluate bank risk-return efficiency through a stochastic 
risk-return frontier8. To our knowledge, only two studies applied this method to the European 
context. On a sample of 113 French banks between 1993 and 1997, Petey (2004) examines the 
determinant of bank insolvency proxied by the risk-return efficiency measure. Koetter (2006) 
analyzes the stability of efficiency measures for a sample of universal German banks between 
1993 and 2004.  
The objective of this paper is to estimate and study the efficiency of a sample of European 
listed banks in terms of expected risk and return. While previous studies that apply the model 
of managerial utility maximization focused on a specific country, our sample covers 192 
banks located in 16 European countries. The studied period, which goes from 2002 to 2011, 
encompasses the recent financial crisis. To our knowledge, there have been little attempts to 
investigate the effect of this financial instability on European bank efficiency (e.g. Alzubaidi 
and Bougheas (2012)).  
To address the matter of European listed banks’ efficiency, we focus on four issues. First, we 
aim to analyze why some banks do not belong to the efficient frontier. Is the sub-optimality of 
their expected risk-return choice mainly explained by inefficiency? Exogenous factors may 
also be responsible for these variations, so we have to ensure that the main reason is 
inefficiency. Results confirm the latest. Studies such as Bauer et al. (1998), Dietsch and 
Lozano-Vivas (2000), Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002) or Weill (2004) underline that efficiency 
measures can significantly vary across different empirical specifications, estimations and 
samples. We conclude in a different way: banks’ ranking is not altered by the econometric 
choices relating to the methods or the estimation techniques of the efficient frontier. 
                                                     
7
 See Hughes and Mester (2008) for a review of these studies. 
8
 Studies such as Hughes (1999), Hughes et al. (2000), Hughes et al. (2001), DeYoung et al. (2001), Hua and 
Liu (2010) or Hughes and Mester (2013) also use this model to evaluate bank efficiency on the US market. 
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Second, we analyze the stability of bank efficiency in terms of level and ranking over time, 
along with the effect of the financial crisis. Is efficiency persistent over time? Do inefficient 
banks stay the same over the years? How the level of bank efficiency varies across the period? 
Does the financial crisis impact efficiency rankings? Our main results suggest that bank 
efficiency is stable, especially in the short term. Overall, a large part of most efficient banks 
tend to stay efficient over the whole period. We also notice that most of banks that under-
performed before the financial crisis improve their efficiency in the post financial crisis 
period.  
A third question involves the characteristics of banks according to their level of efficiency. 
The objective here is to identify the main features of the relatively (in)efficient banks in terms 
of balance-sheet structure, income statements and board constitution. Previous studies that 
investigate bank efficiency in terms of return and risk show for example that more efficient 
banks enjoy large branches networks (Hughes et al. (1996)), are well diversified and benefit 
from large scale economies (Hughes et al. (2001)), display better CAMEL ratings (DeYoung 
et al. (2001)) and credit ratings (Hua and Liu (2010)), experience lower borrowing costs and 
focus on lending activities (Petey (2004)). Even if this aforementioned literature underlines a 
few common characteristics for efficient banks, a typical profile does not stand out. We also 
reach such a result: we cannot highlight a typical profile. However, we do find that most 
efficient banks are more profitable; are less capitalized and focused on lending activity. They 
better perform in terms of operational costs and return. They are also less risky without being 
more solvent or bigger than others. 
Our fourth and last issue aimed at the evaluation of efficiency by external actors such as 
rating agencies. The quality assessment of credit rating agencies is often blamed since the 
financial crisis (see Blöchlinger et al. (2012) or Hilscher and Wilson (2013)). We then wonder 
how rating agencies take into account the degree of efficiency of banks: do actually rating 
agencies assign lower ratings to less efficient banks? The level of banks’ opaqueness may 
further alter their assessment of banks’ efficiency as banks with worse management ability 
may be voluntarily opaque. Are inefficient banks considered as more opaque by the rating 
agencies and analysts? We conclude that (i) poorly managed banks tend to have downgraded 
ratings only when these rating do not account for a potential external support, and (ii) 
inefficient banks do not appear as more opaque. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 describes the methodology to 
estimate bank efficiency while section 3 presents the data, sample and efficiency estimations. 
The quality of the efficiency measure is discussed in section 4. Section 5 investigates the 
stability of banks’ efficiency over time as well as the impact of the financial crisis on 
rankings. Section 6 examines the possibility of differences between most and less efficient 
banks through balance-sheet indicators, income statements and board characteristics. Section 
7 analyzes whether credit rating agencies take into account bank efficiency. Section 8 
concludes. 
 
1.2. Methodology 
Before empirically estimating bank efficiency, we first present the method we employ. 
1.2.1. Looking for a risk-return efficiency measure 
Studies that estimate efficiency in the banking industry mainly focus on cost efficiency 
method (ability to choose inputs at minimized costs for a given level of outputs) and profit 
efficiency method (ability to choose inputs that maximize the profit for a given level of 
outputs). Cost or profit efficiencies are estimated by the bank's relative position to a best 
practice frontier (BPF). The distance to this BPF reflects the bank's ability to convert inputs as 
efficiently as possible into outputs compared to its peers. A bank will be considered as 
relatively less efficient than others if it is situated far from the BPF and this bank could reduce 
its costs by improving its suboptimal managerial choices, still producing a similar bundle of 
outputs. Doing so, the bank would get closer to the BPF.  
Uncertainty is an essential aspect of the banking industry. However, the previous methods 
assume that bank managers are risk-neutral and, accordingly, most studies that estimate bank 
efficiency with these approaches do not consider the risk exposition associated with banks’ 
production plans. For example, under the assumption of risk-neutrality, a bank operating with 
higher costs for a given bundle of outputs turns out to be inefficient compared to its peers 
ceteris paribus. But, a risk-adverse bank may adopt cost-intensive measures to reduce its 
risks, adjust upwards its level of capital to prevent default, allocate more resources to increase 
loan monitoring, accentuate the analysis of credits etc. All these expenses undertaken to 
reduce risk, that is to decrease the uncertainty of the return, may appear as cost inefficient 
whereas these choices may be optimal considering the bank’s level of risk aversion. Hence, 
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assuming that managers are risk-neutral can result in misleading estimates of bank efficiency. 
Consequently, cost/profit efficiency methods are subject to a misspecification that is counted 
as inefficiency. Adjusting the efficiency measurement by accounting for managers’ risk 
aversion is necessary. 
Some studies suggest to include the bank level of capital as an input into the cost or profit 
function while estimating cost or profit efficiency (see for instance Hughes and Mester 
(1993), McAllister and McManus (1993), Mester (1996), Hughes and Mester (1998), Hughes 
(1999), Altunbas et al. (2001b), Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002)). As a risk-adverse manager will 
prefer a higher level of capital, the latter variable indirectly reflects bank managers’ risk 
preferences. Berger and Humphrey (1997) emphasize the importance of accounting for the 
level of capital when estimating cost or profit efficiency. As underlined by Hughes and 
Mester (1998), risk-adverse managers may not be willing to follow an objective of cost 
minimization (or profit maximization) if the level of capital which minimizes their costs 
implies an unacceptable degree of risk. They would rather trade profit for reduced risk. 
Consequently, a suitable estimation of bank efficiency would take manager's risk aversion 
into account.  
As an alternative method, Hughes and Moon (1995)9 developed a structural model based on 
the maximization of a utility function that incorporates bank managers’ risk-preferences and 
allows for different objectives. Managers associate to each feasible production plan a 
conditional probability distribution of profit that is based on their beliefs about the 
probabilities of future economic states of the world and about how profits will be generated 
by different plans in these future economic states. The managerial utility function thus depicts 
managers’ ranking of production plans. These rankings differ for each manager according to 
their objectives and risk preferences based on their subjective assessments of future economic 
states. A risk-adverse manager, whom objective is not to minimize cost/maximize profit, 
ranks production plans by considering both the expected profit and the variance of profit 
associated to each plan. This model integrates the special case of a risk-neutral manager who 
only ranks his plans according to their expected profits. The maximization of the utility 
function determines the highest-ranked production plan, i.e. the manager’s most preferred 
one. From this model, the authors derive an expected return and the associated expected risk, 
                                                     
9
 This model is based on Hughes et al. (1995) following by Hughes et al. (1996) and Hughes et al. (2000) 
studies. 
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measured as the standard deviation of the expected return. This expected return reflects the 
ex-ante level of return on equity that a bank aims to reach for a given level of expected risk 
the bank is willing to take. Given these measures of expected return and risk, a best practice 
frontier is established in the risk-return space to finally estimate bank efficiency. Inefficient 
banks facing a non optimal risk-return trade-off may improve their risk-return management by 
either reducing their risk for a given level of expected return or increasing their return for a 
given level of expected risk. 
 
1.2.2. Extracting bank expected return and risk 
The evaluation of bank risk-return efficiency requires, at first, an accurate assessment of 
expected return and risk.  
Following Hughes et al. (1995, 1996, 2000), we suppose that bank managers maximize a 
utility function that depends on the level of profit (π) and that takes into account their risk-
aversion by considering a combination of bank inputs (x), conditional on the output vector 
(y), the vector of output prices (p), the risk-free rate (r), a measure of asset quality (n) and the 
level of bank's equity capital (k):  
  (1.1.a) 
The maximization of the utility function is subject to two constraints: 
 - the balanced budget:  (1.1.b) 
 - the banking technology:  (1.1.c) 
where  is the price of a unit of after-tax profit in terms of before-tax profit with t 
the tax rate on profit, w the vector of input prices, and m the non-asset based income.  
 
By solving this optimization problem, we obtain two parametric functions:  
 - the expected profit function:  (1.2.a) 
 - the input demand function:  (1.2.b) 
where v is a price vector defined as .  
 
Similarly, we can define the bank manager’s problem as a dual expenditure minimization 
problem subject to a given utility level  and the banking technology:  
 
,x
Max U ,x | y,p, r,n,k


p.y m w.x p .   
T(x, y,k) 0
π
p = 1 (1- t)
(y,n, v,m,k)  
x x(y,n, v,m,k)
v v(w,p, r, p )


U
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  (1.3.a) 
subject to   
  (1.3.b) 
  (1.3.c) 
Solving this problem leads to the input demand function: 
  (1.4.a) 
and to the expected profit function10: 
  (1.4.b) 
The expected level of expenditure (for this given utility level) is the sum of inputs 
remuneration plus profit before tax: 
 
 (1.5)   
From the budget equilibrium constraint, the level of expenditure is necessarily equal to:  
 
 (1.6)  
Functional forms for utility and banking technology are unknown. We thus approximate the 
expenditure function by using the Almost Ideal expenditure function developed by Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980) and used in a similar way by DeYoung et al. (2001): 
 
 (1.7) 
Where LnP is defined as a linear combination of logarithms, squared logarithms and cross 
products of logarithms of the components of ( , y, w, pπ, r, n, k)
11:  
                                                     
10
 This profit is not necessarily the maximum profit. 
11
 As the number of coefficients to estimate is already important and to save on degrees of freedom, the output 
vector of price p is replaced by an index =  which is the weighted average price of the 
outputs. i and j are indices which identify outputs and s and t refer to inputs. Notice that  
and . 
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 (1.8) 
 
The coefficients of this log-linear combination of variables are parameters to be estimated. 
Using the Shephard's lemma, the partial derivative of subject to is equal to the 
expenditure share allocated to the inputs: 
 (1.9) 
 
Equally, the expenditure share allocated to the profit can be defined as:  
 (1.10) 
 
Based on the expenditure functional form (1.8) and the inputs and profit share equations (1.9) 
and (1.10), the profit share    can be defined as: 
 (1.11) 
and the expenditure share allocated to the input s is equal to: 
 (1.12) 
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At last, the hypothesized optimality of total equity (k) is granted by: 
 
(1.13) 
 
Some restrictions on parameters have to be considered: some coefficients have to be 
symmetric; homogeneity constraints on input and profit shares have to be respected, and these 
shares should sum up to 1. These restrictions are presented in Appendix 1.1. 
On the basis of the estimated coefficients vector  and the value of the different components 
of  relative to each date t and each bank b, we assess 
the expected profit share of bank b at date t as the estimated value of the profit share defined 
in (11), . From this expected profit share , we deduce the expected return 
on equity of bank b at time t:  
 (1.14) 
The relative risk is the estimated standard deviation of the expected return on equity. This risk 
is defined as:  
 (1.15) 
where is the gradient of valuated at point .  
Finally, we can compute a risk-return couple for each bank at each date.  
 
1.2.3. The risk-return frontier and the efficiency measure 
To measure the relative risk-return efficiency of banks, we need a suitable layout of the so-
called best practice frontier. This best practice frontier represents the optimal risk-return 
combinations. The shape of the BPF and the involved techniques for the estimation of this 
BPF have now to be stated. We can choose between two main methods12 to estimate the BPF: 
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 See Bauer et al. (1998), Weill (2004) and Koetter et al. (2006) for a comparison of these techniques 
respectively on a set of US, European and German banks.  
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the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)13 and the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)14. DEA is 
a (non parametric) linear programming method of envelopment of the risk/return 
combinations; the estimated envelope is assimilated to the BPF and the distance between 
risk/return combinations below the BPF and the envelope is imputed to inefficiency as a 
whole. On the contrary, the SFA approach of the BPF is a parametric one: the general shape 
of the BPF has to be chosen a priori and the parameters of this BPF are estimated under some 
distributional hypothesis. Moreover, the SFA approach breaks down the error term in two 
components: a pure stochastic element and the inefficiency component. The SFA method 
ensures that the resulting inefficiency measure is not biased by random disturbances while the 
DEA method may overestimate bank inefficiency by interpreting as an inefficient behavior 
what would result from a simple random shock. For this main reason, we will give advantage 
to the SFA approach and the DEA method will be used as a comparison. 
 
Within the framework of this SFA approach, the risk/return frontier is specified as a 
production function for which the bank i produces some expected return ERi,t at time t on the 
basis of chosen risk RKi,t. We then define the risk-return stochastic frontier on the basis of the 
Battese and Coelli (1992)
15
 model: 
i,t i,t i,tER =α + β RK + ε
 
(1.16) 
 with:   
The error term , which is time and bank-specific, is the sum of two components, i,t and - 
ui,t. The first one, , is a two-sided random component which takes into account potential 
exogenous shocks which can impact the production function. It would be noticed that bank 
managers cannot be accountable for this random component from an inefficiency point of 
view. This first purely random component is assumed to be normally distributed with a 
zero mean and a variance : 
. 
                                                     
13
 See Charnes et al. (1978) who were the first to introduce this method and Petey (2004) for an application of 
this method in a risk-return space.  
14
 See contemporaneous studies of Aigner et al. (1977), Battese and Corra (1977) and Meeusen and Van Den 
Broeck (1977). 
15
 The Battese and Coelli (1992) model uses maximum likelihood techniques to estimate a time-varying 
efficiency. We give advantage to this model because unlike previous ones, it relaxes the assumption that 
inefficiencies are constant through time (this hypothesis is hard to accept through many time periods (see 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000)). 
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The negative inefficiency component - , is extracted from the left tail of a normal 
distribution with zero mean and variance : 
   
 
The sample log-likelihood (see Battese and Coelli (1992)) is maximized relative to 
and a parameter which equals . is a measure of the relative 
contribution of the inefficiency component  to the volatility of the whole . 
 
At last, we infer the expected (conditional) ûi,t value for ui,t from the estimated  and the 
conditional distribution of ui,t given i,t. The managerial efficiency of bank i at time t is then 
computed as: 
Efficiencyit = 
 
(1.17) 
 
whose values lie between zero, for the less efficient banks, and one for the perfectly efficient 
ones.  
We are now able to empirically compute a measure of bank’s relative efficiency in terms of 
risk and return. 
 
1.3. Empirical approach 
In this section, we present the sample and the data used in this study as well as the variables 
used in order to estimate the risk-return efficiency. 
1.3.1. Data and sample characteristics 
Our study focuses on European listed 16  banks for which we have extracted consolidated 
financial statements from Fitch IBCA Bankscope database between 1998 and 2011. This 
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 We only include European listed (or delisted) banks to select an homogeneous sample of banks that allows us 
to estimate a common best-practice frontier and to extract a measure of each bank relative efficiency that is not 
affected by sample heterogeneity (Bos et al. (2009)). As robustness check, we still account for potential 
differences in environments among European countries by incorporating in the frontier equation a vector of 
i,tu
2
uσ
+
ui,tu N (0,σ )
2 2
v uα, β, (σ +σ ) γ
2
u
2 2
v u
σ
(σ +σ )
i,tu i,t
i,tˆ
itˆ-ue
Chapter 1 - Risk-return efficiency of European listed banks 
22 
database reports annual balance sheets and income statements for 377 banks from the 
following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. As 
we are looking for systematic differences among banks characteristics, we do not impose a 
restriction on banks specialization and include either listed or delisted banks. For these banks, 
we also collect daily market data, necessary to compute market-based indicators, and board 
structure data from the Bloomberg database. To accurately estimate the annual frontier’s 
parameters, a 5-year period of observations, [t-4; t], is required. We thus obtain a first risk-
return frontier in 2002. By limiting the sample to banks for which we are able to estimate their 
efficiency for at least one year, and after cleaning bank production variables from outliers, we 
are left with a final sample of 192 banks from 2002 to 2011. This period includes the financial 
crisis, which goes from 2007 to 2009. See Appendix 1.2 for some general descriptive statistics 
of the sample. 
Table 1.1 reports some general characteristics of our sample. The number of banks lightly 
varies among the first years. Yet, a large proportion of those 192 banks are present from 2007 
to 2011. Italian (16%) and French (15%) banks are predominant17 in our sample. Our set of 
banks is mainly composed of commercial banks (43%). It also includes cooperative banks 
(14%), bank holding companies (13%) and saving banks (12%). The set is composed of 143 
listed banks and 49 delisted banks.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
variables that capture banks’ country-specific environmental conditions (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), 
Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002)). 
17
 The low number of UK banks is due to a lack of data that prevent us to estimate risk-return efficiency for most 
of them. 
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Table 1.1: Distribution of banks 
This table reports the distribution of the 192 banks by year, country and bank type. 
By year 
Number of banks  
(Number of listed) 
Percentage 
2002 76 (55) 7.59 
2003 83 (61) 8.29 
2004 81 (59) 8.09 
2005 77 (57) 7.69 
2006 78 (55) 7.79 
2007 97 (77) 9.69 
2008 123 (102) 12.29 
2009 150 (117) 14.99 
2010 147 (114) 14.69 
2011 89 (74) 8.89 
By country  
Austria 12 (8) 6.25 
Belgium 2 (1) 1.04 
Denmark 17 (10) 8.85 
Finland 3 (3) 1.56 
France 28 (20) 14.58 
Germany 15 (10) 7.81 
Greece 10 (9) 5.21 
Ireland 4 (2) 2.08 
Italy 30 (22) 15.63 
Netherlands 6 (4) 3.13 
Norway 19 (17) 9.90 
Portugal 5 (3) 2.60 
Spain 9 (6) 4.69 
Sweden 7 (7) 3.65 
Switzerland 14 (13) 7.29 
United Kingdom 11 (8) 5.73 
By type  
Commercial banks  82 (58) 42.71 
Cooperative banks  26 (23) 13.54 
Bank holding and bank holding companies  25 (21) 13.02 
Saving banks  24 (20) 12.05 
Investment banks  9 (6) 4.69 
Real estate and mortgage banks  7 (7) 3.65 
Other non-banking credit institutions  7 (6) 3.65 
Private banking and asset mortgage companies 6 (3) 3.13 
Specialized Governmental Credit Institution 6 (6) 3.13 
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1.3.2. Bank production variables 
We assume that banks use three different inputs (x): x1, the amount of fixed assets, x2, the 
number of employees18, and x3, the sum of deposits
19, short term funding (i.e. total customer 
deposits, deposits from banks, other deposits and short term borrowings) and long term 
funding. Their prices are respectively w1, other operating expenses to fixed assets, w2, the 
amount of annual wages per employee, and w3, interest expenses to the amount of deposits 
and borrowed funds. We include two outputs (y): y1, the amount of gross loans, and y2, the 
amount of other earnings assets. The related prices are respectively proxied by p1, the ratio of 
interest income on loans to gross loans, and p2, the sum of other interest income and net gains 
and losses on other activities to the amount of other earnings assets.  
As a measure of assets quality, we consider the amount of loan loss provisions (n). We also 
include the amount of total equity (k). As non-asset based income, we consider the total of 
bank fees (m). To estimate the price of after tax-profit, we use countries’ taxes on income, 
profits and capital gains (t) supplied by the World Bank Database. As a risk-free rate, we use 
the 3-month Treasury bond rate and, if not available, we consider the one with the shortest 
maturity available. A summary 20  and some descriptive statistics of these variables are 
presented in Appendix 1.3. 
 
1.3.3. Estimating risk-return efficiency 
In a first step, we estimate expected return and risk. We establish a demand system made of 
the profit share equation (eq. 1.11), the input share equation (eq. 1.12) and the equation that 
assesses the optimality of equity capital (eq. 1.13). Given the values of previous variables 
relative to each date and each bank, we estimate, for each year, the vector of the unknown 
coefficients of this system ( ), identical for all banks, by using nonlinear two-stage least 
squares over the 1998-2011 period. We then estimate an expected return and risk for each 
                                                     
18
 Bankscope does not provide the information each year for this variable. We assume that the number of 
employees is relatively stable over time. We can obtain a value for each year by interpolation and extrapolation 
using personal expenses, a highly correlated variable. To check whether this process affects the results, we 
estimate the expected return and risk on the original series of employees. Results remain the same.  
19
 We follow the suggestion of Hughes and Mester (1993) to include bank deposits as an input of bank 
production. 
20
 We remove the outliers of production variables. As robustness, we estimate the expected return and risk 
without dropping these outliers. We also use different risk-free rates or tax profit rates, include 3 outputs 
(derivatives and remaining earnings assets are associated with previous outputs), or finally use the OLS method 
to estimate the system. Overall the resulting measures are consistent with our main estimation.  
tβˆ
Chapter 1 - Risk-return efficiency of European listed banks 
25 
bank and each year21. The expected return on equity (eq. 1.14) comes from the estimated 
profit share while risk is the standard deviation of the estimated return (eq. 1.15). These 
measures reflect what level of return managers can expect and the associated risk relative to 
their portfolio decisions. 
In a second step we estimate the best-practice risk-return frontier which prevails for each year. 
To this end, expected return and risk variables have been rescaled with regard to their sample 
standard deviation as in Hughes et al. (1996) or DeYoung et al. (2001). The frontier equation 
is specified by equation 1.16. We estimate the frontier for each year based on a 5-year rolling 
window22 to compute the yearly risk-return efficiency measure. Using a frontier estimated 
over the complete period would unsuitably suggest that the future information is known when 
we evaluate bank efficiency at time t23. Starting in 2002 and on the set of 192 banks, we 
estimate24 the frontier parameter values by maximizing the log-likelihood associated to the 
model. Residuals  are computed accordingly. Each estimated best-practice frontier is 
graphically represented in Appendix 1.4. 
Finally the risk-return efficiency measure is estimated. As explained before, the residuals 
measure the distance from a risk-return combination to the best-practice frontier. This 
deviation from the optimal frontier may be due to mismanagement and/or an external positive 
or negative event25. The SFA model allows to disentangle suitably the residuals and isolates 
the inefficiency component, ûi,t. The time dependent related efficiency score (eq. 1.17) varies 
in the range of 0 (the worst banks on an efficiency point of view) to 1 (the most efficient 
banks). This efficiency score is computed for each bank at each date over the 2002 – 2011 
period. 
  
                                                     
21
 We clean return and risk measures by removing some outliers’ observations which wrongly drive the frontier 
estimate.  
22
 For robustness check, we also compute a BPFt computed using all the information available prior time t.  We 
present it later. 
23
 For robustness check, we estimate the efficiency relative to a single best practice frontier over the whole 
sample. 
24
 We used the SFA function of the R - FRONTIER package to implement this estimation. 
25
 In some cases, some risk-return points can overtake the frontier when random component of the error term 
cancels out (even exceeds) the inefficiency one. 
i,tˆ
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1.4. Are there really inefficient banks? 
The first objective of this section is to ensure that, at least, some banks are poorly managed, 
that is, there are some risk/return combinations which actually locate below the BPF because 
they are really inefficient. Furthermore, we wonder about the dispersion degree of the 
efficiency scores through banks. The second objective is then to check that the distribution of 
the efficiency measure is heterogeneous. At last, as efficiency scores have to be estimated, 
banks' ranking relative to these estimated scores may be influenced by our econometric 
choices related to the estimation method, the profile of the BPF or the estimation sample. 
Accordingly, we will test for the robustness of banks' efficiency ranking with regards to these 
econometric choices. 
1.4.1. Does inefficiency matter? 
Table 1.2 produces the estimates of each BPFt, from t = 2002 to 2011. It should be reminded 
that the BPF, on the basis of which we assess bank inefficiency at time t, is estimated on a 
five-year sample [t-4, t]. Column 1 describes these samples. Column 2 gives the number of 
risk-return observations of the relevant sample. Column 3 provides the estimates of the 
efficient frontier parameters. Overall, the estimated frontier parameters are relatively stable 
over time: risk affects positively and significantly the expected return. This result is consistent 
with the theory suggesting that to reach a higher return, taking a higher risk is needed, 
regardless of the economic environment. We report in column 4 the estimated values of the 
variance of the inefficiency term while, in column 5, we focus on the parameter γ computed 
for each equation. This parameter is calculated as the ratio of the inefficiency component 
variance to the variance of the whole error term: this parameter measures the relative 
contribution of the inefficiency component to the total volatility i.e. the part of the deviation 
to the BPF due to banks’ mismanagement. This parameter is significant for each frontier 
estimates with values between 0.47 and 0.75: inefficiency explains at least 50% of the sub-
optimality of banks’ expected risk-return choices. A large part of total volatility is then 
attributed to inefficiency. The stochastic part matters for at least 25%, which suggests that 
using a stochastic frontier method is relevant. Consequently, our results are in favor of the 
effectiveness of risk/return inefficiencies.  
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Table 1.2: Estimated frontiers 
This table presents the estimates of each best practice frontiers from 2002 to 2011. ER is the expected return and 
RK, the risk.   
  is the variance of the inefficiency component.   is defined as the ratio of the variance of the 
inefficiency term to the variance of the error term. 
Years Nb. Obs. Frontier equation   
   
1998 - 2002 180 
ER = 3.06
***
 + 0.06.RK 
(0.00)         (0.41) 
1.89
***
 
(0.00) 
0.75
***
 
(0.00) 
1999 - 2003 263 
ER = 2.94
***
 + 0.13
**.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.03) 
1.66
***
 
(0.00) 
0.64
***
 
(0.00) 
2000 - 2004 344 
ER = 2.89
***
 + 0.16
***.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
1.61
***
 
(0.00) 
0.62
***
 
(0.00) 
2001 - 2005 383 
ER = 2.81
***
 + 0.25
***
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
1.48
***
 
(0.00) 
0.57
***
 
(0.00) 
2002 - 2006 395 
ER = 2.91
***
 + 0.24
***.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
1.45
***
 
(0.00) 
0.54
***
 
(0.00) 
2003 - 2007 416 
ER = 3.17
***
 + 0.19
***.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
1.54
***
 
(0.00) 
0.58
***
 
(0.00) 
2004 - 2008 456 
ER = 3.24
***
 + 0.17
***.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
1.84
***
 
(0.00) 
0.74
***
 
(0.00) 
2005 - 2009 525 
ER = 2.99
***
 + 0.20
***.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
1.81
***
 
(0.00) 
0.73
***
 
(0.00) 
2006 - 2010 595 
ER = 2.67
***
 + 0.24
***.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
1.41
***
 
(0.00) 
0.52
***
 
(0.00) 
2007 - 2011 606 
ER= 2.57
***
 + 0.20
***.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
1.37
***
 
(0.00) 
0.47
***
 
(0.00) 
 
1.4.2. Distribution of the efficiency measure 
Figure 1.1 represents the distribution of the efficiency measure over the whole period. Table 
1.3, which reports the descriptive statistics of the efficiency measure on the same period, 
shows that the absolute range of the distribution is large as it goes from 0.022 to 0.841. 
However, there are a few observations in the left tail of the distribution. Most of observations 
(70%) are indeed located around the mean efficiency value, 0.506, and the relatively low 
standard deviation (0.135) supports this finding. These results give first insights to confirm 
that some banks lie further below the best practice frontier
26
 and underline a relative 
difference in the efficiency of risk-return choices made by European banks. To go deeper in 
the description of the risk-return efficiency of European banks, we provide the mean 
efficiency scores for each country and bank type.   
  
                                                     
26
 A mean efficiency value close to one would suggest that the majority of banks is located near the best practice 
frontier. 
γ
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Figure 1.1: Histogram of the efficiency measure 
This figure shows the histogram of the efficiency measure on the whole sample. 
 
 
Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics of the efficiency measure 
This table reports the main descriptive statistics of the efficiency measure on the whole sample. 
 Efficiency measure 
Mean 0.506 
Median 0.525 
Standard Deviation 0.143 
Minimum 0.022 
Maximum 0.841 
Number of observations 1,001 
 
 
Table 1.4 shows in the first part the distribution of efficiency by country. We perform a test of 
the null H0 "there is no differences in the average efficiency whatever the country". This test 
concludes in favor of the alternative: on average, efficiency is different across countries. 
Germany appears as the less performing country as regards to the mean of risk-return 
efficiency. A closer look actually shows a high dispersion which underlines different level of 
risk-return efficiency in the country. 
We then focus on the relative performance of banks in terms of risk-return efficiency 
according to their specialization in the second part of Table 1.4. As banks are organized in a 
number of different ways, their efficiency may differ according to their ownership structure 
(Altunbas et al. (2001a)). Empirically, evidences are mixed. Studies on cost efficiency show 
that cooperative and saving banks have a cost efficiency advantage relative to commercial 
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ones (see for instance Altunbas et al. (2001a), Weill (2004), Mamatzakis et al. (2008)). Petey 
(2004) underlines that cooperatives banks are better in their risk-return choices than savings 
banks which are in turn better than commercials ones. Subject to moral hazard incentives, 
private commercial banks tend to operate in the interests of their shareholders and might be 
expected to take greater risks than savings and cooperative banks. Because of their 
unconventional organizational design, savings and cooperative banks rely primarily on retail 
and small customers who have interests in keeping them safe and may exert a discipline by 
withdrawing funds with evidence of managerial inefficiency (Altunbas et al. (2001a)).  
We perform a test of the null H0 "there is no differences in the average efficiency whatever 
the banks specialty" which concludes in favor of the alternative: on average, efficiency is 
different across different types of banks. This result confirms that banks' face a different level 
of risk-return efficiency according to their organizational forms. We conclude to a lower 
mean risk-return efficiency for commercial banks compared to saving ones but, contrary to 
the findings of Petey (2004), commercial and cooperative banks display a rather similar mean 
efficiency. This result is in line with the findings of Iannotta et al. (2007) who highlight that 
European mutual banks behave likewise private banks in terms of risk and operating costs 
because mutual banks become increasingly involved in the same range of activities of any 
private banks.  
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Table 1.4: Distribution of the efficiency measure 
This table reports the distribution of the efficiency measure by country and bank type. T-stat is the Student 
statistic for H0: "the mean of efficiency is the same for all banks". 
***
indicate significance at the 1% level. 
By country 
N. of 
banks 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Austria 12 0.472 0.120 0.152 0.664 
Belgium 2 0.640 0.121 0.404 0.812 
Denmark 17 0.487 0.110 0.200 0.656 
Finland 3 0.533 0.101 0.373 0.710 
France 28 0.460 0.128 0.062 0.842 
Germany 15 0.398 0.186 0.022 0.788 
Greece 10 0.521 0.133 0.222 0.734 
Ireland 4 0.531 0.186 0.253 0.792 
Italy 30 0.504 0.137 0.069 0.719 
Netherlands 6 0.526 0.186 0.153 0.740 
Norway 19 0.571 0.097 0.276 0.765 
Portugal 5 0.592 0.115 0.266 0.761 
Spain 9 0.574 0.104 0.354 0.779 
Sweden 7 0.522 0.129 0.083 0.729 
Switzerland 14 0.488 0.122 0.046 0.744 
United Kingdom 11 0.538 0.166 0.077 0.802 
T-Stat 10.387
***
    
   
  
By type     
Commercial banks  82 0.506 0.148 0.038 0.813 
Cooperative banks  26 0.492 0.106 0.242 0.762 
Bank holding and bank holding companies  25 0.519 0.161 0.044 0.765 
Saving banks  24 0.555 0.108 0.221 0.758 
Investment banks  9 0.453 0.148 0.111 0.802 
Real estate and mortgage banks  7 0.504 0.191 0.022 0.842 
Other non-banking credit institutions  7 0.466 0.168 0.202 0.708 
Private banking and asset mortgage companies 6 0.444 0.151 0.119 0.710 
Specialized Governmental Credit Institution 6 0.498 0.076 0.345 0.664 
T-Stat 5.141
***
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1.4.3. Are banks’ rankings correlated across efficiency methods? 
Efficiency measures may significantly vary according to different econometric alternatives. 
Correlatively, these econometric choices possibly impact banks' efficiency ranking. Hence, 
we now test for the robustness of our banks' efficiency ranking whatever are these 
econometric choices. 
1.4.3.1. Stability relative to the frontier estimation 
We check, at first, whether efficiency ranking is affected by the estimation of the BPF, i.e. we 
control for the choice we made to estimate a time dependent frontier based on a 5-year rolling 
window. We now compute the efficiency scores for each year relative to a single BPF 
computed on all available observations over the complete period 1998-2011 (see Koetter 
(2006), Petey (2004)). The induced banks' efficiency ranking is referred as "SINGLE" in 
tables 1.5 to 1.7. Also, we compute the efficiency scores for each year t relative to a BPF 
estimated on a growing sample of observations, i.e. a window [1998, t] and the relating 
ranking is "PAST" in tables 1.5 to 1.7. 
 
1.4.3.2. Stability relative to the frontier specification 
We check now for the neutrality of our linearity choice relating to the BPF design on banks' 
efficiency ranking. Papers such as Hughes et al. (1996) or DeYoung et al. (2001), assume that 
the risk-return frontier is not linear, underlying that risk positively affects bank expected 
return but at a decreasing rate. Accordingly, while remaining within the SFA methodology, 
we also estimate an alternative frontier specified as: 
2
1 2i,t i,t i,t i,tER =α + β RK +β RK + ε
 
(1.18) 
 with:   
The relevant ranking is referred as "NON-LINEAR" in tables 1.5 to 1.7. 
 
1.4.3.3. Stability relative to the frontier model 
Previous articles compare the SFA and the DEA approaches of the BPF (see Koetter et al. 
(2006) or Weill (2004)). Some of them give advantages to the DEA as such a method does not 
require any assumption about the functional form of the frontier or the error distribution. We 
then use, as an alternate choice, a DEA model to assess efficiency scores and "DEA" ranking 
in tables 1.5 to 1.7.  
i,t i,t i,tu   
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Until now, the estimation of the efficiency rests on some homogeneity hypothesis and we do 
not consider banks heterogeneity across countries or specialties. However, Mester (1997) 
underlines that banks could operate in different market or institutional contexts; in that way, 
the efficiency scores would be estimated on the basis of specific best-practice frontiers and 
not a common one. Consequently, we have to check whether our approach fits well across 
heterogeneous markets. To take into account heterogeneity, we estimate alternately the 
efficiency scores according to Battese and Coelli (1995)
27
 and we use country dummies 
variables, bank size and a measure of each country’s economic cycle to model the inefficiency 
error differently (HETEROGENEITY ranking in tables 1.5 to 1.7).  
 
1.4.3.4. Comparison between efficiency methods  
Table 1.5 gives the main descriptive statistics, the variance of the inefficiency component and 
the parameter γ28 for each alternative econometric choice. Table 1.6 provides the results of 
tests of mean equality which compare the mean value of risk-return efficiency of the main 
method with those of alternative ones.  
First, whatever the measure, the contribution of the inefficiency component is about 50 % of 
the total volatility of the error term. Regardless of the sample definition, the frontier 
estimation, specification or model, this parameter indicates that inefficiency always matters in 
our sample of banks.  
Second, when the efficiency is estimated on a growing sample or when the efficient frontier is 
assumed to not be linear, tests of mean equality underline that both mean values of risk-return 
efficiency are similar with the main estimation. This result suggests that the efficiency 
measure is not affected either when the specification of the frontier is different or when we 
consider all the past information available at time t to compute the frontier. 
Third, when we measure the risk-return efficiency relative to a single BPF computed on all 
the whole sample, results show a higher average efficiency. This estimation inherently 
assumes that ex-post information is known at time t and that the shape of the frontier is the 
same for each year. Presumably, this choice of a fixed frontier leads to overestimate the 
                                                     
27
 The Battese and Coelli (1995) model extends the Battese and Coelli (1992) one by expressing the one-sided 
inefficiency error component (     as a linear function of explanatory variables that reflects banks and countries 
specific characteristics. 
28
 To only get one value by measure, we compute the mean value of this parameter through years.  
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efficiency of banks because, although relatively stable, the shape of the frontier varies each 
year as we underlined in the main estimation. 
Four, mean levels of efficiency turn out to be lower with the DEA method or when we 
account for heterogeneity. In the DEA method case, this result is in line with previous 
findings in literature. Studies generally find that nonparametric methods yields relatively low 
efficiencies scores compare to parametric ones (see Weill (2004) or Koetter et al. (2006) for a 
review of these studies). Indeed, this DEA approach tends to overestimate bank inefficiencies 
and dispersion in the data as it may falsely count as inefficiency, differences resulting from a 
random shock (Berger and Humphrey (1997)).  
While we estimate alternately the efficiency scores taking into account heterogeneous 
environments, we suggest that some of the deviation from the best practice frontier may be 
due to heterogeneity across banking or environmental specificities. The resulting lower mean 
efficiency suggests that some deviations may be then identified as efficiency by the main 
method whereas they may actually reflect systematic differences. Accordingly, Bos et al. 
(2005) find that accounting for heterogeneity affects mean efficiency estimates leading 
notably to lower mean cost efficiency. Our result in terms of risk-return efficiency confirms 
this finding.  
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Table 1.5: Descriptive statistics for alternative methods of efficiency estimates 
This table provides general descriptive statistics on alternative methods to estimate bank efficiency.   
  is the 
variance of the inefficiency component. γ is the part of the variance of the inefficiency term to the variance of the 
error term. We compute the mean value of this parameter through years. "SINGLE" is the efficiency ranking 
related to a unique frontier. "PAST" refers to an efficiency score estimated per year, with a frontier based on all 
the past available information. "NON-LINEAR" refers to the introduction of a squared risk term into the 
equation of the best practice frontier. "DEA" is the ranking involved by a DEA model. "HETEROGENEITY" 
takes into account countries’ specificities, bank size and countries’ business cycle.  
 Mean Min Max Std Dev   
  Mean γ N 
A. Frontier estimation        
SINGLE 0.582 0.118 0.831 0.107 1.364 0.473 1,001 
PAST 0.510 0.047 0.830 0.129 1.574 0.598 996 
B. Frontier specification        
NON-LINEAR 0.507 0.040 0.835 0.132 1.586 0.627 996 
C. Frontier model        
DEA 0.492 0.000 1.000 0.207 - - 996 
HETEROGENEITY 0.347 0.003 1.000 0.216 0.780 0.565 1,001 
 
 
Table 1.6: Test of mean equality for alternative methods of efficiency estimates 
This table compares the mean values of risk-return efficiency between our main measure and the alternate ones. 
"MAIN" refers to our baseline estimation of bank efficiency. "SINGLE" is the efficiency ranking related to a 
unique frontier. "PAST" refers to an efficiency score estimated per year, with a frontier based on all the past 
available information. "NON-LINEAR" refers to the introduction of a squared risk term into the equation of the 
best practice frontier. "DEA" is the ranking involved by a DEA model. "HETEROGENEITY" takes into account 
countries’ specificities, bank size and countries’ business cycle. 
***.**.*
 indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 levels respectively. T-stat is the Student statistic for H0: "The 
mean value of efficiency is the same between our main measure and the alternate ones". 
Alternative methods 
T-Stat  
MAIN vs Alternative methods 
SINGLE  13.54
***
 
PAST  0.665 
NON-LINEAR  0.507 
DEA  -1.75
*
 
HETEROGENEITY  -19.43
***
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Despite a substantial amount of research, there is no consensus on the best method for 
measuring the efficient frontier (Bauer et al. (1998)). We cannot claim that one of the 
alternative measure prevails as the true level of banks' inefficiency cannot be observed. 
However, the efficiency measure derived from each approach should give consistent results in 
terms of banks' rank-order. Although efficiency levels may vary between alternative methods, 
these ones then should generate similar efficiency rankings of banks as they measure the same 
managerial ability. According to Bauer et al. (1998), if using alternative methods rank 
institutions differently then policy implications, conditional on the method employed, may be 
fragile. The stability of ranking of banks is then even more important for regulatory policy 
decisions than the absolute level of efficiency. 
Hence, we test for the null of no correlation between our main ranking and the alternate ones 
involved by different econometric choices. Table 1.7 provides the Spearman’s rank-order 
correlation between this main ranking ("MAIN") and the alternate ones over the whole period. 
All these rank correlations are positive and strongly significant. Efficiency rankings are quite 
similar across methods. Yet, this table further reveals that these rankings are slightly affected 
when we account for heterogeneity. Indeed, the inclusion of banking and environmental 
specificities leads to a decline of rank order correlation to 70% which suggests that a portion 
of banks are ranked differently. 
Moreover, the statistically significant correlation of 0.82 between the main measure and the 
DEA method is particularly interesting. This result suggests that parametric and non 
parametric methods rank banks similarly according to their level of risk-return efficiency 
while previous studies mostly report an insignificant or very weak correlation (Ferrier and 
Lovell (1990)), Sheldon (1994), Bauer et al. (1998), Weill (2004), Koetter et al. (2006)). This 
result is thus in line with the few European studies which find that both SFA and DEA 
methods rank banks similarly e.g. Resti (1997) who focus on the cost-efficiency of Italian 
banks.  
Overall, each method ranks banks approximately in the same order. Then we conclude in 
favor of the robustness of our main ranking as to the alternate econometric choices. 
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Table 1.7: Banks' efficiency ranking and econometric choices: some robustness checks  
This table shows the rank-order correlation between our banks' efficiency main ranking and the alternate ones. 
"MAIN" refers to our baseline estimation of bank efficiency. "SINGLE" is the efficiency ranking related to a 
unique frontier. "PAST" refers to an efficiency score estimated per year, with a frontier based on all the past 
available information. "NON-LINEAR" refers to the introduction of a squared risk term into the equation of the 
best practice frontier. "DEA" is the ranking involved by a DEA model. "HETEROGENEITY" takes into account 
countries’ specificities, bank size and countries’ business cycle. 
 
MAIN 
MAIN  1.00 
SINGLE  0.89 
PAST  0.99 
NON-LINEAR  0.99 
DEA  0.82 
HETEROGENEITY  0.70 
 
1.5. Is bank efficiency stable? 
According to Bauer et al. (1998), a relative stability over time of banks’ efficiency is needed 
for regulatory policy objectives. The financial crisis may have altered banks’ efficiency 
ranking, and the ability of some banks to manage risk suitably may have been impacted by the 
turmoil. In this section, we determine the year-to-year stability of banks’ efficiency ranking 
and analyze the evolution of efficiency through years to observe whether the less efficient 
(resp. most efficient) banks remain inefficient (efficient) before, during and after the financial 
crisis period. 
1.5.1. Stability over time of banks’ efficiency ranking 
Table 1.8 provides the Spearman rank-order correlations between the efficiency rankings 
relative to each couple of years. In the short term, these correlations appear to be positive and 
significant. The rankings are highly correlated year-to-year and exhibit few changes from one 
year to another. This finding suggests that efficiency measure is quite stable in the short run. 
This is consistent with Koetter et al. (2006) which find a similar result in the case of German 
banks. In the same way, Berger and Humphrey (1997) highlight that efficiency is reasonably 
persistent. However, we observe a decline in correlation coefficients over time along with 
their significance. An efficient (inefficient) bank at time t is not necessarily efficient 
(inefficient) at t + k if k is large. These results suggest a change in banks’ efficiency ranking 
in the long term, in particular after the financial crisis. 
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Table 1.8: Rank-order correlations of efficiency through years 
This table produces the Spearman rank-order correlation of efficiency rankings between each couple of years, from 2002 to 2011.  
***.**.*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
2002  1.00 
         
2003  0.72
***
 1.00 
        
2004  0.64
***
 0.70
***
 1.00 
       
2005  0.39
***
 0.45
***
 0.76
***
 1.00 
      
2006  0.47
***
 0.30
***
 0.59
***
 0.71
***
 1.00 
     
2007  0.49
***
 0.64
***
 0.32
***
 0.44
***
 0.74
***
 1.00 
    
2008  0.53
***
 0.52
***
 0.36
***
 0.47
***
 0.67
***
 0.77
***
 1.00 
   
2009  0.42
***
 0.51
***
 0.35
***
 0.41
***
 0.50
***
 0.61
***
 0.79
***
 1.00 
  
2010  0.25
*
 0.35
**
 0.35
***
 0.54
***
 0.57
***
 0.59
***
 0.58
***
 0.65
***
 1.00 
 
2011  0.12 0.43
**
 0.10 -0.02 -0.15 0.32
**
 0.35
**
 0.70
***
 0.83
***
 1.00 
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1.5.2. Level of banks’ efficiency before, during and after the financial 
crisis period 
Figure 1.2 produces the evolution of efficiency through years. We distinguish 3 periods of 
time29: before the financial crisis (2002-2006), the financial crisis (2007-2009) and after the 
financial crisis (2010-2011). This graph confirms that efficiency level is relatively stable 
around the value of 0.50 before and after the financial crisis. However, during the financial 
crisis, the mean efficiency substantially decreased while the standard deviation increased. The 
spread between maximum and minimum is also much more important as some banks 
underperform during this period reaching a very low level of efficiency.  
These assessments raise several questions about the evolution of banks’ efficiency ranking 
through years and especially about the ranking of extreme performers. Do the most (less) 
efficient banks before the crisis period maintain their ranking during and after the crisis 
period? Symmetrically, did the most (less) efficient banks after the crisis period already 
belong to the most (less) efficient group before and during the financial crisis? Are the most 
(less) efficient banks during the crisis period over-performed (under-performed) on the other 
subsamples?   
                                                     
29
 According to the definition provided by the Bank of International Settlements, the financial crisis period goes 
from 2007 to 2009 (Bank of International Settlements (2010a)). We hence define the period ranging from 2002 
to 2006 as before the financial crisis and the period ranging from 2010 to 2011 as after the financial crisis. Even 
if we mainly focus on the financial crisis because of its impact on the banking sector, the “after the financial 
crisis” period should not be assimilated to a sound period as the European debt crisis started to affect some of 
European countries from late 2009 (see Banque de France (2012)).  
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Figure 1.2: Mean efficiency per year 
This figure shows the evolution of efficiency measure through the maximum value (■), the minimum value (▲) 
and the mean value (♦) for each year. Sticks around the mean curve represent the standard deviation of 
efficiency. Before refers to the 2002-2006 period, Crisis to the 2007-2009 period and After to the 2010-2011 
period.  
 
 
 
1.5.3. Did the financial crisis affect banks’ efficiency ranking? 
For each sub-period (before, during and after crisis), we compute the mean of the efficiency 
score for each bank. Then, for each sub-period, banks are ranked among the different deciles 
of the efficiency score distribution. The two first (resp. last) deciles identify the less (resp. 
most) efficient banks for a given sub-period30. We wonder now whether the most (or less) 
efficient banks match through the different sub-periods. 
 
                                                     
30
 We made the same investigation by either using banks located on the 10th decile or banks that belong to the 
8
th
, 9
th
 or 10
th
 deciles. We apply the same logic for the group of the less efficient banks. Results are similar.  
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1.5.3.1. Re-distribution during and after the crisis of the most (less) efficient 
banks before the crisis period 
Table 1.9 displays the re-distribution during and after the crisis period of those banks which 
were ranked as most (or less) efficient banks before the crisis period. On the upper (lower) 
part of the table, we focus on the group of most (less) efficient banks before the crisis period 
and investigate how these banks are ranked on the following periods. 
This table shows that 50% of the most efficient banks before the crisis still belongs to the 
most efficient group during the crisis period. Equally, around 50% of the most efficient banks 
before the crisis are listed among the most efficient after the crisis period. Overall, a large part 
of banks formerly ranked in the top two deciles before the financial crisis are able to maintain 
their ranking on the following periods. But around 10% of banks that were previously best 
performers are re-ranked as less efficient after the crisis period. These banks experienced a 
decline in their relative level of efficiency through years so that they are now listed in the 
group of less efficient banks during the most recent period.  
However, none of the less efficient banks before the crisis has been able to improve its 
ranking to integrate the group of the most efficient during and after the crisis. They manage to 
reach the 6
th
 decile during the crisis and the 8
th
 after. Yet, only 37% of the less efficient banks 
before the crisis are re-ranked in this same group after the crisis. A large part of the worst 
performing banks has been able to improve their ranking through time.   
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Table 1.9: Re-distribution during and after the crisis of most and less efficient banks 
before the crisis period 
This table displays the re-distribution during the crisis period (2007-2009) and after (2010-2011) of the most and 
less efficient banks before the crisis period (2002-2006). For each sub-period, those banks which belong to the 
9
th
 and 10
th
 deciles are considered as the most efficient whereas banks in the 1
st
 and 2
nd
deciles are considered as 
the less efficient ones. The upper (lower) part of the table focuses on the group of most (less) efficient banks 
before the crisis period and indicates what percentage of this group of banks is re-located in each decile of the 
following periods. 
Subsample: The 20% most efficient banks before the crisis period  
 
 
During the crisis After the crisis 
Less efficient 
1
st
 decile 0.00 % 10.53 % 
2
nd
 decile 0.00 % 0.00 % 
 3
rd
 decile 0.00 % 0.00 % 
 4
th
 decile 15.00 % 5.26 % 
 5
th
 decile 0.00 % 10.53 % 
 6
th
 decile 5.00 % 5.26 % 
 7
th
 decile 10.00 % 15.79 % 
 8
th
 decile 20.00 % 5.26 % 
Most efficient 
9
th
 decile 30.00 %* 26.32 % 
10
th
 decile 20.00 %* 21.05 % 
*These figures show that 50% (30%+20%) of the most efficient banks before the crisis period still 
belongs to the group of the most efficient banks during the crisis period. 
 
Subsample: The 20% less efficient banks before the crisis period  
 
 
During the crisis After the crisis 
Less efficient 
1
st
 decile 25.00%* 12.50% 
2
nd
 decile 18.75%* 25.00% 
 3
rd
 decile 25.00% 12.50% 
 4
th
 decile 18.75% 18.75% 
 5
th
 decile 6.25% 12.50% 
 6
th
 decile 6.25% 6.25% 
 7
th
 decile 0.00% 6.25% 
 8
th
 decile 0.00% 6.25% 
Most efficient 
9
th
 decile 0.00% 0.00% 
10
th
 decile 0.00% 0.00% 
*These figures show that 43.75% (25%+18.75%) of the less efficient banks before the crisis period 
still belongs to the group of the less efficient banks during the crisis period. 
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1.5.3.2. Re-distribution before and after the crisis of the most and less efficient 
banks during the crisis period 
Table 1.10 shows the re-distribution before and after the crisis period of the most and less 
efficient banks during the crisis period. On the upper (lower) part of the table, we focus on the 
group of most (less) efficient banks during the crisis period and investigate how these banks 
are ranked on the previous and following periods.  
Half of the most efficient banks during the financial crisis are also identified as the most 
efficient ones before and after this period. Overall, the top performers in the crisis context 
were already well ranked before. Yet, after the crisis, the other half of most efficient banks 
during the crisis is spread all over subordinate deciles, and even 10% of these banks are 
downgraded towards the less efficient group (the first two deciles). 
Most of worst performing banks during the crisis period belonged to the same low-ranked 
deciles before or after the crisis. However, 4% of them overturn completely their ranking after 
the crisis period. 
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Table 1.10: Re-distribution before and after the crisis of most and less efficient banks 
during the crisis period 
This table displays the re-distribution before the crisis period (2002-2006) and after (2010-2011) of the most and 
less efficient banks during the crisis period (2007-2009). For each sub-period, those banks which belong to the 
9
th
 and 10
th
 deciles are considered as the most efficient whereas banks in the 1
st
 and 2
nd
deciles are considered as 
the less efficient ones. The upper (lower) part of the table focuses on the group of most (less) efficient banks 
before the crisis period and indicates what percentage of this group of banks is re-located in each decile of the 
previous and following periods. 
Subsample: The 20% most efficient banks during the crisis period  
 
 
Before the crisis After the crisis 
Less efficient 
1
st
 decile 0.00 % 6.45 % 
2
nd
 decile 0.00 % 3.23 % 
 3
rd
 decile 9.09 % 3.23 % 
 4
th
 decile 0.00 % 3.23 % 
 5
th
 decile 9.09 % 3.23 % 
 6
th
 decile 18.18 % 9.68 % 
 7
th
 decile 9.09 % 6.45 % 
 8
th
 decile 9.09 % 12.90 % 
Most efficient 
9
th
 decile 22.73 %* 19.35 % 
10
th
 decile 22.73 %* 32.26 % 
*These figures show that 45.46% (22.73%+22.73%) of the most efficient banks during the crisis were 
already identified as most efficient banks before the crisis period. 
 
Subsample: The 20% less efficient banks during the crisis period  
 
 
Before the crisis After the crisis 
Less efficient 
1
st
 decile 42.86 %* 32.00 % 
2
nd
 decile 7.14 %* 24.00 % 
 3
rd
 decile 7.14 % 12.00 % 
 4
th
 decile 21.43 % 0.00 % 
 5
th
 decile 7.14 % 12.00 % 
 6
th
 decile 0.00 % 8.00 % 
 7
th
 decile 0.00 % 8.00 % 
 8
th
 decile 14.29 % 0.00 % 
Most efficient 
9
th
 decile 0.00 % 4.00 % 
10
th
 decile 0.00 % 0.00 % 
*These figures show that 50% (42.86%+7.14%) of the less efficient banks during the crisis were 
already identified as less efficient banks before the crisis period. 
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1.5.3.3. Re-distribution before and during the crisis of the most and less 
efficient banks after the crisis period 
Table 1.11 reports the re-distribution before and during the crisis period of the most and less 
efficient banks after the crisis period. On the upper (lower) part of the table, we focus on the 
group of most (less) efficient banks after the crisis period and investigate how these banks 
were ranked across previous periods.  
We first wonder in which decile were previously located those banks which will be in the 
most efficient group after the crisis period. The results show that nearly 40% of them were 
ranked similarly before the crisis and, most importantly, 60% during the crisis. By 
considering the 8
th
 decile, 82% of the most efficient banks after the crisis were formerly 
ranked in the top three deciles during the crisis period. Overall, banks identified as the most 
efficient ones after the crisis period exhibited a comparable ranking during the crisis period.  
Half of the less efficient banks after the crisis period are also listed as the less efficient ones 
on previous periods. The results also shows that, among the less efficient banks after the 
crisis, 15.38% and 11% were respectively belonging to the group of the most efficient banks 
before and during the crisis. 
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Table 1.11: Re-distribution before and during the crisis of most and less efficient banks 
after the crisis period 
This table displays the re-distribution before the crisis period (2002-2006) and during (2007-2009) of the most 
and less efficient banks after the crisis period (2010-2011). For each sub-period, those banks which belong to the 
9
th
 and 10
th
 deciles are considered as the most efficient whereas banks in the 1
st
 and 2
nd
deciles are considered as 
the less efficient ones. The upper (lower) part of the table focuses on the group of most (less) efficient banks 
before the crisis period and indicates what percentage of this group of banks is re-located in each decile of the 
previous periods. 
Subsample: The 20% most efficient banks after the crisis period  
 
 
Before the crisis During the crisis 
Less efficient 
1
st
 decile 0.00 % 0.00 % 
2
nd
 decile 0.00 % 3.57 % 
 3
rd
 decile 9.09 % 0.00 % 
 4
th
 decile 9.09 % 0.00 % 
 5
th
 decile 4.55 % 3.57 % 
 6
th
 decile 13.64 % 3.57 % 
 7
th
 decile 4.55 % 7.14 % 
 8
th
 decile 18.18 % 25.00 % 
Most efficient 
9
th
 decile 22.73 %* 32.14 % 
10
th
 decile 18.18 %* 25.00 % 
*These figures show that 40.91% (22.73%+18.18%) of the most efficient banks after the crisis were 
already identified as the most efficient banks before the crisis period. 
 
Subsample: The 20% less efficient banks after the crisis period  
 
 
Before the crisis During the crisis 
Less efficient 
1
st
 decile 23.08%* 25.93% 
2
nd
 decile 23.08%* 25.93% 
 3
rd
 decile 7.69% 18.52% 
 4
th
 decile 15.38% 3.70% 
 5
th
 decile 0.00% 11.11% 
 6
th
 decile 0.00% 0.00% 
 7
th
 decile 0.00% 0.00% 
 8
th
 decile 15.38% 3.70% 
Most efficient 
9
th
 decile 7.69% 3.70% 
10
th
 decile 7.69% 7.41% 
*These figures show that 46.16% (23.08%+23.08%) of the less efficient banks after the crisis were 
already identified as the less efficient banks before the crisis period. 
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1.5.3.4. Summary 
The findings highlight that a large part of most efficient banks tend to stay in this group over 
the three periods while a small part of them are re-ranked as less efficient over time. 
Likewise, less efficient banks during the crisis kept their ranking after, strengthening the 
result of a stability of banks’ efficiency ranking for best and worst performers, especially in 
the short time. Nevertheless, a significant proportion of the less efficient banks at the 
beginning of the period improved their ranking later. 
Overall, the results imply that efficiency is quite stable over time, but there is also a 
possibility of risk-return efficiency improvement. This suggests that in the long term, there is 
no fate at being inefficient. 
 
1.6. Are there common banks’ characteristics depending on their level of 
efficiency? 
In this section, we try to determine the characteristics of efficient and inefficient banks in 
terms of activity, accounting or board structure indicators. 
1.6.1. Activity, accounting and board structure indicators 
1.6.1.1. Balance sheet and income statement indicators 
The objective is to identify how bank efficiency varies with several aspects of bank balance-
sheet and income statement. Empirical literature provides some evidences that bank efficiency 
is somehow related to bank's performance/profitability, level of capital, lending activities, 
size, risk-taking and solvency31 . Appendix 1.5 presents the descriptive statistics of these 
variables and Appendix 1.7 provides their correlations table. 
 
1.6.1.1.1. Performance and profitability 
Previous studies that have explored the relationship between bank efficiency and 
performance/profitability mostly find that more efficient banks are more profitable 
(displaying a higher return on equity or return on assets) and better control their costs (with a 
lower costs ratio) (Casu and Girardone (2004)). For instance, profit efficiency allows to 
                                                     
31
 The accounting measures come from Bankscope Database and the market ones from Bloomberg Database. 
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evaluate the overall performance of a firm. A firm that is relatively profit efficient maximizes 
its profit with paying attention to both cost minimization and revenue maximization 
objectives (see Berger and Mester (1997)). Profit efficient banks turn out to be more 
profitable and would appear as better managed. 
We then wonder whether more able managers in terms of risk-return efficiency are also more 
able to generate profits and to control their costs. To capture bank performance, we choose the 
cost to income ratio (CTIR) defined as the total of non-interest expenses to revenues. 
Profitability is measured by the return on average asset (ROA) that is the total operating 
income to total assets. 
 
1.6.1.1.2. Capital 
Previous studies highlight a positive relationship between bank efficiency and capital levels: 
more efficient banks tend to have higher capital ratios (Mester (1996), Kwan and Eisenbeis 
(1997), Fiordelisi et al. (2011)). Equity ratios, such as the equity to total asset ratio, reflect the 
degree to which shareholders have their own capital at risk in the bank and, therefore, their 
incentives to monitor bank management. Highly capitalized banks are then likely to be more 
efficient because they are more subject to shareholders' discipline (Eisenbeis et al. (1999), 
Casu and Girardone (2004)). 
To account for capital adequacy and leverage, we respectively consider the ratio of Tier 1 
capital divided by risk weighted assets (TIER1R) and the total equity to total asset ratio 
(EQTA). 
 
1.6.1.1.3. Lending activities 
Some papers highlight a relationship between banks lending activities and efficiency. On one 
hand, banks that are specialized in lending activities appear as more efficient as they have a 
comparative advantage in managing credit risk (Spong et al. (1995), Petey (2004), Casu and 
Girardone (2004)). On the other hand, banks may focus on traditional lending activities 
because managers are not able to diversify activities and fail to create new growth 
opportunities that make banks less efficient (Casu and Girardone (2004)). We then wonder 
whether the level of bank risk-return efficiency is related to the lending activities of banks. 
To address this question we consider the level of loans proxied by the ratio of net loans to 
total assets (NLTA). We also use the ratio of net interest income to total operating income 
(NIIOPINC) that indicates the share of banks’ traditional revenue. 
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1.6.1.1.4. Size 
Bank size is an important factor for banks that allows them to operate optimally by obtaining 
scale and scope economies. According to the literature the relationship between bank size and 
efficiency is ambiguous. First, more efficient banks are reported to be the largest ones; larger 
banks may choose product mixes that conduct to larger scope economies (Berger et al. 
(1993), Miller and Noulas (1996)). Second, more efficient banks may be the smallest ones; 
smaller banks are more focused on an specific activity that aware them some operational 
advantages and scale economies (De Young and Nolle (1996), Isik and Hassan (2002)). 
Studies such as Mester (1996) failed to find a relationship between bank size and efficiency.  
We examine whether the level of risk-return efficiency is related to the size of the bank by 
measuring bank size as bank total assets (TA). 
 
1.6.1.1.5. Risk 
The empirical literature mostly provides evidences that less efficient banks are also riskier 
(Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997), Williams (2004), Fiordelisi et al. (2011)). Poorly managed 
banks tend to make bad loans (Berger and DeYoung (1997)). They face higher costs because 
of an inefficient control of their operating expenses and an inadequate credit monitoring that 
lead them to take higher risks to compensate for the lost returns. This negative link between 
efficiency and risk - taking is referred by Berger and DeYoung (1997) as "bad management" 
hypothesis. Altunbas et al. (2007) fail to find a negative relationship between efficiency and 
risk-taking and conclude that inefficient banks tend to take on less risks in the short term. 
The objective is here to investigate whether the less (more) efficient banks in terms of 
expected risk-return have a level of effective risk higher (lower) than the one of more (less) 
efficient banks. We consider two indicators of banks risk-taking: credit risk, measured by 
banks’ provisions with the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans (LLPNL) and total bank 
risk (TRISK), proxied by the standard deviation of weekly bank stock returns computed on a 
moving window of 52 quoted weeks. 
 
1.6.1.1.6. Solvency 
Risk-return efficient banks should have a lower probability of experiencing financial distress 
(DeYoung et al. (2001), Petey (2004)). A relative risk-return inefficient bank fails to reach the 
optimal level of return and its level of risk-taking turns out to be excessive for its level of 
expected return. This excessive risk increases the level of bank default risk. Accordingly, we 
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expect that more risk-return efficient banks make a better risk-return trade-off that lead them 
to be more solvent. 
We measure bank solvency by using a market based Z-score (ZMKT) computed with a 
market measure of bank stock return and the previous total risk as (1 + average return) / 
TRISK. 
 
1.6.1.2. Board structure indicators 
In this section we wonder whether board structure in banks relates to risk-return efficiency. 
The board plays an important role in monitoring managers' behavior and decisions. Board 
members should have sufficient knowledge of the main bank's financial activities and 
independence to advise managers efficiently on strategy identification and implementation 
and to enable effective governance and oversight (Bank of International Settlements (2015)). 
Through internal risk governance mechanism, they would also monitor bank's managers risk-
taking to ensure that the risk management is consistent with the strategy and policies 
approved by the board and bank's risk appetite (Minton et al. (2014)). Previous studies that 
investigate the impact of board structure
32
 on bank performance or efficiency reveal that 
empirical evidences are mixed. Regarding bank board structure, we then focus on several 
indicators provided by Bloomberg Database33. Appendix 1.6 reports the descriptive statistics 
of these indicators and Appendix 1.8 the correlations between these variables. 
 
1.6.1.2.1. Board size 
A large strand of literature shows that more efficient banks are associated with smaller boards 
(e.g. Agoraki et al. (2010), Pathan and Faff (2013)). Directors in larger boards have limited 
incentives to monitor executive management (Jensen (1993)): the large size prevents them to 
meet frequently, increases decision-making problems, disagreement, communication and 
coordination costs (Lipton and Lorsch (1992)). In that case, we expect a negative relationship 
between bank efficiency and board size.  
Another strand of literature finds that less efficient banks are associated with smaller board 
size (e.g. Tanna et al. (2011), Adams and Mehran (2012)). For instance, Adams and Mehran 
                                                     
32
 We do not test for gender diversity although the percentage of female directors on board may have a 
substantial impact on bank performance (Pathan et Faff (2013)) because of a lack of available data. 
33
 Unfortunately, historical values for board indicators are only available from 2007 to 2011. 
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(2012) support a positive relation between bank board size and performance by providing 
evidence that boards need to be larger due to a more complex organizational structure, more 
M&A activities and consequently more directors with subsidiary directorships that facilitate 
the communication. In that case, we expect a positive relationship between bank efficiency 
and board size. 
Finally, Andres and Vallelado (2008) find an inverted U-shaped relationship between board 
size and performance. Adding directors improves bank performance by providing better 
managers' monitoring and advising. However, when the number of directors reaches a high 
proportion, the bank performance decreases because of a lack of coordination and control as 
well as an increase in decision-making problems.  
Thus, previous studies present mixed results. To investigate whether more risk-return efficient 
banks are associated with a large or small board or whether efficiency and board size are not 
related, we consider an indicator of the board size (SIZE) measured as the number of directors 
on the board. 
 
1.6.1.2.2. Board composition 
We wonder whether more risk-return efficient banks are associated with a different number of 
independent directors in their boards. Independent directors only have director relationship 
with the bank and do not have ties with managers. Previous empirical evidences about the 
relationship between independent directors and bank performance are ambiguous. 
Banks should have independent directors which have the ability to exert sound judgment 
without being subject to the influence of managers or CEO (Bank of International Settlements 
(2015)). Independent directors face fewer conflicts of interests that prevent risky behavior of 
managers. Then, in order to promote their reputation, they may provide a better monitoring of 
managers and deliver good advices that increase the efficiency of banks (Fama and Jensen 
(1983)). In that case, efficient banks may be associated with more independent directors. 
However, Minton et al. (2014) highlight that the presence of financial experts among 
independent boards lead to less efficient risk-taking behavior in US financial institutions 
during the 2007-2008 crisis. Accordingly, Erkens et al. (2012) and Aebi et al. (2012) find that 
financial firms with more independent directors perform worse during the crisis because, 
before the crisis they took excessive risks to maximize the shareholders wealth which turns 
out in costly and large losses during the crisis. More, although they bring their expert 
knowledge that may be beneficial to tackle management problems, they may lack of relevant 
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bank-specific information (Adams and Ferreira (2007)). Also, a large number of independent 
directors prevent bank executives, who have the advantage to facilitate the communication 
between board directors and management, to join the board (Coles et al. (2008)). In that case, 
inefficient banks may be therefore associated with more independent directors.  
More specifically, Andres and Vallelado (2008) underline that to improve bank performance, 
the board should be composed of an optimum combination of executive directors (who use 
their expert knowledge to advise) and independent directors (who use their independence to 
monitor) than excessively independent boards. Agoraki et al. (2010) conclude similarly: the 
impact on board composition on profit efficiency is non-linear. 
In this study, we consider the board independence by an indicator (INDEPENDENT) that 
reflects the number of independent directors as defined by each bank’s own criteria (for 
instance, it may represent the number of board directors’ members that do not own shares in 
the bank). 
 
1.6.1.2.3. Executives pay 
Board directors set the level of executive/CEO pay which is in turn likely to affect the level of 
bank efficiency. Indeed previous studies highlight that higher pay to executive improves the 
efficiency of firms. For instance, Jensen and Murphy (1990) report a positive relationship 
between executive pay and firm performance. For bank executives, board directors attribute a 
managerial compensation that positively varies with the performance of the bank (Barro and 
Barro (1990)). The objective behind is to align executives' interests with those of bank and 
shareholders. Executives are sensitive and motivated by this higher pay associated with better 
bank performance and have more incentives to improve bank efficiency. Hence, efficient 
banks may be associated with higher executive pay.  
On the contrary, some studies conclude that higher pay leads to worse firm performance. 
Board directors may fail to set an appropriate level of pay and executive may act in their own 
interest at the expense of bank performance (Crystal (1991) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2011)). In that case, efficient banks may be associated with lower executive pay.  
We account for the level of executive pay by considering the total amount of salary the bank 
has paid to the executives (SALARIES). 
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1.6.1.2.4. Board age  
We wonder whether there is a significant difference between the most and the least efficient 
banks in their average age of board directors. Older directors are more competent, they have 
important knowledge, they may benefit from greater and most valuable business experience 
that may be very helpful to tackle problems and advice managers. They are also more likely to 
avoid risky decisions because of a high degree of risk aversion. Banks with older board may 
achieve a higher performance (Francis et al. (2012)). Efficient banks may be those with older 
board directors. 
However, older directors are less prone to pursue innovative and optimal strategies: they may 
not deal with new information and technology as easily as young directors. Directors' age is 
thus negatively related to firm performance (Nakano and Nguyen (2011)). We then expect 
that efficient banks to have younger directors. 
To account for the age of board directors, we consider an indicator of the average age of 
board members (AGE). 
 
1.6.1.2.5. CEO Turnover 
A change in executive leadership is likely to affect firm performance. The CEO plays an 
important role in the firm strategy and its relative performance (Bertrand and Schoar (2003)). 
The probability of a forced turnover is negatively related to the CEO's performance (Jenter 
and Kanann (2006)). If the turnover is forced by the board, this reflects board's desire to 
change firm strategy. The board is dissatisfied with the existing CEO when for instance the 
current business strategy is performing poorly. The objective is then to identify, attract and 
hire a new CEO with better management skills in order to improve the strategy (see Clayton 
et al. (2005)). Demerjian et al. (2012) find that replacing CEOs with more able managers 
improves firm management. Accordingly, forced turnovers of low-quality CEOs represent a 
positive news for shareholders (Kind and Schläpfer (2011)). In that case, the new CEO is 
expected to provide a better management: efficient banks are associated with high turnovers. 
A CEO change may also result from a voluntary departure or retirement of the CEO (Clayton 
et al. (2005)). The board may also dismiss a well-performing CEO wishing to move in a 
direction and believes that this current CEO cannot perform the task. In both case, the board 
may hire a new CEO based on expected ability to continue or improve the firm's strategy. 
However, the ability of the new CEO may be lower from expected or from the one of the 
former CEO (Kind and Schläpfer (2011), Clayton et al. (2005)). If the turnover leads to an 
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under-performer CEO, the performance should not be improved after the voluntary or forced 
departure of high-quality CEO (Demerjian et al. (2012)). In that case, we expect that efficient 
banks are associated with a low turnover. 
Bank efficiency is likely to be affected by CEO's turnovers. Consequently, we measure the 
instability of executives members by the number of CEO's turnovers by year 
(TURNOVERS). 
 
1.6.2. Profile of banks 
We aim at extracting a typical profile for the less (most) efficient banks: we undertake tests of 
mean equality (t-test) on bank balance-sheet, income statement and board structure indicators. 
Each year, banks are ranked according to their efficiency scores. A bank is considered as less 
(most) efficient at time t if its efficiency score is in the first (last) two deciles D1t and D2t (resp. 
D9t and D10t) of the efficiency distribution at time t. Then we compute the mean of each 
accounting or board structure indicator 1/ for the only observations (i,t) which are in the two 
first deciles D1t, D2t whatever t (“low efficiency” observations) and 2/ for the only 
observations (i,t) which are in the two last deciles D9t, D10t whatever t (“high efficiency” 
observations). At last, for each indicator, we test for the null "the mean is the same for “low 
efficiency” and “high efficiency” observations" (T-Stat).  
Table 1.12 provides the results of these t-tests for banks’ balance sheet and income statement 
indicators and table 1.13 reports those for banks’ board structure indicators. They highlight 
that low-graded (D1, D2) observations exhibit, on average, a poor performance in terms of cost 
to income and profitability, and a high level of capital. They are also less focused on lending 
activity and have lower traditional revenues than the most efficient ones. Less efficient banks 
are riskier either in terms of provisions or total risk. However, banks’ size and solvency tend 
to be quite similar whatever the level of efficiency.  
According to the board structure, we find that less efficient banks have larger boards. This 
result is in line with Agoraki et al. (2010) who find a negative correlation between board size 
and performance of European banks measured in terms of both cost and profit efficiency. We 
also find that the proportion of independent directors on the board is not significantly related 
to the bank efficiency. This result for European banks is similar to Adams and Mehran (2012) 
for US banks. Our result in terms of age of board directors is in line with Spong et al. (1995) 
who show that the level of bank efficiency is not related to the average age of board directors. 
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Finally, results underline that the level of bank risk-return efficiency is not related to the level 
of executive pay or to CEO turnovers. 
 
Table 1.12: Test of mean equality for balance-sheet and income statement variables 
This table compares the mean values of banks’ balance-sheet and income statement indicators between “low 
efficiency” observations and “high efficiency” observations. Observation (i, t) is in the low (high) efficiency 
group if it was ranked in the first (last) two deciles of the efficiency distribution at time t, whatever t on the 
sample of 192 banks. CTIR is the cost to income ratio. ROA is the return on assets. TIER1R is the ratio of Tier 1 
capital divided by risk weighted assets. EQTA is the ratio of equity to total assets. NLTA is the ratio of net loans 
to total assets. NIIOPINC is the ratio of net interest income to total operating income. TA is the bank's total 
assets expressed in billions Euros. LLPNL is the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans. TRISK is the bank 
total risk defined as the standard deviation of weekly bank stock returns. ZSCORE is a market based Z-score. 
***.**.*
 indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 levels respectively. T-stat is the Student statistic for H0: "The 
mean of the variable is the same between the two groups". 
 Low efficiency High efficiency T-Stat Low vs High 
CTIR 0.733 0.593 -6.124
***
 
ROA 0.001 0.006 4.957
***
 
TIER1R 0.124 0.092 -5.389
***
 
EQTA 0.083 0.061 -4.157
***
 
NLTA 0.449 0.668 10.495
***
 
NIIOPINC 0.544 0.621 3.914
***
 
TA 208.587 164.467 -1.172 
LLPNL 0.014 0.007 -3.817
***
 
TRISK 0.055 0.045 -2.826
***
 
ZSCORE 28.917 29.023 0.053 
 
Table 1.13: Test of mean equality for board structure variables 
This table compares the mean values of banks’ board structure indicators between “low efficiency” observations 
and “high efficiency” observations. Observation (i, t) is in the low (high) efficiency group if it was ranked in the 
first (last) two deciles of the efficiency distribution at time t, whatever t on the sample of 192 banks. SIZE is the 
number of directors on the board. AGE is the average age of the members of the board. SALARIES is the total 
amount of salary the bank has paid to the executives in thousands Euros. TURNOVERS is the number of CEO 
turnovers each year. INDEPENDENT is the number of independent directors in banks. 
***.**.*
 indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 levels respectively. T-stat is the Student statistic for H0: "There are no differences 
in means of variables according to banks level of efficiency". 
 Low efficiency High efficiency T-Stat Low vs High 
SIZE 16.250 14.309 -2.023
**
 
AGE 57.675 57.944 0.310 
SALARIES 3,131.538 2,912.395 -0.396 
TURNOVERS 0.286 0.214 -0.517 
INDEPENDENT 9.516 8.346 -1.238 
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The previous analyze does not underline a specific profile for the most or the less efficient 
banks but some characteristics prevail. Most efficient banks enjoy higher expected return, 
return on assets and a better performance in terms of cost-to-income ratio. These banks make 
better risk-return choices that lead them to expect a higher return and lower operational costs. 
Banks that are more focused on lending activities or with fewer directors are the most 
efficient. Because they are more specialized, they are able to select more efficient strategies 
compare to more diversified banks. The most efficient banks are also less risky in terms of 
credit risk and total risk and also hold a lower level of capital. Finally, contrary to previous 
findings, we do not find evidence that these banks are more solvent or bigger than others.  
 
 
1.7. Banks’ efficiency, rating agencies and analyst views 
1.7.1. Credit rating agencies 
Credit rating agencies mainly evaluate banks' vulnerability to default and banks' ability to 
meet their financial obligations. The long-term credit rating provided by Fitch rating agency 
(FIR), the Issuer Rating provided by Moody’s (MIR) as well as the long-term issuer credit 
rating provided by Standard & Poor’s (SPIR) are traditional ratings and reflect the opinion of 
these agencies about the relative creditworthiness of banks accounting for potential external 
support34. Similarly Fitch bank individual rating (FBIR) and Moody’s bank financial strength 
rating (MBFSR) evaluate banks intrinsic safety by assuming that they could not rely this on 
external support. 
To assess banks' creditworthiness, rating agencies focus on several financial and non financial 
factors, both qualitative and quantitative, that may influence the bank's ability to repay their 
debts
 35
. Hence, the rating process is not limited to an examination of financial measures. A 
proper assessment of credit quality also includes a review of the role and credibility of bank 
management in determining operational success (Standard and Poor's (2008)). We may 
wonder whether bank risk-return efficiency play a role in this rating process.  
First, more risk-return efficient banks should have a lower probability of experiencing 
financial distress (DeYoung et al. (2001), Petey (2004)). Credit ratings may indirectly 
                                                     
34
 Ratings provided by Fitch, Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s rating agencies come from the Bloomberg database. 
35
 See Standard and Poor's - About Credit Ratings - 2012 
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consider banks’ efficiency through its impact on bank level of default. Hua and Liu (2010) 
conclude similarly. Second, skilled managers handle earnings more successfully and report 
higher quality earnings (Demerjian et al. (2013)). Earnings management matters in the rating 
process as credit rating deviations are associated with earnings management activities (Alissa 
et al. (2013)). Credit ratings may indirectly consider banks’ efficiency through its impact on 
earnings management. More, as banks with less able managers provide less stable future 
outcomes, this may indicate an increased default risk that agencies should consider. Finally, 
Kuang and Qin (2013) find that rating agencies take into account managerial risk-taking 
incentives into their credit risk assessments and assign a lower rating for banks with high risk-
taking incentives. The quality of risk management may be directly incorporated in the rating 
process
36
. In both case, we expect that rating agencies assign a lower rating to less efficient 
risk-takers. 
The objective of this section is then to investigate whether less (more) efficient banks are 
associated with a worse (better) rating. To conduct this analysis, we convert Fitch, Moody's 
and S&P rating scales in cardinal values according to the correspondence (see Appendix 1.9). 
By definition, the safety of banks decreases when the numerical rating increases. We compute 
two synthetic numerical rating as the average of traditional ratings (RTGTRAD) and the 
average of strength/individual ratings (RTGSOL). Appendix 1.10 gives the main values of 
each rating including both RTGTRAD and RTGSOL according to the class of efficiency.  
To investigate whether rating agencies assign a worse rating to the less efficient banks, we 
undertake a test of mean equality on these bank ratings. The objective is to test whether the 
mean of each rating differs between the subsamples of “low-efficiency” observations and 
“high-efficiency” ones37.  
Table 1.14 provides the results of these T-tests for each rating. We notice that there are no 
differences in the assignment of traditional ratings by Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s. Banks exhibit quite similar ratings whatever their level of efficiency. While assigning 
banks’ credit ratings, rating agencies seem only to care about the external support banks may 
                                                     
36
 According to the definition provided of ratings provided by Fitch agency, “[…] these ratings were designed to 
assess a bank’s exposure to, appetite for, and management of risk”. The quality of risk management should be 
directly included in the process rating and we may expect that risk-return efficient banks face a higher rating 
compared to less efficient banks. See Fitch Ratings - Definitions of Ratings and Other Forms of Opinion - 2013. 
37
 To define the groups of high and low efficiency observations, we apply the same criteria as previously. The 
null for the T-tests assumes "no difference between the means of numerical ratings for the two classes of 
efficiency". 
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benefit. The mean tests for FBIR or MBFSR (and RTGSOL) confirm this result: when rating 
agencies do not consider the likelihood of a potential support, they unsurprisingly assign on 
average a higher (less attractive) numerical rating to low-efficiency banks compared to the 
others.  
We can conclude that, with strength/individual ratings, credit rating agencies correctly 
incorporate the bank efficiency among their evaluation criteria and assign on average 
downgraded ratings for less efficient ones. However, traditional ratings seem to reflect the 
potential external support from which banks may benefit rather than their efficiency.  
 
Table 1.14: Test of mean equality for ratings 
This table compares the mean value of numerical ratings between the subsample of “low-efficiency” 
observations and the one of “high efficiency” observations. The observation (i,t) is in the low (high) efficiency 
class if the matching efficiency score is in the first (last) two deciles of the year t efficiency scores distribution. 
FIR and FBIR are respectively the long-term credit rating and the bank individual rating provided by Fitch. MIR 
and MBFSR are respectively the Issuer Rating and the Moody’s bank financial strength rating provided by 
Moody’s. SPIR is the long-term issuer credit rating provided by Standard & Poor’s. RTGSOL is the mean value 
of MBFSR and FBIR while RTGTRAD is the mean value of FIR, MIR and SPIR. 
***.**.*
 indicate significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10% levels respectively. T-stat is the Student statistic for H0: "There is no difference between the 
means of numerical ratings relating to the two relevant classes of efficiency". 
 Low efficiency High-efficiency T-Stat Low vs High 
FIR 5.68 5.35 -1.36 
MIR 4.81 4.42 -0.96 
SPIR 5.26 5.40 0.55 
RTGTRAD 5.34 5.46 0.52 
    
FBIR 6.92 5.05 -6.21
***
 
MBFSR 7.77 6.37 -4.28
***
 
RTGSOL 7.60 5.90 -6.00
***
 
 
 
1.7.2. Bank opacity 
Banks are inherently more opaque than other firms (Morgan (2002), Iannotta (2006)) and 
especially during distress periods (Flannery et al. (2013)). The opacity reflects the uncertainty 
with which outside investors accurately assess the fundamental value and financial condition 
of banks. Opacity may result when banks hide information to the market or when the 
information disclosed is not credible for investors (Jones et al. (2012)). Consequently, 
information asymmetries between bank and market investors reduces the effectiveness of 
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market discipline (Jones et al. (2013)). We may wonder whether more efficient banks provide 
more public information to signal their better performance to the market and, hence, ask 
whether such banks are less opaque. 
More performing banks may have incentives to increase the quality of the reported 
information as it reduces information asymmetry; investors can better assess their economic 
performance (Bharath et al. (2008)) and their cost of capital may decrease (Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991)). Hirtle (2007) underlines that banks with better management are 
voluntarily less opaque and provide more detailed risk disclosure to signal their superior risk 
management ability. Managers of more efficient firms are likely to deliver less variable 
returns and higher earnings quality (Demerjian et al. (2013)). Akhigbe et al. (2013) confirm 
that better managed banks that enjoy higher profit efficiency are also more transparent. These 
studies tend to indicate that investors have less difficulties to evaluate more efficient banks as 
they seem to provide data which are more reliable. On the contrary, less performing banks 
may have incentives to understate their situation and are more likely to underreport financial 
losses (Gunther and Moore (2003), Huizinga and Laeven (2009)). These findings suggest that 
less efficient banks may have less incentive and/or ability to disclose reliable information 
about the quality of their management. The quality of the information they provide is weak 
and less credible for investors who face more difficulties in accurately assessing the financial 
situation of less efficient banks. Less efficient banks may appear as more opaque. 
 
The objective of this section is then to investigate whether less (more) efficient banks are 
more (less) opaque. To measure the opacity of banking firms, studies focus on their assets' 
composition because of their inherent opacity (Morgan (2002), Jones et al. (2012)). In this 
study, we give advantage to measures of disagreements between either analysts or rating 
agencies as they are found to serve as a proxy for the information uncertainty associated with 
the opacity of banks.  
First, bank opacity may lead to higher analyst earnings forecast error and increases the 
dispersion in analyst forecasts (Diether et al. (2002)). We then consider an opacity indicator 
based on analysts’ standard deviation of earnings per share (EPSSTD) estimates. The 
volatility of EPS estimates captures the precision with which analysts assess earnings, a high 
volatility underlying a disagreement between analysts’ estimates and, hence, increasing 
opacity.  
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Second, the relative opacity of banks may be assessed by using disagreement between rating 
agencies i.e. split ratings (Morgan (2002), Livingston et al. (2007), Jones et al. (2012)). We 
consider 4 splits based on previous credit ratings: FBIR-MBFSR, MIR-SPIR, FIR-SPIR, and 
FIR-MIR. Appendix 1.11 gives the mean values of split rating and EPS estimates for the 
different classes of efficiency.  
 
We test whether there is a higher divergence between ratings and analyst consensus for the 
less efficient banks: as previously, we compute the mean of each opacity indicator for both 
class of efficiency (high, low) and we carry out T-test for the equality of means whatever the 
efficiency groups involved in the comparison. 
Table 1.15 provides those tests. The results show that there is no significant divergence 
between split ratings for the low-efficiency observations by comparison with high-efficiency 
ones. Accordingly, the standard deviation of earnings per share estimates is on average the 
same whatever the degree of bank efficiency. More efficient banks are not less opaque than 
least efficient ones. 
 
 
Table 1.15: Test of mean equality for split ratings and EPS forecast 
This table compares the mean value of split-ratings and standard deviation of EPS estimates (EPSSTD) between 
the subsample of “low-efficiency” observations and the one of “high efficiency” observations. The observation 
(i,t) is in the low (high) efficiency class if the matching efficiency score is in the first (last) two deciles of the 
year t efficiency scores distribution. The split measures the divergence in absolute value between a couple of 
ratings. FIR and FBIR are respectively the long-term credit rating and the bank individual rating provided by 
Fitch. MIR and MBFSR are respectively the Issuer Rating and the Moody’s bank financial strength rating 
provided by Moody’s. SPIR is the long-term issuer credit rating provided by Standard & Poor’s. EPSSTD is the 
standard deviation of earnings per share estimates. 
***.**.*
 indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 levels 
respectively. T-stat is the Student statistic for H0: "There are no differences in means of variables according to 
banks level of efficiency". 
 Low-efficiency High-efficiency T-Stat Low vs High 
MIR -SPIR 1.09 1.23 0.97 
FIR - SPIR 0.80 0.73 -0.60 
FIR - MIR 1.11 0.85 -1.61 
    
FBIR - MBFSR 1.32 1.54 1.29 
    
EPSSTD 0.65 0.53 -0.62 
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1.8. Conclusion 
This paper estimates and studies the efficiency of a sample of European listed banks in terms 
of expected risk and return between 2002 and 2011. More specifically, the objective is to 
investigate the stability of efficiency through estimation methods and through time, to 
examine the characteristics of less and more efficient banks and to check whether external 
actors correctly incorporate bank efficiency into their analysis. To this end, by using a 
stochastic frontier, we estimate bank risk-return efficiency i.e. the relative efficiency of banks’ 
risk-return choices accounting for managers’ risk aversion. None of the studies that estimate 
bank efficiency with this method run comparisons across a large set of European banks or 
investigate whether this efficiency was affected by the financial crisis. We extend the 
established literature in these ways.  
After providing econometrical evidences that some European banks are inefficiently 
managed, a comparison between our measure and alternative methods highlights the 
robustness of banks’ rankings. The study of efficiency stability through time yields two 
important results. First, bank efficiency is stable over time, especially in the short term where 
banks’ rankings mostly stay the same year-to-year. Second, most of efficient banks were not 
adversely affected by the financial crisis while the less performing ones have tended to 
improve their efficiency in the long run. The analysis of banks’ activity, accounting and board 
structure indicators underlines that some common characteristics prevail for risk-return 
efficient banks: they are specialized on traditional banking activity (i.e. lending); they are less 
capitalized; they better perform in terms of return and operational costs; and they are less 
risky without being more solvent or bigger than others. Also, while assigning banks’ credit 
ratings, rating agencies seem only to care about the external support banks may benefit 
whereas their strength/individual ratings correctly incorporate bank efficiency. Finally, we 
conclude that less efficient banks are not more opaque than efficient ones. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1.1: Restrictions on system parameters   
Some conditions may be imposed on the parameters to guaranty symmetry on some coefficients, homogeneity of 
share equations and that the sum of input and profit share equations equals 1.  
1. Symmetry restrictions  
● S1:    ●S2:    ● S3: 
 
2. Homogeneity restrictions  
a. Homogeneity of degree 1 of the expenditure function: 
● H1:       ● H2:  
● H3:  
 
b. Homogeneity of degree 0 for input and profit shares: 
● H4:      ● H5:  
● H6:      ● H7:  
● H8:  ● H9:  
● H10:  
 
3.  Adding-up restrictions  
The sum of inputs and profit shares must be equals to 1: . This condition requires:  
● A1:  
And that all these sums are equal to 0:  
● A2:       ● A3:   ● A4:  
● A5:         ● A6:   ● A7:  
● A8:         ● A9:  
 
To assess the previous model, we then impose S1-S3, A1-A8.  
 
Note that A9 is equivalent to H2 so we do not include both. Among the homogeneity constraints, we impose H1, 
H3-H10. H7 can be simplify as  as we impose (A6).  
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Appendix 1.2: Table A1 - General descriptive statistics of the final sample 
This table provides general descriptive statistics on some financial variables. TA is the bank's total assets. ROA 
is the return on assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total equity. NLTA is the ratio of net loans to 
total assets. DEPTA is the ratio of total deposits to total assets. NPLNL is the ratio of nonperforming loans to net 
loans. LLPNL is the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans. All variables are in percentages except TA which 
is in billions Euros.  
 TA ROA LEVERAGE NLTA DEPTA NPLNL LLPNL 
Mean 159.06 0.41 17.34 61.10 62.77 2.77 0.86 
Median 20.66 0.55 15.39 65.25 63.33 2.16 0.49 
Standard 
Deviation 
348.89 1.08 9.46 20.84 16.34 2.56 1.42 
Minimum 0.07 -9.61 1.28 1.38 1.73 0.04 0.00 
Maximum 2,202.42 4.23 69.01 97.44 94.08 13.73 18.48 
 
 
 
Appendix 1.3: Table A2 - Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables involved 
in the AIDS model 
Variables Description Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. 
y1*  Gross loans 
1
 47,721.55 104,000.00 768,000.00 0.066 
y2 Other earnings assets
1
 46,292.15 150,000.00 1,760,000.00 0.005 
p1* 
Interest income on loans / 
Gross loans 
0.079 0.254 5.835 0.000 
p2* 
(Other interest income + Net 
gains (losses) on trading and 
derivatives + Net gains and 
losses on other securities + 
Net gains (losses) on assets at 
FV through income statement 
+ Net insurance income + 
Other operating income) / 
Other earnings assets 
0.305 1.370 19.793 0.000 
* 
Weighted average of output 
prices  
0.056 0.040 0.490 0.004 
x1 Fixed assets 
1
 785.42 2,166.42 26,858.00 0.00 
x2* Employees 
2
 12,324.20 29,821.43 331,458.00 60.00 
x3* Deposits and borrowed funds
1
 70,415.33 167,000.00 1,340,000.00 0.000 
 
 
     
p
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Table A2 (Continued) 
Variables Description Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. 
w1* 
Other Operating Expenses / 
Fixed assets 
3.533 8.658 98.667 0.012 
w2* 
Personal Expenses / 
Employees
3
 
95.600 98.925 2,066.78 0.735 
w3* 
(Interest Expense on Customer 
Deposits + Other interest 
expense) / Deposits 
0.040 0.055 1.000 0.000 
Part1 Share of physical capital 0.171 0.119 1.805 0.001 
Part2 Share of labor 0.198 0.099 0.961 0.014 
Part3 Share of deposits 0.454 0.191 1.363 0.000 
Partπ Share of profit before tax 0.176 0.155 0.803 -1.340 
 Profit before tax 
1
 954.65 2,579.09 26,512.05 -17,798.58 
p.y + m Expected revenue 
1
 6,035.73 12,647.44 109,000.00 3.89 
n* Loan loss provision 
1
 404.06 1,348.3 18.549.00 0.00 
m* Non asset based income -Fees 
1
 738.00 1,859.00 18,489.27 0.00 
k* Total equity 
1
 4,555.20 11,272.64 139,000.00 0.70 
r Specific country's Treasury bond within a 3-month time maturity
4
 
t Specific country's taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% of revenue)
5
 
 
*: These variables are cleaned by removing extreme observations.  
1: In billions of Euros. 
2: In number of people. This series is completed by interpolation and extrapolation using a highly correlated variable: personal expenses.   
3: In thousands Euros per year, per employees. 
4: If the 3-month is not available, we select the one with the shortest maturity.  
5: Source: WorldDataBank  
π
p .π
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Appendix 1.4: Figures A1 - Best practice frontier per year 
These figures represent, for each year, the relevant BPF. ER’ and RK’ are respectively the expected return and 
risk, rescaled by their standard deviation. 
                   Year - 2002                    Year - 2003                    Year - 2004 
   
                   Year - 2005                    Year - 2006                    Year - 2007 
   
                   Year - 2008                    Year - 2009                    Year - 2010 
   
                    Year - 2011  
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Appendix 1.5: Table A3 - General descriptive statistics of balance-sheet and income 
statement indicators 
This table provides general descriptive statistics on indicators of banks’ balance-sheet and income statement. 
EFFICIENCY is the measure of bank efficiency. CTIR is the cost to income ratio. ROA is the return on assets. 
TIER1R the ratio of Tier 1 capital divided by risk weighted assets. EQTA is the ratio of equity to total assets. 
NLTA is the ratio of net loans to total assets. NIIOPINC is the ratio of net interest income to total operating 
income. TA is the bank's total assets expressed in billions Euros. LLPNL is the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
net loans. TRISK is the bank total risk defined as the standard deviation of weekly bank stock returns. ZSCORE 
is a market based Z-score. 
 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CTIR 0.633 0.609 0.189 0.166 1.948 
ROA 0.004 0.005 0.011 -0.096 0.042 
TIER1R 0.101 0.090 0.045 0.043 0.490 
EQTA 0.073 0.065 0.042 0.015 0.483 
NLTA 0.611 0.653 0.208 0.014 0.974 
NIIOPINC 0.598 0.618 0.179 0.019 0.986 
TA 159.057 20.656 348.887 0.075 2,202.423 
LLPNL 0.009 0.005 0.014 0.000 0.185 
TRISK 0.046 0.038 0.030 0.002 0.254 
ZSCORE 31.905 27.001 23.419 1.075 258.334 
 
 
Appendix 1.6: Table A4 - General descriptive statistics of board indicators 
This table provides general descriptive statistics on indicators of banks’ board structure. SIZE is the number of 
directors on the board. AGE is the average age of the members of the board. SALARIES is the total amount of 
salary the bank has paid to the executives in thousands Euros. TURNOVERS is the number of CEO turnovers 
each year. INDEPENDENT is the number of independent directors in banks. 
 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
SIZE 15.219 15.000 4.823 6.000 31.000 
AGE 57.508 57.265 3.270 50.300 68.670 
SALARIES 2,468.653 2,020.930 2,092.386 0.207 10,753.000 
TURNOVERS 0.221 0.000 0.478 0.000 2.000 
INDEPENDENT 8.830 9.000 4.253 2.000 23.000 
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Appendix 1.7: Table A5 - Correlation between bank efficiency and balance-sheet and income statement indicators 
This table provides the correlation between bank efficiency and the indicators of banks’ balance-sheet and income statement. EFFICIENCY is the measure of bank efficiency. 
CTIR is the cost to income ratio. ROA is the return on assets. TIER1R the ratio of Tier 1 capital divided by risk weighted assets. EQTA is the ratio of equity to total assets. 
NLTA is the ratio of net loans to total assets. NIIOPINC is the ratio of net interest income to total operating income. TA is the bank's total assets. LLPNL is the ratio of loan 
loss provisions to net loans. TRISK is the bank total risk defined as the standard deviation of weekly bank stock returns. ZSCORE is a market based Z-score. 
 
EFFICIENCY CTIR ROA TIER1R EQTA NLTA TA NIIOPINC LLPNL ZSCORE TRISK 
EFFICIENCY 1.00 
          
CTIR -0.25
***
 1.00 
         
ROA 0.22
***
 -0.42
***
 1.00 
        
TIER1R -0.22
***
 0.20
***
 0.06
*
 1.00 
       
EQTA -0.14
***
 0.02 0.11
***
 0.56
***
 1.00 
      
NLTA 0.37
***
 -0.33
***
 0.04 -0.22
***
 0.06
*
 1.00 
     
NIIOPINC 0.15
***
 -0.22
***
 -0.16
***
 -0.17
***
 -0.22
***
 0.60
***
 -0.14
***
 
    
TA -0.04 0.06
*
 -0.04 -0.07
**
 -0.32
***
 -0.39
***
 1.00 1.00 
   
LLPNL -0.21
***
 0.24
***
 -0.54
***
 0.09
**
 0.03 -0.10
***
 -0.02 0.11
***
 1.00 
  
TRISK -0.24
***
 0.16
***
 -0.28
***
 0.13
***
 -0.07
**
 -0.17
***
 0.18
***
 0.04 0.40
***
 -0.63
***
 
 
ZSCORE 0.05 -0.13
***
 0.17
***
 -0.09
**
 0.02 0.17
***
 -0.13
***
 0.03 -0.22
***
 1.00 1.00 
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Appendix 1.8: Table A6 - Correlation between bank efficiency and board structure indicators 
This table provides the correlation between bank efficiency and the indicators of banks’ board structure. EFFICIENCY is the measure of bank efficiency. SIZE is the number 
of directors on the board. AGE is the average age of the members of the board. SALARIES is the total amount of salary the bank has paid to the executives. TURNOVERS is 
the number of CEO turnovers each year. INDEPENDENT is the number of independent directors in banks. 
 
EFFICIENCY SIZE AGE SALARIES CHANGES INDEPENDENT 
EFFICIENCY  1.00 
     
SIZE  -0.07 1.00 
    
AGE  0.02 0.16
**
 1.00 
   
SALARIES -0.03 0.40
***
 0.47
***
 1.00 
  
TURNOVERS -0.08 -0.00 -0.08 -0.05 1.00 
 
INDEPENDENT  -0.07 0.41
***
 0.23
***
 0.38
***
 0.17
*
 1.00 
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Appendix 1.9: Table A7 - Ratings scales 
These tables indicate the numerical scale for credit ratings of Moody’s, Fitch and Standards & Poor’s (see Ronn and Verma (1987)). FIR and FBIR are respectively the long-
term credit rating and the bank individual rating provided by Fitch. MIR and MBFSR are respectively the Issuer Rating and the Moody’s bank financial strength rating 
provided by Moody’s. SPIR is the long-term issuer credit rating provided by Standard & Poor’s. 
                Traditional credit rating                    Financial strength rating 
 
Cardinal 
value 
MIR FIR  SPIR 
1 Aaa AAA AAA 
2 Aa1 AA+ AA+ 
3 Aa2 AA AA 
4 Aa3 AA- AA- 
5 A1 A+ A+ 
6 A2 A A 
7 A3 A- A- 
8 Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 
9 Baa2 BBB BBB 
10 Baa3 BBB- BBB- 
11 Ba1 BB+ BB+ 
12 Ba2 BB BB 
13 Ba3 BB-  BB-  
14 B1 B+ B+ 
15 B2 B B 
16 B3 B- B- 
17 Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ 
18 Caa2 CCC CCC 
19 Caa3 CCC- CCC- 
20 Ca CC CC 
21 C C C 
22 D D D 
Cardinal 
value 
MBFSR 
 Cardinal 
value 
FBIR 
1 A  1 A 
2 A-    
   2,5 A/B 
3 B+    
4 B  4 B 
5 B-    
   5,5 B/C 
6 C+    
7 C  7 C 
8 C-    
   8,5 C/D 
9 D+    
10 D  10 D 
11 D-    
   11,5 D/E 
12 E+    
13 E  13 E 
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Appendix 1.10: Table A8 - Ratings by efficiency classes 
This table provides the mean of numerical ratings for each class of efficiency. FIR and FBIR are respectively the 
long-term credit rating and the bank individual rating provided by Fitch. MIR and MBFSR are respectively the 
Issuer Rating and the Moody’s bank financial strength rating provided by Moody’s. SPIR is the long-term issuer 
credit rating provided by Standard & Poor’s. RTGOL is the mean of FBIR and MBFSR and RTGTRAD is the 
mean of MIR, SPIR and FIR. 
Efficiency FBIR MBFSR RTGSOL FIR MIR SPIR RTGTRAD 
[0-0.1[ 6.25 7.57 7.18 4.86 4.00 5.00 4.57 
[0.1-0.2[ 9.50 8.17 8.46 5.62 4.20 5.67 5.61 
[0.2-0.3[ 7.23 7.84 7.57 5.50 4.69 5.44 5.42 
[0.3-0.4[ 6.39 7.63 7.37 5.96 4.54 4.74 5.22 
[0.4-0.5[ 5.68 6.84 6.51 5.67 5.20 5.13 5.21 
[0.5-0.6[ 5.50 6.55 6.17 5.87 5.10 5.61 5.72 
[0.6-0.7[ 5.27 6.51 6.06 5.61 4.73 5.64 5.76 
[0.7-0.8[ 4.54 5.77 5.33 4.81 3.82 5.15 4.92 
[0.8-0.9] 6.00 7.00 6.31 5.00 4.50 5.00 5.08 
All 5.63 6.73 6.37 5.65 4.79 5.35 5.48 
 
Appendix 1.11: Table A9 - Split ratings and EPS estimates by efficiency classes 
This table provides the value of split ratings and standard deviation of EPS estimates (EPSSTD) for each class of 
efficiency. The split measure the divergence in absolute value between two ratings. FIR and FBIR are 
respectively the long-term credit rating and the bank individual rating provided by Fitch. MIR and MBFSR are 
respectively the Issuer Rating and the Moody’s bank financial strength rating provided by Moody’s. SPIR is the 
long-term issuer credit rating provided by Standard & Poor’s. 
 Split ratings 
EPSSTD 
Efficiency FBIR - MBFSR MIR - SPIR FIR - SPIR FIR - MIR 
[0-0.1[ 2.08 1.67 0.43 1.17 0.53 
[0.1-0.2[ 2.50 1.50 1.00 0.75 0.45 
[0.2-0.3[ 1.57 1.00 0.57 1.08 1.41 
[0.3-0.4[ 1.11 0.78 0.68 0.91 0.44 
[0.4-0.5[ 1.22 1.06 0.75 0.58 0.78 
[0.5-0.6[ 1.39 0.90 0.58 0.53 0.66 
[0.6-0.7[ 1.44 1.18 0.71 0.76 0.42 
[0.7-0.8[ 1.37 1.39 0.67 1.05 0.35 
[0.8-0.9] 1.25 2.00 0.33 1.50 - 
All 1.39 1.06 0.66 0.75 0.59 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Do bank bondholders price banks’ ability to manage 
risk/return? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter refers to the working paper entitled "Do bank bondholders price banks' ability to manage 
risk/return" (Casteuble, Nys, Rous (2015)).  
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2.1. Introduction  
The literature on credit bond spreads shows that default risk proxies are not sufficient to 
explain the default premium: bondholders need to use additional financial content to explain 
its level. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether, in the banking industry 
characterized by its opaqueness, the quality of bank management conveys additional 
information in explaining the pricing of the default premium of bond spreads.  
Common credit default measures used in the empirical literature to estimate the default risk 
premium are of three kinds: credit or bank ratings (Elton et al. (2001), Sironi (2002), Sironi 
(2003), Pop (2006), Güntay and Hackbarth (2010)), market-based measures such as the 
distance to default (Tsuji (2005), Das et al. (2009), Demirovic et al. (2015)), and accounting-
based ones like Z-Score (Balasubramnian and Cyree (2014), and Kavussanos and Tsouknidis 
(2014)). Studies have been conducted to assess the accurateness of these proxies. Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) find that the Merton distance to default model is outperformed by a "naïve" 
alternative of the model. Du and Suo (2007) find a similar result as a simple reduced form 
model outperforms the structural model of Merton (1974). But they also show that adding the 
firm's equity value as an explanatory variable greatly raises the valuation of credit risk. 
In line with this later result, some studies show that considering additional information 
improves the determination of the default risk premium. Benos and Papanastasopoulos (2007) 
find, on a set of North American firms, that default risk measurement is better explained by 
adding to the distance to default metric accounting measures such as liquidity, profitability, 
leverage and capital structure variables. Das et al. (2009), while studying CDS spreads, show 
that the prediction of default is improved using both market and accounting information. 
Campbell and Taksler (2003) conclude that adding equity volatility to credit ratings better 
explain US bond spreads. Likewise Demirovic et al. (2015) find that accounting data, such as 
profitability, liquidity and leverage ratios, add relevant information in explaining the credit 
spread of US firms. If theoretically securities prices contain all the information necessary to 
predict default, practically accounting data bring incremental information value in explaining 
the default premium, and are thus relevant to debt holders. Comparable evidences are found 
by Iannotta et al. (2013): when the debt market grows more opaque, the information content 
of ratings is poorer and bond investors rely more on additional information. And precisely the 
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banking market is identified by its opaqueness. Morgan (2002), for the US industry, and 
Iannotta (2006), for the European industry, shows that split ratings at the issuance of bonds 
are larger for banking firms than for non-banking firms: in other words the banking industry 
is more opaque than other markets. Thus, investigating whether bondholders consider 
additional information to price the default premium is particularly relevant in the banking 
context.  
We therefore ask in this paper whether the assessment of the default premium required by 
bondholders can be improved by adding additional information, and more specifically bank 
managerial ability as a determinant. Bank managerial ability can be defined as manager's 
talent, reputation, willingness, or technical skills. We hypothesize that this may have a direct 
impact on bond spreads by improving the perception of default premium. Some papers show 
that debt holders take an interest in the way firms are managed when they price their debt. For 
example, Donelson et al. (2015) find, in a survey answered by 492 bank lenders, that 
respondents value management as an important factor in deciding whether to extend 
commercial credit, even before leverage and financial condition. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2006) show that weak governance implies worse credit ratings, which leads to a higher debt 
financing cost for firms. Both studies conclude that previous ones undervalue the potential 
direct effect of management on the cost of debt as they mainly focus on issue characteristics 
and issuer risk attributes. The originality of our paper is to investigate whether bank 
managerial ability is a relevant determinant of the cost of bank bonds. 
Managerial ability is difficult to assess empirically. Demerjian et al. (2012) introduce a new 
measure of managerial ability based on firm managers' relative efficiency to generate revenue. 
In the context of the banking industry, we rather estimate risk-return efficiency scores as 
computed by DeYoung et al. (2001): first these scores, unlike profit and cost efficiency 
scores, take into account the risk induced by banking activities, and second the method allows 
us to only capture the part of efficiency that is solely attributable to the manager action38. We 
consider these scores as a measure of bank managerial ability (BMA afterwards) in terms of 
risk-return. Using a set of 192 European listed banks, we first estimate bank revenue and risk.  
 
                                                     
38
 In their paper, DeYoung et al. (2001), compute risk-return efficiency scores that come from the ex-ante 
portfolio choices made by risk-averse bank managers. They use a stochastic best practice frontier that allows 
eliminating the influence of chance and exogenous effects on efficiency measure. They finally use these scores 
to examine how CAMEL ratings reflect bank level of risk - taken and risk - taking efficiency.  
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Then we assess the level of managerial ability for each bank as the distance of the bank to the 
best practice frontier, determined by a stochastic frontier model. We then test the impact of 
bank managerial ability on bond pricing using a sample of 1,924 bonds issued by 67 European 
listed banks between 2002 and 2011. More specifically we aim to study if an increase in the 
quality of the bank’s management will decrease bank credit spread. We deepen our analysis 
by considering distress and sound episodes, and then by studying whether different bond 
factors can alter the bond spread-BMA relationship.   
Our analysis yields several key findings. Well-managed banks benefit from lower credit 
spread while controlling for issue and issuer characteristics. This result is robust to different 
specifications of the spread equation, to different proxies of default risk and different 
measures of managerial ability. There are two explanations for these findings. First, as the 
coefficient of managerial ability is significant as well as the default risk one, it corroborates 
previous findings that this default risk variable cannot explain entirely the default premium. 
Second, bank managerial ability can be seen as a measure that reflects the premium required 
by bondholders from less capable banks. These have less able managers to take optimal 
decisions, their choices are unsure. This makes bondholders less secure about the reliability of 
banks’ level of default and its resulting proxy. Facing uncertainty about the actual default 
level, bondholders require a premium which depends on the degree of confidence they have in 
the measure of the level of default. We also consider the pricing of bond spread before and 
during the financial crisis. Our results confirm that bank managerial ability is an important 
determinant as bondholders price it during the two periods, sound and distress, whereas the 
default risk proxy is only considered during the turmoil. A deeper analysis actually shows that 
the relationship between bank managerial ability and bank bond spread holds on more 
restrictive subsets relating to ratings categories, secured or subordinated bonds and different 
bond maturities. Our findings have potential policy implications in the market discipline field. 
They highlight that bondholders monitoring is effective and supervisors could rely on bond 
spreads to detect bank managerial shortcomings.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 announces our hypotheses and 
describes data and sample. Section 3 provides the methodology to calculate the proxy of 
managerial ability. Section 4 specifies the bond spread equation and variables. Section 5 
presents and discusses our results. Section 6 is devoted to some robustness checks. Section 7 
concludes.  
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2.2. Hypotheses, data, sample and summary statistics 
2.2.1. Hypotheses 
This paper is based on the literature that suggests that the default risk premium required by 
bondholders is misspecified. Because of a lack of accurateness in the measure of proxies 
commonly used, adding information may improve the determination of the default risk 
premium. Given that default risk proxies cannot explain entirely the default premium, we 
make the hypothesis that bank managerial ability is also a determinant of the cost of debt. 
Some recent studies (see Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) and Donelson et al. (2015)) conclude 
that the potential effect of management on the cost of debt has not been properly taken into 
account, previous studies mainly focus on issue characteristics and issuer risk attributes. In 
line with these studies, we aim to investigate whether bank managerial ability impacts the 
spread charged by bondholders. More precisely we ask if bondholders price bank managerial 
ability by requiring a premium through the yield spread depending specifically on the degree 
of managers’ competence no matter the level of the default risk proxy.  
H1: Bank managerial ability directly impacts the level of the spread paid by banks on 
their debt on the primary market. 
 
We then deepen our analysis by considering whether the recent financial crisis has modified 
the pricing of bonds: was the managerial ability a determinant of bond spreads before the 
financial crisis, or has this context led investors to more carefully take it into account. The 
troubled context of this period has raised banks' failures and default probability. According to 
Chiu et al. (2015), default risks significantly increased during this period. More, the financial 
crisis also increased the possibility of mispricing risk. Indeed, Flannery et al. (2013) indicate 
that during the financial crisis, banks have become more opaque and outside investors more 
uncertain about banks' solvency. This opaqueness creates uncertainty about how market actors 
evaluate banks’ probability of default. We thus assume that bondholders are more sensitive to 
components of the default risk premium during the distress period, in other words we expect 
that, during this period, bank managerial ability and default measures have a significantly 
superior effect. 
H2: Bondholders’ sensitivity to bank managerial ability increases during the recent 
financial crisis.  
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Finally, our last hypothesis aims to analyze whether the impact of bank managerial ability 
remains the same depending on bond characteristics. Güntay and Hackbarth (2010) underline 
the increasing sensitivity of creditors when credit quality declines whereas their behavior 
remains the same whatever the maturity of bonds. Pop (2006) shows that subordinated 
creditors are more sensitive than senior ones to the risk profile of bank issuers. We hence 
expect that the bondholders’ sensitivity to bank managerial ability depends on bonds' rating, 
payment rank and maturity. As the default probability increases with investment horizon, 
holders of bonds with long maturities should be more exposed in case of issuer's failure. 
Similarly, holders of bonds with downgraded ratings and holders of subordinated or 
unsecured bonds face a lower debt quality and a higher probability of default. Consequently, 
those investors should be more concerned about the bank managerial ability and the BMA-
spread relationship should be strengthen in those cases. 
H3: Bondholders' sensitivity to bank managerial ability increases when bonds are 
subordinated/unsecured, face downgraded ratings or long maturities. 
 
2.2.2. Data and sample 
To test these hypotheses, we focus on European publicly traded banks
39
, for which we have 
extracted financial statement from FitchIBCA Bankscope database between 1998 and 2011. 
By limiting the sample to banks that provide information on variables needed to compute the 
measure of bank managerial ability for at least one year, we are left with a sample of 192 
banks.  
Among them, we identify 92 banks within Bloomberg database that have issued 4,791 bonds 
on the primary40  market satisfying the following criteria: standard bonds issued between 
200241 and 2011 with fixed coupon rate, no-early redemption (bullet) and no option features 
                                                     
39
 We restrain the sample to European listed banks to obtain an homogeneous sample of banks that allows us to 
estimate a common best-practice frontier and to extract a measure of each bank relative efficiency that is not 
affected by sample heterogeneity (Bos et al. (2009)). As robustness check, we account for potential differences 
in environments among European countries by incorporating variables in the frontier equation that capture 
banks’ country-specific environmental conditions (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), Lozano-Vivas et al. 
(2002)). Results remain unchanged. 
40
 We use primary market data to get up-to-date ratings that reflect bond default risk at issue date. These ratings 
have been converted in cardinal values as shown in Appendix 2.1. 
41
 We choose to collect bonds from 2002 and not 1998 because we need 4 years of information to estimate the 
bank managerial ability measure i.e. the first observation is established in 2002 (computed on a 1998-2002 time 
sample). More, by choosing 2002, we eliminate the DotCom bubble effect that happens in 2001, which could 
affect results.  
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(non-callable, non-putable, non-sinkable and non-convertible). We indifferently include 
matured and non-matured bonds. These bonds are secured, unsecured or subordinated. They 
have to be rated at the immediate neighborhood of issuance by, at least, one credit rating 
agency (Moody’s, Standards & Poors or Fitch). We only keep bonds for which we have an 
annual coupon rate and exclude issues with a very short maturity and perpetual bonds that do 
not have a maturity date in order to calculate a spread. Each bond spread is computed as the 
difference between the bond yield at issuance and the implicit yield of a same currency and a 
same maturity Treasury bond. When the bond maturity does not match the maturity of the risk 
free rate benchmark, the yield of this one is interpolated, for a given maturity, as in Sironi 
(2003). For bonds issued in Euros, we take the country of the issuer as benchmark. Detailed 
information about issues such as issue date, maturity, amount issued, currency coupon rate, 
ratings by the three main rating agencies have also been collected.  
The sample of bonds was restricted by data availability. We drop observations with no 
measure of bank managerial ability available at the issue date42 (2,616 bonds) and bonds for 
which the control variables in the bond spread equation are not available (241 bonds). Our 
sample includes the recent sovereign debt crisis; during this period government bond yields 
from PIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) cannot be considered as a good proxy 
of the risk free rate. We thus omit 10 bonds issued in 2011 by Italian, Portuguese or Irish 
banks for which we observe a highly negative bond spread43. We end up with a final sample 
of 1,924 bonds issued by 67 European banks over the 2002-2011 period. This dataset is used 
to estimate the spread equation. See Appendix 2.2 for a description of the sample by year, 
country and rating categories. 
Table 2.1 provides a distribution of banks and issues by country. We notice that most of the 
issues are German (1,018 out of 1,924). Most of British issues were deleted during the sample 
selection as for most issuers we cannot assess bank managerial ability. Table 2.2 presents 
some general descriptive statistics at the bank level.  
                                                     
42
 In the first step, we keep banks for which we are able to measure bank managerial ability for at least one year. 
However, at the bond level, it is not necessary that all these banks have a measure available for all years and that 
explain the reason why we drop some bonds. 
43
 As criteria, we choose to only keep bonds for which the related spread is superior to -500 basis points. For 
robustness, we estimate a spread equation with these 10 bonds or without the years of the sovereign debt crisis. 
Results are robust. We also compute a spread relative to the same risk - free rate for all bonds, the German 
government bond yield, and proceed to the estimation of the bond spread equation. We find very similar results. 
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Table 2.1: Distribution of banks and issues by country 
Countries Banks
*
 
Sample 
Issuers Issues 
Austria 12 5 89 
Belgium 2 - - 
Britain 11 4 17 
Denmark 17 2 12 
Finland 3 1 14 
France 28 7 193 
Germany 15 9 1,018 
Greece 10 1 1 
Ireland 4 4 107 
Italy 30 13 200 
Netherlands 6 2 4 
Norway 19 4 6 
Portugal 5 3 15 
Spain 9 7 125 
Sweden 7 4 121 
Switzerland 14 1 2 
Total 192 67 1,924 
*
European listed banks available in Bankscope for which we have the required data to compute the measure of 
bank managerial ability.  
 
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for the 67 issuing banks 
All variables are expressed in percentage except for TA, which is in billion Euros. TA is banks’ total assets. 
ROA is the return on assets. ROAE is the return on average equity. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total 
assets. NLTA is the ratio of net loans to total assets. TCR is the risk-based total capital ratio. TIER1R is the risk-
based Tier 1 capital ratio. LLPNL is the ratio of loan loss provision to net loans.  
 TA ROA ROAE EQTA NLTA TCR TIER1R LLPNL 
Mean 507.00 0.19 4.40 4.28 50.43 12.28 8.91 0.72 
Median 275.00 0.22 6.29 3.57 57.57 11.82 8.20 0.60 
St. Dev. 504.00 0.53 12.24 1.91 17.59 2.31 2.43 0.58 
Maximum 2,200.00 1.59 34.06 12.05 88.27 22.40 18.90 6.97 
Minimum 5.13 -7.00 -129.58 1.45 10.33 8.00 4.30 0.01 
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2.3. A risk-return measure of bank managerial ability 
At each date, bank managers assign subjective probabilities to different future economic 
states. As managerial skills or competences differ, this assignment depends on their relative 
expertise in processing the available information and some banks are better than others to 
infer an optimal productive strategy. Consequently, the risk-return couple of the best banks 
would be located on a so-called best practice frontier (BPF) whereas it would be located under 
for the others. We argue that the relative distance from a given risk-return couple to the 
frontier is an acceptable measure for the actual bank managerial ability only if the involved 
risk-return measures are expected ones. Indeed, realized ones are influenced not only by past 
production choices but also by random events that have occurred and that are beyond 
managers control. Consequently, the estimation of bank managerial ability requires, at first, 
an accurate assessment of expected return and risk that result only from bank production 
choices, second, a satisfactory layout of the BPF, and third, a measure of the distance from 
each observation to this BPF. 
We first disclose return and risk for bank b at time t from a microeconomic grounded Almost 
Ideal Demand System AIDS 44  as described in DeYoung et al. (2001). Previous studies 
underline the importance of accounting for managers' risk preferences while estimating the 
bank portfolio production plan as risk influences their investment strategies. The AIDS 
approach hypothesizes that risk adverse bank managers have the possibility to trade return for 
a reduced risk. Managers maximize their own utility function, for given output prices and 
quantities. Equally, this managers' utility-maximization problem can be considered as a dual 
one: managers minimize an expenditure function, for given prices and utility level, to 
determine expected profit and input quantities, subject to technological and income 
equilibrium constraints. The solution of this dual problem results in a preferred expenditure 
function for the given prices, outputs, and utility level. The generalized functional form of this 
preferred expenditure function is similar to DeYoung et al. (2001). Using the Shephard's 
lemma, system of partial derivatives equations of the expenditure function are defined i.e. 
profit and inputs shares. The coefficients of this system are estimated on a moving window. 
Then, from the estimated profit share, we deduce the return on equity of the bank. Risk is 
finally computed as the standard deviation of this return. 
                                                     
44
 See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).  
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Second, with these measures of bank expected risk and return, we are able to compute the best 
practice frontier. We can choose between two main methods to estimate this BPF: the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). The efficiency 
measure resulting from the DEA method incorporates management characteristics but also 
unidentified factors (firm-specific or environmental) that may aid or hinder manager's 
activity. Even if purging the DEA efficiency measure from firm - specific, industry and time 
factors potentially allow to attribute the unexplained portion of firm efficiency/residual to 
management (see Demerjian et al. (2012)), the SFA method saves this additional step.  
Then, we follow DeYoung et al. (2001) and use a stochastic model (SFA); the DEA one will 
be only used as robustness check. This method breaks down the distance to the BPF in two 
components, a pure inefficiency part and a stochastic one, avoiding interpreting as 
inefficiency what would be actually a random shock. The time-dependant BPF relies on the 
estimated return (ER) and risk (RK) 45 1998-2011 time series. As in Hughes et al. (1996) and 
DeYoung et al. (2001), these risk and return measures are standardized relative to their 
respective standard deviations. The BPF pattern depends on a Battese and Coelli (1992)
46
 
model for which:  
 
i,t i,t i,tER =α + β RK + ε
 
(2.1) 
 
with:   
As in a productive efficiency model, the risk of bank i at time t is considered as an input and 
the return as the induced output.  
The bank and time specific error term i,t is made up of two independent components: (i) a 
first usual statistical noise  which is hypothesized to be a normal two-sided term; and (ii) a 
                                                     
45
 We clean ER and RK, by removing extreme observations. More, as robustness check, we compute several 
different measures of risk and expected return to guarantee that our measures are robust. We alternately choose 
different measures of the risk-free rate, of tax rate on profit, estimate the system parameters with the least square 
method, add an output in the model and not remove extreme value. We establish a significant Spearman rank-
order correlation between all these measures and conclude that our results are robust
.
. All these results are 
available upon request. 
46
 The Battese and Coelli (1992) model uses maximum likelihood techniques to estimate a time-varying 
efficiency. We give advantage to this model because unlike previous ones, it relaxes the assumption that 
inefficiencies are constant through time (this hypothesis is hard to accept through many time periods (see 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000)).  
i,t i,t i,tu   
i,t
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one-sided negative second one (- ui,t) which depends on the manager relative ability to select 
an efficient risk-return combination: 
 
Only the second component depends on bank managerial ability. When assessing managerial 
ability at time t, we refer to a time dependent BPFt which is based on a 5-year [t-4, t] rolling 
window. On the set of 192 banks, for each date t, parameter values () are estimated 
by maximizing the log-likelihood47 associated to the model on the relevant period, [t-4, t], 
starting on t = 2002. Residuals  are computed accordingly48. Appendix 2.3 presents the 
estimates of each BPFt, from t = 2002 to 2011. Appendix 2.4 shows the last BPF (2011), 
which is based on the 2007-2011 period49.  
 
At last, we make use of the conditional distribution of ui,t given i,t to infer the expected 
(conditional) ûi,t value for ui,t given ; the estimated measure for bank i managerial ability 
at time t is computed as: 
BMAit = 
itˆ-ue
 
(2.2) 
whose values lie between zero (harmful ability) and 1 (the risk-return combination locates on 
the relevant BPFt). Appendix 2.5 presents the mean value of BMA through years.  
  
                                                     
47
 We used the SFA function of the R - FRONTIER package to implement this estimation. 
48
 For robustness check, we also compute a BPFt computed using all the information available prior time t.  
Results are available upon request. 
49
 It can be noticed that some risk-return observations can overtake the BPF: such an event occurs if the pure-
noise component of the error term cancels out the inefficiency one and the over performing bank benefits from a 
positive random event. 
i,t
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2.4. Variables and model specification  
We investigate whether the quality of bank management affects the bond spread level and 
thus improves the explanation of default premium. 
The baseline spread equation is: 
 
8
0 1 2 i(j)t(j)
3 4
5 i(j)t(j) 6 7 t(j) 9 j
c c(j) r m(j)
= β β β
β β
β  β β β β
SPREAD + RISK  + BMA  
           + LIQUIDITY  TAX
 + SIZE + MATURITY + SUBD + CRISIS  + LAMBDA  
 + α DCO θ DCU ε

  
j j
j j
j j
c m
j
c m
 
(2.3) 
where j denotes the individual bond (j = 1, 2, ..., 1,924), i denotes the bank that issues the 
bond (i = 1, 2, ..., 67), t(j) denotes the date of issuance of the bond j, c(j) denotes the country 
in which the bank is located, m(j) denotes the currency in which the bond has been issued, 
DCO is a vector of countries dummy variables, DCU is a vector of currencies dummy 
variables and    is the error term.  
2.4.1. The dependent variable 
The dependent variable is SPREAD, that is the difference, in basis points, between the bond 
yield to maturity at issuance and the yield of a same currency and maturity Treasury Bond. 
When the time to maturity differs, we interpolate the government bond yield to match with 
the bank bond yield to maturity before calculating the spread. When the bond is issued in 
Euros, we choose the country of the issuing bank as benchmark.  
 
2.4.2. The default premium 
The default premium is required by bondholders to compensate for the bank likelihood of 
failure and directly affects the level of bond spread. In this paper, we assume that this default 
premium is made of two components: RISK, which is a common measure of the default risk 
of the issuing banks, and BMA, the bank managerial ability measure.  
The RISK variable is proxied by issue ratings. These ratings are assigned at issuance by the 
Fitch, Moody's or Standard & Poors agencies to the single issue. We converted them into 
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cardinal values as shown in Appendix 2.1. If several agencies rate bonds at issuance, we use 
the average rating. If only one of them rates the issue, we consider the rating of this particular 
agency. We consider issue ratings50 as the main default risk measure for several reasons. First, 
on the primary market, issue ratings are essential: they reflect the bank's credit quality near 
the time of issuance whereas others proxies do not have this time accuracy. Second, by using 
publicly and private information, through quantitative and qualitative analyses, rating 
agencies provide a rating of the bond which reflects their synthetic opinion about bank's 
default probability and also its recovery rate. Credit ratings are relevant as banks' credit risk 
quality measure. Third, this proxy is commonly used in the bond spread literature. Papers 
such as Houweling et al. (2005) underline the importance of bond ratings in the determination 
of the bond spread and support the evidence of a tight relationship between the bond spread 
and ratings. Finally, we expect that default risk increases with a higher default probability 
and/or a lower expected recovery rate, that is when the credit rating gets worse, the bond 
spread should increase.  
However, a few studies (such as Bliss (2001), Campbell and Taksler (2003) or Iannotta et al. 
(2013)) suggest that bond ratings are not enough to capture the default premium and underline 
the importance of including additional information to improve the measure of the default 
premium. To this end and consistent with our first hypothesis, we introduce bank managerial 
ability as a determinant of the default premium required by bondholders to improve its 
assessment: an improvement in the quality of the management should result in a significant 
decrease of the bond spread. We thus expect a negative relationship between the spread and 
BMA.  
 
2.4.3. Control variables 
Previous studies underline the importance of tax and liquidity effects as they prove to be 
significant non-risk default determinants (see Elton et al. (2001), Longstaff et al. (2004) or 
Houweling et al. (2005)). When bond liquidity increases, the bond spread decreases. However 
we cannot assert that large issues are the most liquid. In theory, large issues should benefit 
from lower information costs and should be easily traded and more liquid. This should lead to 
a negative effect on bond spread. However McGinty (2001) and Iannotta et al. (2013) show 
that some large issues are illiquid and poorly traded. Thus, bondholders may require a higher 
                                                     
50
 Other specifications of the default risk variable are considered in robustness section.  
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spread from large issues. This could lead to a positive effect on bond spread. Hence, the effect 
of the issue amount in terms of liquidity is unclear. We expect that the bond spread includes a 
tax-related component. Bank bonds are subject to country taxes whereas government bonds 
are not. Investors who choose bonds with a high coupon rate will pay higher taxes on each 
coupon compared to bonds with a low coupon rate. The formers have a larger tax burden and 
are at tax disadvantage. The size of the tax component is then proportional to the coupon rate 
of the bonds. Thus, a high coupon rate is less desirable and bondholders should be 
compensated by a higher spread. We expect that this variable positively impacts the bond 
spread. To consider both liquidity and tax effects, we include respectively these two variables: 
AMOUNT, the natural logarithm of the issue amount (expressed in Euros) and TAX, the 
coupon rate. 
In addition to these two variables, we include other bond-level variables as determinants of 
bond spread. MATURITY is the time between the issuance and the maturity of the issue 
(expressed in years). As the probability of default increases with investment horizon, we 
expect a positive sign. SUBD is a dummy that equals 1 if the bond is subordinated, and 0 
otherwise. This dummy differentiates bonds depending on their status in case of default. 
Subordinated debt holders should be more sensitive to the default risk as they are repaid after 
senior ones. They anticipate consequently higher losses for a given default risk. Thus, we 
predict a positive coefficient. 
We also introduce control variables that are found in the literature to affect the bond spread. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. We control for the influence of the size on 
bond spreads for two reasons. First, the too-big-to-fail effect makes bondholders believe that 
regulators will act to prevent failure or compensate investors in case of bank difficulties. 
Second, large banks present more diversified assets in their portfolio and then have a lower 
specific risk than small banks. In both cases, we expect a negative coefficient. CRISIS is a 
dummy that equals 1 if the issuance date occurs during the distress period, from July 2007 to 
the end of 2011, 0 otherwise. According to previous studies, the yield spread is more sensitive 
to bank risk during the financial crisis, and we expect a positive sign. LAMBDA is the inverse 
of a Mills' ratio. Covitz et al. (2004) show that estimates of the bond spread equation are most 
likely contaminated by a selection bias: the bank issuance choice may be conditional to the 
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spread predicted by the bank. We control for this possible selection bias with an Heckman 
(1979) correction51 and we accordingly introduce this variable in the spread equation. 
We finally include a set of currency and country dummies52 to control for differences across 
issues related to economic situations, cross-country institutional differences or liquidity that 
may affect bond pricing.  
Table 2.3 is the correlation matrix53. Table 2.4 provides some general descriptive statistics of 
the variables.  
                                                     
51
 Results of this estimation are shown in Appendix 2.6. 
52
 We drop one of each to avoid colinearity issue. We also estimate the spread equation without currency and 
country dummies in robustness checks. 
53
 As MATURITY and TAX exhibit a high degree of correlation, we alternately estimate the spread equation 
without one of them as robustness. Main results are not altered.  
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Table 2.3: Correlation matrix 
RISK is the average issue rating, BMA is the proxy of bank managerial ability. AMOUNT is the natural logarithm of amount of issue in Euros. TAX is the coupon rate. SIZE 
is the natural logarithm of the issuing bank's total assets. MATURITY is the number of years between the issue and the redemption date. SUBD is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the issuing debt is subordinated, and zero otherwise. The dummy CRISIS equals 1 if the issuance date occurs during the distress period, from July 2007 to the 
end of 2011, and 0 otherwise. 
***.
 
**.
 
*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
RISK BMA AMOUNT TAX SIZE MATURITY SUBD CRISIS 
RISK 1.00 
       
BMA 0.04 1.00 
      
AMOUNT -0.17
***
 0.22
***
 1.00 
     
TAX 0.16
***
 0.12
***
 0.00 1.00 
    
SIZE -0.04
*
 -0.26
***
 -0.05
**
 0.02 1.00 
   
MATURITY  -0.01 -0.02 0.05
**
 0.35
***
 0.07
***
 1.00 
  
SUBD 0.22
***
 0.04 0.09
***
 0.34
***
 0.04
**
 0.41
***
 1.00 
 
CRISIS 0.15
***
 0.14
***
 -0.16
***
 -0.12
***
 -0.08
***
 -0.04 -0.03 1.00 
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Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
SPREAD is the difference in basis points between the bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency and maturity treasury bond, RISK is the average issue rating. 
BMA is the proxy of bank managerial ability, AMOUNT is the natural logarithm of amount of issue in Euros. TAX is the coupon rate. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the 
issuing bank's total assets. MATURITY is the number of years between the issue and the redemption date. SUBD is a dummy variable that equals one if the issuing debt is 
subordinated, and zero otherwise. The dummy CRISIS equals 1 if the issuance date occurs during the distress period, from July 2007 to the end of 2011, and 0 otherwise.  
 SPREAD RISK BMA AMOUNT TAX SIZE MATURITY SUBD CRISIS 
Mean 58.25 3.71 0.46 18.28 3.44 19.52 4.85 0.04 0.49 
Median 39.96 4.00 0.49 18.42 3.39 19.39 4.00 0.00 0.00 
St. Dev. 70.10 1.88 0.15 2.07 1.32 1.11 3.15 0.20 0.50 
Maximum 469.76 11.00 0.79 24.32 8.75 21.51 30.00 1.00 1.00 
Minimum -212.56 1.00 0.04 11.99 0.01 15.42 0.08 0.00 0.00 
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2.5. Empirical results 
2.5.1. Effect of bank managerial ability on bond spreads 
We first undertake some mean and variance tests. Table 2.5 reports the mean and the standard 
deviation of the spread according to the level of each right hand side variable of the equation.   
We split the sample into two sub-samples: (i) below or above the median for the following 
variables (BMA, RISK, SIZE, AMOUNT, MATURITY and TAX), (ii) before or during the 
distress period, and (iii) according to whether the issue is subordinated or not. We then test for 
the equality of the means of SPREAD (T-test) and for the equality of the variances (F-test).  
The objective here is to check whether the mean and the standard deviation of the spread 
differ across the sub-samples tested. If we consider the t-test in the case of the BMA variable, 
we make two subsamples: the first one (HBMA) identifies the bonds issued by the well-
managed banks that is with a BMA superior to the median value. The second sub-sample 
(LBMA) includes bonds from banks which have a BMA inferior or equal to the median value. 
We then calculate the mean of the spread for each subset:                     and                     , and 
we test for:  
 
 
                                            
                                                  
  
 
In order to have consistent results, we expect to reject the null hypothesis, which is the case. 
The procedure is similar for the F-test. 
We find that the mean spread and dispersion differ between better and worse managed banks. 
Those that are the worse managed are penalized. The average spread is higher for badly-rated 
bonds, illiquid bonds, subordinated bonds, long maturities bonds that have been issued during 
the financial crisis, and bonds with high coupon rate. The mean spread test does not show a 
significant difference depending on the size of the issuers.  
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Table 2.5: Bond spread and issue characteristics 
RISK is the average issues ratings. BMA is the proxy of bank managerial ability. AMOUNT is the natural 
logarithm of amount of issue in Euros. TAX is the coupon rate, SIZE is the natural logarithm of the issuing 
bank's total assets. MATURITY is the number of years between the issue and the redemption date. SUBD is a 
dummy variable that equals to one if the issuing debt is subordinated, and zero otherwise. The dummy CRISIS 
equals 1 if the issuance date occurs during the distress period, from July 2007 to the end of 2011, and 0 
otherwise. We split the whole sample into two equally sized sub-samples: below or above the median for the 
following variables (BMA, RISK, SIZE, AMOUNT, MATURITY and TAX)
 54
; before or during the distress 
period and according to whether the issue is subordinated or not. We then test for the equality of the means of 
SPREAD (T-test) and variances (F-test) 
***.
 
**.
 
*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
T-stat is the Student statistic for H0: "the mean of the spread is the same on the two subsamples". 
F-stat is the Fisher statistic for H0: "the standard deviation of the spread is the same on the two subsamples". 
Variables Subsets 
Nb of 
issues 
Mean 
Spread 
T-stat 
Std. Dev. 
Spread 
F-stat 
BMA 
[Q1-Q50[ 962 67.37 
(-5.75)
***
 
73.70 
(1.28)
***
 
[Q50-Q100] 962 49.13 65.09 
RISK 
[Q1-Q50] 1,200 52.38 
(4.79)
***
 
65.84 
(1.32)
***
 
]Q50-Q100] 724 67.99 75.70 
AMOUNT 
[Q1-Q50[ 889 52.09 
(3.58)
***
 
67.63 
(1.12)
*
 
[Q50-Q100] 1,035 63.54 71.78 
TAX 
[Q1-Q50[ 962 39.45 
(12.20)
***
 
60.12 
(1.53)
***
 
[Q50-Q100] 962 77.05 74.25 
SIZE 
[Q1-Q50[ 962 56.57 
(1.05) 
64.41 
(1.36)
***
 
[Q50-Q100] 962 59.94 75.37 
MATURITY 
[Q1-Q50] 979 54.51 
(-2.38)
***
 
65.17 
(1.31)
***
 
]Q50-Q100] 945 62.13 74.71 
SUBD 
Yes 87 133.59 
(-10.54)
***
 
79.83 
(1.39)
***
 
Now 1,837 54.68 67.58 
CRISIS 
Before 949 19.11 
(28.93)
***
 
40.11 
(3.22)
***
 
During 975 96.35 
72.06 
                                                     
54
 Even using the median value, we do not necessarily obtain the same number of observations in each sub-
sample. Indeed, for some variables, the median value is taken by a multitude of observations. For example, in the 
case of the risk variable, 357 bonds have a rating equal to 4, the median value. This represents 18% of the 
sample. We decided to affect the median value either to the superior or the inferior sub-sample in order to try to 
balance each subset.  
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We then estimate the coefficients of the spread model using OLS and robust variance-
covariance matrix for these estimated coefficients. Column 1 in Table 2.6 reports the results 
of this estimation.  
Coefficients of both RISK and BMA appear to be highly significant: worst rated and 
managed banks pay a larger spread. A lower bond rating reflects a higher probability of 
default, which conveys a higher yield spread. A decrease in the BMA measure reveals a 
decline in the bank managerial ability for which bondholders require a higher spread. A one 
standard deviation improvement of BMA (0.15) decreases the bond spread by 7.85 basis 
points55. 
BMA appears to be a determinant of the bond spread in addition to the risk variable. We 
suggest two explanations for such a finding. First, Leverty and Grace (2012) find that 
inefficient management leads to a higher likelihood of failure. Firms controlled by less 
capable managers are more likely to become insolvent. Thus, while the effect of managerial 
ability on bank default risk should be fully incorporated by bond ratings, we observe a direct 
effect on bond spreads which tends to confirm that the default proxy does not entirely reflect 
the default premium. Second, Demerjian et al. (2013) find that managerial ability has a 
positive impact on bank disclosure policies and financial reporting quality56 which leads to 
lower bank opacity. Moreover, as shown by Bharath et al. (2008)57, when the quality of the 
reported information increases, investors can better assess the economic performance of firms. 
Therefore banks with more capable managers provide data that are more reliable. The default 
measure is more faithful for performing banks. Bondholders are thus less confident about the 
default measure of banks with low level of managerial ability because of their lack of 
disclosure and their less stable behavior. They require a higher spread to compensate for this 
uncertainty, whatever the level of default, which is captured by the bank managerial ability 
measure. 
 
                                                     
55
 The economic effect of improving BMA by one standard deviation on bond spread is computed as: 0.15 x -
52.32 ≈ -7.85 
56
 They show that superior managers have a better judgment and knowledge about their films leading to higher 
quality earnings, which accurately reflect companies' current operating performance.  
57
 They measure the degree of discretionary accounting choices made by firms. Banks have difficulties to 
estimate future operating cash flows of borrowers using financial statements in the case of firms with large 
abnormal operating accruals, that is abnormal deviations between earnings and operating cash flow. A high level 
of abnormal operating accruals reveals a poor accounting quality which results in higher loan spread. 
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The coefficient of AMOUNT is positive and significant. Bondholders require a higher spread 
from larger amounts. We suggest two explanations for this finding. On one hand, this result 
may imply that larger bonds are illiquid. It is consistent with previous results such as McGinty 
(2001) and, more recently, Iannotta et al. (2013) who suggest that some large bonds are 
actually poorly traded. In that case, the bond spread increases because the high amount of the 
bond decreases its liquidity. On the other hand, a bank that issues larger bonds increases its 
level of debt but, at the same time, its probability of missing ongoing debt payments. 
According to structural models, a firm is assumed to default when the value of its liabilities 
exceed the value of its assets (Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974)). Accordingly, 
when a bank issue a new debt, its level of liabilities increases and this bank is more likely to 
reach the condition for default. This effect is even stronger than the amount of bond is large. 
Holders of larger bonds are then exposed to a higher risk to lose their investment and may 
also require an higher spread for this reason. 
The positive and significant sign associated with TAX points out that bondholders require a 
tax premium. These results confirm empirical findings (see Elton et al. (2001), Longstaff et 
al. (2004), Driessen (2005) or Houweling et al. (2005)). The MATURITY coefficient is 
negative and significant. Bondholders seem to charge a higher spread for bonds with shorter 
maturity. A deeper analysis of bondholders’ behavior before and during the financial crisis 
might explain this result. The SUBD dummy is positive and significant: subordinated debt 
holders require a higher spread for the higher risk they bear (see Pop (2006)). 
The coefficients of the other control variables are consistent with the literature. The sign of 
the SIZE variable is negative and significant. This suggests that large issuers benefit from 
diversification or from an implicit guarantee discount on the yield spread (see Flannery and 
Sorescu (1996) or Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011)). The bond spread is significantly higher 
during the recent financial crisis (starting in mid-2007) as shown by the positive and 
significant coefficient associated to the CRISIS variable. The 2007-2009 financial crisis led to 
an increase in the bond premium required by investors (see Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2011)). 
The inverse of the Mills’ ratio (LAMBDA) presents a significant coefficient, we thus need to 
take into account the sample selection bias in our study (see Covitz et al. (2004)). In 
summary, our results suggest that, when we control for observable issue characteristics and 
issuer fundamentals, bondholders directly price bank managerial ability. 
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2.5.2. Financial crisis effect on the pricing of managerial ability 
According to our hypothesis 2, we ask whether the behavior of bondholders is the same 
depending on the economic situation. We further look into our analysis by considering two 
sub-periods: before and during the recent financial crisis. The first period stretches from 2002 
to the end of the second quarter of 2007. The financial crisis goes from the third quarter of 
2007 to the end of 2011. Appendix 2.7 reports the number of issues and the average spread for 
the whole period and for each sub-period. This table also provides breakdowns by payment 
rank, maturity groups, coupon rate groups, credit rating groups and whether or not there is a 
disagreement between rating agencies. Nearly the same number of bonds is issued during both 
periods: 949 during the sound period and 975 during the stressed one. However, the number 
of issuers is quite different: during the distress period, 58 banks have issued bonds while only 
20 one of them has issued bonds during the sound period58.  
We estimate coefficients of the spread model presented in equation 2.3 for both periods. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.6 report the results for the sound and distress periods.  
The financial crisis has influenced the way bondholders price debt. Before the distress period, 
bondholders only price bank managerial ability. The default risk proxy is not significant. 
However, during the financial crisis, both default risk proxy and bank managerial ability are 
priced by bondholders. Bondholders have become sensitive to the risk measure. We can also 
observe that they are more sensitive to bank managers' ability as the coefficient relative to the 
BMA variable is higher during the distress period. Improving BMA of one standard deviation 
results in a reduction of 4.19 basis points of the spread during the sound period while 
decreasing the spread by 14.88 basis points during the turmoil. The increase of the default 
probability and uncertainty during the financial crisis has led bondholders to be particularly 
attentive in the pricing of the default premium. Our results suggest that bondholders have 
increased their monitoring during the difficult time.  
The effect of the amount of issue is different depending on the sub-samples periods. While it 
matters during the sound period, it becomes non significant during the distress period. The tax 
 
 
                                                     
58
 The financial crisis led many banks to adjust their funding models towards more stable and more traditional 
sources. 
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premium appears to be a determinant of the bond spread in both periods. Bank size and 
payment rank matter during the sound period, bond maturity and payment rank during the 
financial crisis. The coefficient of bond maturity appears to be negative and significant only 
during the financial crisis. Given the liquidity problems faced by banks during the period 
considered (see the average amount of issues in Appendix 2.2), our result might be explained 
by a strong demand of liquidity with short maturities (2007, 2008, and 2009 are characterized 
by the lowest average maturities over the period studied) while demand for longer maturities 
is lessen.  
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Table 2.6: Bond spread equations: whole, sound and distress periods 
This table reports the estimates of equation 2.3 where SPREAD is the difference in basis points between the 
bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency and maturity treasury bond, RISK is the average issue 
rating, BMA is the proxy of bank managerial ability. AMOUNT is the natural logarithm of amount of issue in 
Euros. TAX is the coupon rate. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the issuing bank's total assets. MATURITY is 
the number of years between the issue and the redemption date. SUBD is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
issuing debt is subordinated, and zero otherwise. The dummy CRISIS equals 1 if the issuance date occurs during 
the distress period, from the July 2nd 2007 to the end of 2011, 0 otherwise. LAMBDA is the inverse of the 
Mills’ ratio. ***. **. * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Country and currency 
dummies are present in each equation. 
 Whole Sound Distress 
 (1) (2) (3) 
RISK (α) 4.528*** 0.891 8.032*** 
 (7.26) (1.38) (7.65) 
BMA (β) -52.330*** -27.982*** -99.223*** 
 (-5.20) (-2.79) (-5.18) 
AMOUNT 1.578
**
 2.075
***
 0.658 
 (2.25) (3.52) (0.54) 
TAX 18.878
***
 17.997
***
 21.252
***
 
 (11.36) (6.57) (9.25) 
SIZE -5.739
***
 -7.859
***
 -4.159 
 (-3.33) (-5.63) (-1.42) 
MATURITY -1.719
***
 -0.471 -3.028
***
 
 (-3.77) (-0.68) (-4.62) 
SUBD 34.842
***
 16.340
**
 52.186
***
 
 (5.03) (2.09) (5.67) 
CRISIS 67.681
***
 - - 
 (22.78) - - 
LAMBDA -48.441
**
 -64.621
***
 -21.546 
 (-2.17) (-4.30) (-0.78) 
CONSTANT 51.430 87.677
**
 102.111
*
 
 (1.34) (2.48) (1.77) 
Obs. 1,924 949 975 
Adjusted R² 0.550 0.356 0.415 
F 64.395 18.480 21.357 
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2.5.3. Factors affecting the relationship between managerial ability and 
bond spread 
To further our analysis, we investigate whether the grade of credit ratings, bond maturity and 
payment rank strengthen or weaken the relationship between managerial ability and bond 
spread. 
For each category, we estimate coefficients of the spread model.  
2.5.3.1. Credit Ratings 
In columns 1 to 3, we report subsample equations for three rating categories: respectively high 
(AAA), medium (between AA+ and AA-) and low (between A+ and BB+) rating levels. 
Table 2.7 reports the results of these estimations. 
For each of the three subsamples, the BMA coefficient is negative and significant as for the 
whole sample. Whatever the level of default risk, bondholders require a higher spread for 
impaired management. Moreover our results show that for bonds rated A+ to BB+ investors 
are more sensitive to managerial ability than for those with better ratings. The coefficient 
assigned to this variable is more than twice the one of bonds with a rating above A+.  
We observe that the coefficient of the default risk proxy is positive and significant only for 
bonds with a default risk belonging to the low rated category: we can foresee that the default 
risk proxy matters only for these bonds as this category presents the most disparity among the 
ratings.  
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Table 2.7: Bond spread equations: credit rating categories 
This table reports the estimates of equation 2.3 on subsample for respectively high (AAA), medium (between 
AA+ and AA-) and low (between A+ and BB+) rating levels. SPREAD is the dependent variable defined as the 
difference in basis points between the bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency and maturity 
treasury bond, RISK is the average issue rating, BMA is the proxy of bank managerial ability. AMOUNT is the 
natural logarithm of amount of issue in Euros. TAX is the coupon rate. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the 
issuing bank's total assets. MATURITY is the number of years between the issue and the redemption date. 
SUBD is a dummy variable that equals one if the issuing debt is subordinated, and zero otherwise. The dummy 
CRISIS equals 1 if the issuance date occurs during the distress period, from the July 2nd 2007 to the end of 
2011, 0 otherwise. LAMBDA is the inverse of the Mills’ ratio. ***. **. * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels respectively. Country and currency dummies are present in each equation. 
 [AAA] [AA+ ; AA-] [A+ ; BB+] 
 (1) (2) (3) 
RISK (α) -1.076 1.949 7.873** 
 (-0.12) (0.69) (2.22) 
BMA (β) -46.214*** -43.053** -106.198*** 
 (-3.10) (-2.49) (-5.80) 
AMOUNT 0.650 1.622
*
 2.436 
 (0.44) (1.67) (1.48) 
TAX 10.386
***
 21.628
***
 22.934
***
 
 (6.61) (7.67) (7.22) 
SIZE -13.072
***
 -3.098 -15.320
***
 
 (-3.50) (-0.91) (-4.04) 
MATURITY -2.960
***
 -0.498 -2.617
***
 
 (-4.32) (-0.63) (-2.95) 
SUBD - 27.280
**
 29.879
***
 
 - (2.28) (3.36) 
CRISIS 43.585
***
 74.174
***
 68.283
***
 
 (9.14) (14.61) (11.19) 
LAMBDA -120.977
***
 -54.831 -91.514
***
 
 (-3.67) (-0.91) (-2.67) 
CONSTANT 259.876
***
 -9.373 213.854
**
 
 (3.66) (-0.12) (2.47) 
Obs. 461 894 569 
Adjusted R² 0.555 0.560 0.630 
F 25.927 32.549 31.209 
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2.5.3.2. Payment Rank 
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.8, we report subsample estimates for respectively secured 
bonds and unsecured / subordinated bonds.  
Results are in line with our previous ones: the BMA coefficient is negative and significant for 
both categories whereas the pricing of the default risk proxy is effective only for unsecured / 
subordinated bonds. The coefficient estimates of most control variables are statistically 
significant for both categories and have the same signs as those we find in our baseline 
results. Bondholders price managerial ability whatever the payment rank of bonds.  
Our findings are in line with those of Bliss and Flannery (2000) and Pop (2006): subordinated 
bondholders are particularly sensitive to bank default risk, and their monitoring is more 
effective. 
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Table 2.8: Bond spread equations: payment rank categories 
This table reports the estimates of equation 2.3 on subsample for respectively secured bonds and unsecured or 
subordinated bonds. SPREAD is the dependent variable defined as the difference in basis points between the 
bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency and maturity treasury bond, RISK is the average issue 
rating, BMA is the proxy of bank managerial ability. AMOUNT is the natural logarithm of amount of issue in 
Euros. TAX is the coupon rate. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the issuing bank's total assets. MATURITY is 
the number of years between the issue and the redemption date. SUBD is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
issuing debt is subordinated, and zero otherwise. The dummy CRISIS equals 1 if the issuance date occurs during 
the distress period, from the July 2nd 2007 to the end of 2011, 0 otherwise. LAMBDA is the inverse of the 
Mills’ ratio. ***. **. * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Country and currency 
dummies are present in each equation. 
 Secured Unsecured / Subordinated 
 (1) (2) 
RISK (α) -1.060 5.729*** 
 (-0.45) (4.29) 
BMA (β) -67.874*** -53.868*** 
 (-3.45) (-4.31) 
AMOUNT -0.393 1.376
*
 
 (-0.26) (1.66) 
TAX 16.389
***
 19.572
***
 
 (5.21) (10.02) 
SIZE -13.320
***
 -5.410
**
 
 (-3.33) (-2.48) 
MATURITY -2.152
***
 -1.569
***
 
 (-2.89) (-2.76) 
SUBD 35.713
***
 31.210
***
 
 (6.25) (4.49) 
CRISIS -1.060 80.480
***
 
 (-0.45) (20.56) 
LAMBDA -115.883
***
 -32.085 
 (-2.64) (-1.23) 
CONSTANT 276.396
***
 33.070 
 (3.31) (0.65) 
Obs. 586 1,338 
Adjusted R² 0.358 0.596 
F 16.548 55.726 
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2.5.3.3. Maturity 
In Table 2.9 reports the estimates for the maturity effect. Instead of making two subgroups we 
opt here for the use of interaction terms59. We create a dummy HM which equals 1 if the 
maturity is higher than 4 years (the median maturity), 0 otherwise. We interact this term with 
both RISK and BMA. The δ coefficient, relative to the interacted variable BMA*HM, is not 
significant but the sum β + δ remains significantly negative: the effect of BMA on the spread 
does not depend on the maturity of the bond. Furthermore, our results show that bondholders 
sensitivity to the default risk proxy is stronger for long maturities: bondholders require a 
higher default risk premium for long-term bonds (see Güntay and Hackbarth (2010)). 
  
                                                     
59
 Results are similar if we proceed by sub-samples (available upon request). 
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Table 2.9: Bond spread equations: maturity effect 
This table reports the estimates of equation 2.3 where SPREAD is the difference in basis points between the 
bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency and maturity treasury bond, RISK is the average issue 
rating, BMA is the proxy of bank managerial ability. AMOUNT is the natural logarithm of amount of issue in 
Euros. TAX is the coupon rate. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the issuing bank's total assets. SUBD is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the issuing debt is subordinated, and zero otherwise. The dummy CRISIS 
equals 1 if the issuance date occurs during the distress period, from the July 2nd 2007 to the end of 2011, 0 
otherwise. LAMBDA is the inverse of the Mills’ ratio. HM is dummy which equals 1 if maturity is higher than 4 
years (median maturity), 0 otherwise. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
***.
 
**.
 
*
 indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Country and currency dummies are present in each equation. 
 SPREAD 
RISK (α) 3.243*** 
 (4.07) 
BMA (β) -42.955*** 
 (-3.70) 
AMOUNT 1.714
**
 
 (2.41) 
TAX 17.856
***
 
 (11.31) 
SIZE -6.359
***
 
 (-3.61) 
SUBD 24.467
***
 
 (3.45) 
CRISIS 68.194
***
 
 (22.80) 
LAMBDA -51.88
**
 
 (-2.24) 
CONSTANT 58.90 
 (1.52) 
RISK x HM (γ) 3.373*** 
 (2.88) 
BMA x HM (δ) -16.051 
 (-1.03) 
HM -8.562 
 (-1.01) 
Obs. 1,924 
Adjusted R² 0.547 
F 60.678 
test for α + γ = 0 6.61*** 
test for β + δ = 0 -59.00*** 
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2.6. Robustness checks 
Our results indicate evidences that managerial ability is a determinant of the bond spread. We 
undertake robustness checks relative to the bank managerial ability variable, and the 
relationship between this variable and the bond spread. Estimations are reported in 
Appendices 2.8 to 2.10. 
2.6.1. Spread equation and sample robustness 
We first perform several robustness checks related to the spread regression model. We 
estimate the spread equation: (i) excluding the managerial ability measure to test for the 
marginal explanatory power of this variable, (ii) excluding LAMBDA, the inverse of the 
Mills’ ratio, which can potentially drive results, (iii) excluding the TAX variable, (iv) 
excluding the MATURITY variable, (v) excluding country and currency dummies, (vi) 
calculating a bond spread using an identical benchmark for all bonds, the German 
Government Yield, and (vii) excluding years of the sovereign debt crisis i.e. 2010 and 2011. 
These estimations are available in Appendix 2.8.  
Compared to column (i) in Table A7 of Appendix 2.8, the adjusted R-squared of column (1) 
in Table 2.6 is higher due to the inclusion of bank managerial ability. This confirms that the 
introduction of bank managerial ability matters into the determination of bond spread.  
Second, the insertion of both TAX and MATURITY variables into the spread equation does 
not affect the main relationships.  
Third, excluding country and currency dummies (vi) affect the SIZE variable whose 
coefficient is no longer significant. This result is consistent with our findings in univariate 
mean tests and underlines the necessity to control for country and currency effects. 
Finally, our results are also robust to the choice of benchmark to compute the bond spread 
(vii) and to the time period (viii). 
 
2.6.2. Managerial ability robustness 
We then undertake robustness checks related to the measure of the bank managerial ability. 
Results can be found in Appendix 2.9. We try five different proxies for the measure of BMA: 
(i) BMA1 is computed using a Battese and Coelli (1995) model that includes environmental 
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variables60 as suggested by Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), (ii) BMA2 is obtained by using 
a data envelopment method (DEA) as Demerjian et al. (2012), (iii) BMA3 is estimated 
through the same technical estimation as BMA except we assume that investors refer to the 
very past information, and consequently the BPF is estimated using the whole information 
since 1998, the window for the estimation of the different annual frontiers is thus [1998, t], 
(iv) BMA4 is calculated with the introduction of a non linear term, the squared risk term, into 
the frontier61 as suggested by DeYoung et al. (2001), and (v) BMA5 is estimated using a 
single BPF computed over the complete period 1998-2011 assuming that investors hold ex-
post information.  
We can notice that when we use the DEA method (BMA2), the coefficient associated to bank 
managerial ability is no longer significant. This result may be a consequence of the use of the 
DEA method. Indeed, this nonparametric method cannot disentangle random error from 
inefficiency in the error term and is not able to provide an accurate measure of managerial 
ability. For the other proxies (BMA1, BMA3, BMA4, BMA5), results remain mostly the 
same. 
 
2.6.3. Risk robustness 
Finally, we replicate the estimations by replacing the default proxy (the rating bond) by 5 
different proxies also commonly used in the literature to measure the effect of the default 
premium on bond spreads. Results can be found in Appendix 2.10.  
First, we consider the distance to default (DD). We use the same formula as Crosbie and Bohn 
(2003) with a maturity of one year and daily series of equity market value. The daily series of 
debt are interpolated from annual ones using a cubic spline. The volatility of equity is 
measured as the standard deviation of the daily return multiplied by     . The risk-free 
interest rate is the 12-month Euribor whatever the country. All relevant series come from 
Bloomberg. A higher distance to default is associated with a lower probability of failure (see 
Demirovic et al. (2015)). Second, we use a market based and accounting Z-score. The market 
based Z-score (ZMKT) is computed using market measures of bank stock return and risk, the 
                                                     
60
 The Battese and Coelli (1995) model extends the Battese and Coelli (1992) one by expressing the one-sided 
inefficiency error component (     as a linear function of explanatory variables that reflects countries specific 
characteristics. We include the density of population, the domestic credit provided by financial sector and the 
GDP per capita relative to each countries (extracted from respectively Eurostat and the Worldbank).  
61
 The frontier equation is then ERit = RKit + RK² it  + it.  
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later is defined as the standard deviation of weekly bank stock returns computed on a moving 
window of 52 quoted weeks [t-51, t]. The accounting based Z-score (ZROA) equals the return 
on assets plus the capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. A 3-
year moving window is used to estimate standard deviations for each bank each year (see 
Cubillas et al. (2012) or Balasubramnian and Cyree (2014)). A higher Z-score indicates that a 
bank is more stable and less prone to default.  
Third, we use two different kind of bank ratings: RTGTRAD, the average of the Fitch, 
Moody's and Standard and Poor's issuer ratings and RTSOL, the average of bank individual / 
financial ratings (see Sironi (2003)). The former strength ratings are different from traditional 
issuer ratings as they exclude a potential influence of a safety net effect; in this respect, they 
reflect the intrinsic financial condition of banks. These ratings measures are built using the 
rating scales in Appendix 2.1. With the exception of RTSOL, for which the coefficient 
appears to be not significant, results remain unchanged whatever the risk proxy.  
 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the relationship between bank managerial ability and bond spread. We 
provide evidence that banks with better capable managers have significantly lower spread. 
This finding is robust to the inclusion of bank and issue-specific characteristics, common 
control variables, splitting of the sample and alternative econometric specifications. The 
impact of bank managerial ability on bond spread is significant. Disregarding management 
effects while studying bond spread determinants leads to a misspecification of the default risk 
component. We find evidence that bank bondholders take into account the quality of bank 
management in terms of risk and return when they price debt.  
Our findings also suggest that the quality of bank management is a determinant of 
bondholders' confidence in the measure of default risk. Unskilled managers are less able to 
make efficient choices and provide information which reflects inaccurately their true default 
probability. The actual level of default is then more uncertain for inadequately managed banks 
and bondholders require a higher spread to compensate for this uncertainty, whatever the 
current level of default. Our findings have potential policy implications in the market 
discipline field. They highlight that bondholders' monitoring is effective, and enhance the 
quality of market signals which correctly reflects banks' default profile.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 2.1: Table A1 - Ratings scales  
These tables indicate the numerical scale for credit ratings (see Ronn and Verma (1987)). As traditional credit ratings we use Moody's Issuer Rating, Fitch Long Term Issuer 
Default Rating, and Standard & Poor's Issuer Credit Rating. The strength ratings are only Moody's Bank Financial Strength Rating (MBFSR) and Fitch's Bank Individual 
Rating (FBIR) as Standard & Poor's agency does not provide a solidity rating.  
  Traditional credit rating: Issuers and Issues              Financial strength rating: Issuers 
 
Cardinal 
value 
Moody’s Fitch  S&P 
1 Aaa AAA AAA 
2 Aa1 AA+ AA+ 
3 Aa2 AA AA 
4 Aa3 AA- AA- 
5 A1 A+ A+ 
6 A2 A A 
7 A3 A- A- 
8 Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 
9 Baa2 BBB BBB 
10 Baa3 BBB- BBB- 
11 Ba1 BB+ BB+ 
12 Ba2 BB BB 
13 Ba3 BB-  BB-  
14 B1 B+ B+ 
15 B2 B B 
16 B3 B- B- 
17 Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ 
18 Caa2 CCC CCC 
19 Caa3 CCC- CCC- 
20 Ca CC CC 
21 C C C 
22 D D D 
Cardinal 
value 
MBFSR 
 Cardinal 
value 
FBIR 
1 A  1 A 
2 A-    
   2,5 A/B 
3 B+    
4 B  4 B 
5 B-    
   5,5 B/C 
6 C+    
7 C  7 C 
8 C-    
   8,5 C/D 
9 D+    
10 D  10 D 
11 D-    
   11,5 D/E 
12 E+    
13 E  13 E 
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Appendix 2.2: Table A2 - Distribution and sample descriptive statistics of issues by year, rating, and country categories.  
Subd indicates whether the issue is subordinated or not. Spread is the difference in basis points between bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency and maturity 
treasury bond. Maturity is the number of years between the issue and the redemption date. Bond rating, traditional and solidity bank ratings are the average rating of issues 
and banks respectively according to the rating scale (see Appendix 2.1). BMA is the proxy for bank managerial ability. 
 
Issues Nb. 
(Banks) 
Subd 
Spread Maturity 
(years) 
Amount 
(€ million) 
Bond 
Rating 
Traditional 
Bank Rating 
Solidity 
Bank 
Rating 
 
Mean S.d. BMA 
By year           
2002 94 (16) 14 24.68 39.69 5.16 344.51 3.63 4.76 5.67 0.41 
2003 133 (18) 8 34.05 60.34 5.38 207.17 4.47 5.62 6.98 0.38 
2004 252 (22) 7 9.71 30.64 4.83 166.21 4.13 5.36 6.12 0.46 
2005 207 (20) 1 11.54 32.25 4.93 259.38 3.59 5.67 6.04 0.51 
2006 146 (22) 6 27.28 40.14 4.52 405.47 4.33 5.44 5.09 0.53 
2007 185 (20) 4 36.18 39.00 3.82 1,487.32 3.74 4.73 4.96 0.61 
2008 180 (32) 14 110.98 78.47 4.52 669.46 3.40 4.63 5.59 0.43 
2009 261 (35) 8 120.42 67.59 4.28 667.57 3.16 4.83 6.55 0.38 
2010 319 (45) 17 76.30 58.53 5.73 788.98 3.37 5.52 7.42 0.41 
2011 147 (26) 8 95.11 91.04 5.23 631.58 3.98 6.10 6.47 0.54 
By rating           
AAA/Aaa 461 0 44.50 49.16 5.10 531.39 1.00 5.82 6.69 0.48 
AA+/Aa1 146 0 60.55 76.82 4.03 792.72 2.00 4.93 6.44 0.36 
AA/Aa2 236 2 80.91 76.20 4.72 1,290.73 3.00 4.00 4.92 0.47 
AA-/Aa3 512 28 51.53 72.01 5.03 514.26 4.00 4.65 5.76 0.44 
A+/A1 225 21 73.27 64.92 4.88 645.68 5.00 5.50 6.43 0.50 
A/A2 258 17 46.98 68.76 4.47 170.85 6.00 6.16 6.62 0.49 
A-/A3 70 13 107.71 97.38 5.18 142.38 7.00 6.74 7.71 0.42 
BBB+/Baa1 12 4 66.69 110.27 5.92 84.8 8.00 6.59 7.41 0.47 
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Table A.2 (Continued) 
BBB/Baa2 3 2 77.82 129.30 6.45 33.67 9.00 7.94 6.92 0.50 
BBB-/Baa3 0 0 - - - - 10.00 - - - 
BB+/Ba1 1 0 72.60 - 5.00 70.35 11.00 11.00 8.50 0.64 
By country           
Austria 89 (5) 1 68.34 54.73 5.79 136.57 3.54 6.01 7.57 053 
Britain 17 (4) 2 232.17 118.44 7.67 1,150.56 5.22 4.76 4.33 0.55 
Denmark 12 (2) 0 69.30 29.44 2.89 742.50 1.67 5.50 9.83 0.37 
Finland 14 (1) 2 94.38 91.80 4.99 1,604.64 3.71 3.71 5.14 0.50 
France 193 (7) 30 98.44 73.74 4.70 1,381.01 3.59 3.52 4.65 0.43 
Germany 1,018 (9) 20 35.17 51.13 4.65 210.81 3.73 5.55 6.57 0.41 
Greece 1 (1) 0 22.20 - 7.00 1,500.00 1.00 8.00 6.25 0.63 
Ireland 107 (4) 0 68.53 82.30 2.74 1,108.46 3.80 5.22 5.93 0.64 
Italy 200 (13) 25 69.77 81.91 5.81 836.83 4.91 5.98 6.39 0.51 
Netherlands 4 (2) 0 110.15 84.22 8.00 1,018.75 5.08 4.00 - 0.59 
Norway 6 (4) 0 36.34 24.43 3.33 275.00 5.16 6.25 6.62 0.64 
Portugal 15 (3) 0 83.50 93.97 4.68 845.33 2.74 5.92 6.18 0.59 
Spain 125 (7) 3 62.16 67.31 5.89 1,194.05 2.17 4.87 4.88 0.60 
Sweden 121 (4) 4 114.93 62.31 4.66 1,065.44 3.39 4.59 5.84 0.46 
Switzerland 2 (1) 0 102.50 115.17 3.99 425.00 3.42 4.33 5.25 0.33 
TOTAL 1,924 87 58.26 70.11 4.85 586.87 3.71 5.27 6.21 0.46 
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Appendix 2.3: Table A3 - Summary of stochastic frontier estimated parameters 
ER is the estimated bank return and RK is the bank risk. P-values are shown in parentheses. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
is equal to and  is the 
variance of the inefficiency component ui,t. 
Years Frontier equation Nb. Obs. 
Log 
Likelihood 
Mean 
Efficiency 
  
1998 - 
2002 
ER = 3.06
***
 + 0.06.RK 
(0.00)         (0.41) 
180 -252.63 0.4753 
0.75
***
 
(0.00) 
1.89
***
 
(0.00) 
1999 - 
2003 
ER = 2.94
***
 + 0.13
**.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.03) 
263 -369.58 0.5143 
0.64
***
 
(0.00) 
1.66
***
 
(0.00) 
2000 – 
2004 
ER = 2.89
***
 + 0.16
***.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
344 -482.81 0.5234 
0.62
***
 
(0.00) 
1.61
***
 
(0.00) 
2001 - 
2005 
ER = 2.81
***
 + 0.25
***
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
383 -530.64 0.5466 
0.57
***
 
(0.00) 
1.48
***
 
(0.00) 
2002 - 
2006 
ER = 2.91
***
 + 0.24
***.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
395 -548.51 0.5544 
0.54
***
 
(0.00) 
1.45
***
 
(0.00) 
2003 - 
2007 
ER = 3.17
***
 + 0.19
***.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
416 -582.18 0.5370 
0.58
***
 
(0.00) 
1.54
***
 
(0.00) 
2004 - 
2008 
ER = 3.24
***
 + 0.17
***.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
456 -635.84 0.4815 
0.74
***
 
(0.00) 
1.84
***
 
(0.00) 
2005 - 
2009 
ER = 2.99
***
 + 0.20
***.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
525 -730.63 0.4867 
0.73
***
 
(0.00) 
1.81
***
 
(0.00) 
2006 - 
2010 
ER = 2.67
***
 + 0.24
***.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
595 -828.10 0.5668 
0.52
***
 
(0.00) 
1.41
***
 
(0.00) 
2007 - 
2011 
ER= 2.57
***
 + 0.20
***.
RK 
(0.00)        (0.00) 
606 -848.34 0.5851 
0.47
***
 
(0.00) 
1.37
***
 
(0.00) 
 
Appendix 2.4: Figure A1 - The last estimated frontier over the period 2007 – 2011 
ER' is the estimated bank return and RK' is the bank risk.  
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Appendix 2.5: Table A4 - Mean return, risk and bank managerial ability measure for 
the 192 banks 
ER is the estimated bank return, RK is the bank risk and BMA is the measure of bank managerial ability.  
Years Return (ER) Risk (RK) BMA 
2002 0.18 0.41 0.52 
2003 0.16 0.39 0.50 
2004 0.15 0.25 0.50 
2005 0.14 0.23 0.51 
2006 0.15 0.27 0.54 
2007 0.16 0.23 0.57 
2008 0.15 0.31 0.49 
2009 0.11 0.20 0.41 
2010 0.12 0.34 0.54 
2011 0.11 0.35 0.55 
Total 0.14 0.32 0.51 
 
 
Appendix 2.6: Table A5 - Issuance decision model 
Our model of issuance decision is:  
it it it it it it it50 1 2 3 4DISSUE = α +α NPLNL +α VIX + α UNEMPL + α LNTA + α EQTA + ε
 
(2.4) 
DISSUE is a dummy that equals 1 if bank i decides to issue a new bond at time t and 0 otherwise. NPLNL is the 
non-performing loans to net loans ratio. VIX is an index of market volatility. UNEMPL is the unemployment 
rate relative to each country. LNTA is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. EQTA is the equity total assets 
ratio. The previous probit equation is estimated on a sample including both issuing and non-issuing banks. From 
the involved residuals, we compute LAMBDA, the inverse of the Mills’ ratio according to Heckman (1979) . 
Z-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 DISSUE 
NPLNL 0.253 
 (0.16) 
VIX 0.02
***
 
 (2.63) 
UNEMPL -0.06
***
 
 (-4.40) 
LNTA 0.81
***
 
 (19.08) 
EQTA -11.13
***
 
 (-8.36) 
Obs. 5,295 
Mc Fadden R² 0.705 
LR Statistic 2.099
***
 
 
 
Chapter 2 - Do bank bondholders price banks’ ability to manage risk/return? 
108 
Appendix 2.7: Table A6 - Descriptive statistics by issue characteristics over all periods 
The table reports the number of observations and the mean spread (in parentheses) for the whole, distress and 
sound periods. The distress period goes from July 2007 to the end of 2011 whereas the sound period goes from 
2002 to the end of June 2007. It also provides breakdowns by payment rank, maturity groups, coupon rate 
groups, credit rating groups and whether or not there is a disagreement between rating agencies.  
 Whole Sample Distress Sample Sound Sample 
Number of issuers 67 58 38 
Number of issues 1,924 (58.26) 975 (96.35) 949 (19.12) 
    
Payment Rank    
   Secured 586 (37.08) 271 (60.79) 315 (16.68) 
   Unsecured 1251 (62.94) 653 (104.50) 598 (17.55) 
   Subordinated 87 (133.59) 51 (180.90) 36 (66.57) 
    
Maturity    
   Short (< 5 years) 1,296 (55.95) 646 (97.66) 650 (14.51) 
   Medium (5 - 15 years) 602 (62.70) 318 (94.04) 284 (27.60) 
   Long (15 - 30 years) 26 (70.25) 11 (86.50) 15 (58.32) 
    
Coupon    
   0-2% 223 (29.14) 118 (64.82) 105 (-10.95) 
   2-4% 1,015 (45.37) 450 (86.49) 565 (12.62) 
   4-6% 621 (78.21) 362 (106.22) 259 (39.07) 
   6-10% 65 (168.63) 45 (198.21) 20 (102.06) 
    
Bond Rating    
    AAA 461 (44.50) 276 (66.36) 185 (11.89) 
    [AA+;AA-] 894 (60.76) 451 (103.98) 443 (16.75) 
    [A+;BB+] 569 (65.47) 248 (115.85) 321 (26.55) 
    
Split Rating    
    0 1,217 (52.27) 644 (84.50) 573 (16.04) 
    1 707 (68.57) 331 (119.41) 376 (23.81) 
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Appendix 2.8: Table A7 - Different specifications of the bond spread equation and 
sample 
This table reports estimations of different specifications for equation 2.3 where SPREAD is the difference in 
basis points between the bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency and maturity treasury bond. 
RISK is the average issue rating. BMA is the proxy of bank managerial ability. AMOUNT is the natural 
logarithm of amount of issue in Euros. TAX is the coupon rate. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the issuing 
bank's total assets. MATURITY is the number of years between the issue and the redemption date. SUBD is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the issuing debt is subordinated, and zero otherwise. The dummy CRISIS 
equals 1 if issuance occurs during the distress period, from July 2007 to the end of 2011, and 0 otherwise. 
LAMBDA is the inverse of the Mills’ ratio. For estimation (vi), we use a bond spread using a same benchmark 
for all bonds, the German Government Yield. For estimation (vii), we exclude years of the sovereign debt crisis 
i.e. 2010 and 2011. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
***.
 
**.
 
*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
RISK 4.554
***
 4.344
***
 6.523
***
 4.947
***
 4.75
***
 6.974
***
 3.523
***
 
 (7.23) (7.02) (9.99) (7.96) (7.07) (7.04) (5.06) 
BMA - -49.544
***
 -36.386
***
 -49.178
***
 -38.63
***
 -63.521
***
 -65.94
***
 
 - (-4.97) (-3.46) (-4.92) (-4.06) (-4.40) (-5.97) 
AMOUNT 1.246
*
 1.641
**
 1.805
**
 1.533
**
 3.46
***
 3.518
***
 2.045
***
 
 (1.76) (2.33) (2.40) (2.16) (5.95) (3.30) (2.76) 
TAX 18.199
***
 18.968
***
 - 17.441
***
 16.24
***
 35.261
***
 14.69
***
 
 (11.03) (11.44) - (11.33) (11.58) (9.55) (7.68) 
SIZE -4.013
**
 -2.686
**
 -6.261
***
 -6.232
***
 -1.29 3.690 -6.180
***
 
 (-2.37) (-2.39) (-3.37) (-3.57) (-0.63) (1.64) (2.76) 
MATURITY -1.527
***
 -1.741
***
 0.338 - -1.88
***
 -4.325
***
 -0.734 
 (-3.33) (-3.83) (0.70) - (-4.15) (-4.49) (-1.32) 
SUBD 34.263
***
 35.612
***
 53.744
***
 26.702
***
 38.42
***
 31.817
***
 30.24
***
 
 (4.89) (5.14) (6.81) (3.85) (5.46) (3.26) (3.72) 
CRISIS 73.178
***
 67.187
***
 75.948
***
 68.986
***
 71.06
***
 87.521
***
 71.36
***
 
 (27.41) (22.54) (26.57) (23.44) (26.96) (20.26) (18.34) 
LAMBDA -34.620 - -58.955
**
 -50.217
**
 -32.11 61.296
**
 -59.12
**
 
 (-1.60) - (-2.29) (-2.20) (-1.12) (2.01) (-2.47) 
CONSTANT 1.389 -11.162 92.519
**
 55.395 -63.07 -216.939
***
 70.927 
 (0.04) (-0.41) (2.27) (1.42) (-1.51) (-4.01) (1.55) 
Country 
Dummies 
YES YES YES YES NO YES YES 
Currency 
Dummies 
YES YES YES YES NO YES YES 
Obs. 1,924 1,924 1,924 1,924 1,924 1,977 1,458 
R² 0.551 0.557 0.494 0.554 0.450 0.679 0.598 
Adjusted R² 0.542 0.548 0.485 0.546 0.447 0.673 0.588 
F 64.226 65.842 51.235 65.137 174.123 110.825 58.796 
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Appendix 2.9: Table A8 - BMA robustness 
This table reports the estimation of equation 2.3 (OLS with robust error term) where SPREAD is the difference 
in basis points between the bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency and maturity treasury bond. 
RISK is the average issues ratings. BMA is the proxy of bank managerial ability. AMOUNT is the natural 
logarithm of amount of issue in Euros. TAX is the coupon rate. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the issuing 
bank's total assets. MATURITY is the number of years between the issue and the redemption date. SUBD is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the issuing debt is subordinated, and zero otherwise. The dummy CRISIS 
equals 1 if issuance occurs during the distress period, from July 2007 to the end of 2011, and 0 otherwise. 
LAMBDA is the inverse of the Mills’ ratio. HM is dummy that equals 1 if the maturity of the issue is higher than 
4 years, the median, 0 otherwise. BMA1 is assessed with a Battese and Coelli (1995) model that includes 
environmental variables. BMA2 is obtained by using a data envelopment method. BMA3 is estimated by 
assuming that investors refer to the very past information. BMA4 is measured with the introduction of a non-
linear term, the squared risk term, in the equation of the best practice frontier. BMA5 is estimated using a single 
BPF computed over the complete period 1998-2011. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
***.
 
**.
 
*
 indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 BMA1 BMA2 BMA3 BMA4 BMA5 
RISK 5.019
***
 4.484
***
 4.516
*** 
4.499
***
 4.534
***
 
 (7.77) (7.04) (7.22) (7.18) (7.21) 
BMA -61.572
***
 -9.761 -51.173
***
 -43.239
***
 -40.592
***
 
 (-6.24) (-1.39) (-4.85) (-4.46) (-3.30) 
AMOUNT 1.348
*
 1.300
*
 1.559
**
 1.543
**
 1.434
**
 
 (1.76) (1.84) (2.22) (2.19) (2.05) 
TAX 17.548
***
 18.331
***
 18.707
***
 18.664
***
 18.458
***
 
 (9.92) (11.04) (11.29) (11.27) (11.15) 
SIZE -4.114
**
 -4.509
***
 -5.707
***
 -5.771
***
 -5.335
***
 
 (-2.28) (-2.63) (-3.31) (-3.32) (-3.09) 
MATURITY -2.080
***
 -1.568
***
 -1.683
***
 -1.672
***
 -1.628
***
 
 (-4.21) (-3.41) (-3.70) (-3.67) (-3.56) 
SUBD 41.876
***
 34.452
***
 34.857
***
 34.631
***
 34.564
***
 
 (5.32) (4.92) (5.02) (4.98) (4.94) 
CRISIS 73.791
***
 71.899
***
 69.150
***
 70.453
***
 70.048
***
 
 (25.17) (24.56) (24.09) (25.20) (23.96) 
LAMBDA -32.108 -38.929
*
 -47.554
**
 -47.078
**
 -44.268
**
 
 (-1.40) (-1.77) (-2.13) (-2.11) (-1.99) 
CONSTANT 27.412 14.586 51.109 48.613 45.664 
 (0.68) (0.38) (1.33) (1.26) (1.16) 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Currency Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 1,610 1,924 1,924 1,924 1,924 
R² 0.577 0.551 0.557 0.556 0.553 
Adjusted R² 0.567 0.542 0.548 0.547 0.545 
F 57.854 62.579 64.058 63.783 63.174 
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Appendix 2.10: Table A9 - Risk robustness 
This table reports the estimates of some alternate specifications for equation 2.3 where SPREAD is the 
difference in basis points between the bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency and maturity 
treasury bond,. RISK is the average issues ratings. BMA is the proxy of bank managerial ability. AMOUNT is 
the natural logarithm of amount of issue in Euros. TAX is the coupon rate. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the 
issuing bank's total assets. MATURITY is the number of years between the issue and the redemption date. 
SUBD is a dummy variable that equals one if the issuing debt is subordinated, and zero otherwise. The dummy 
CRISIS equals 1 if the issuance date occurs during the distress period, from July 2007 to the end of 2011, and 0 
otherwise. LAMBDA is the inverse of the Mills’ ratio. DD is the distance to default. ZMKT is a market based Z-
score and ZROA an accounting based one. RTGTRAD, the average of the Fitch, Moody's and Standard and 
Poor's issuer rating and RTSOL, the average of bank individual / financial ratings. T-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. 
***.
 
**.
 
*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 DD ZROA ZMKT RTGTRAD RTGSOL 
RISK -6.137
***
 -0.053
***
 -0.314
***
 2.989
**
 0.910 
 (-6.81) (-2.82) (-3.85) (2.04) (0.90) 
BMA -48.094
***
 -40.567
***
 -59.184
***
 -54.009
***
 -53.130
***
 
 (-2.89) (-3.56) (-5.54) (-5.38) (-5.01) 
AMOUNT -1.118 0.900 0.462 0.703 0.937 
 (-1.16) (1.26) (0.63) (1.01) (1.38) 
TAX 24.872
***
 20.951
***
 20.832
***
 19.975
***
 20.084
***
 
 (10.30) (12.41) (12.02) (12.13) (11.99) 
SIZE -3.619 -6.076
***
 -6.531
***
 -3.241 -5.376
***
 
 (-1.56) (-3.46) (-3.69) (-1.61) (-2.98) 
MATURITY -1.658
***
 -2.174
***
 -2.057
***
 -2.060
***
 -1.996
***
 
 (-2.59) (-4.72) (-4.35) (-4.51) (-4.32) 
SUBD 45.733
***
 42.251
***
 42.679
***
 44.462
***
 43.188
***
 
 (4.87) (6.08) (6.16) (6.40) (6.16) 
CRISIS 53.116
***
 63.167
***
 62.489
***
 62.899
***
 62.959
***
 
 (13.01) (22.05) (19.84) (21.82) (20.93) 
LAMBDA -19.950 -37.169
*
 -31.807 -19.229 -32.335 
 (-0.70) (-1.78) (-1.50) (-0.91) (-1.51) 
CONSTANT 73.488 81.454
**
 112.211
***
 9.548 64.743 
 (1.47) (2.11) (2.73) (0.21) (1.47) 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Currency Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 1,205 1,921 1,807 1,905 1,892 
R² 0.551 0.550 0.558 0.550 0.548 
Adjusted R² 0.537 0.541 0.549 0.542 0.539 
F 38.702 62.150 60.306 61.796 62.388 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Control rights versus cash-flow rights, banks’ shareholders 
and bondholders conflicts: 
Evidence from the 2007 - 2010 crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter refers to the working paper entitled "Control rights versus cash-flow rights, banks’ shareholders and 
bondholders conflicts: Evidence from the 2007 - 2010 crisis " (Casteuble and Saghi-Zedek (2015)).  
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3.1. Introduction  
A substantial amount of research addresses the financial implications of the divergence 
between control rights (i.e., the right to vote and hence to control) and cash-flow rights (i.e., 
the right to receive dividends) of ultimate owners. Such a divergence between both rights, 
commonly referred to as excess control rights, arises mainly from the use of pyramidal
62
 
ownership structures, as prevalent in Asia and Europe. Pyramids enable controlling owners to 
achieve control of a firm by committing low equity investment while maintaining tight 
control of the firm, accentuating the agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders. Overall, during normal times, the literature finds that the presence of 
excess control rights negatively affects firm value and performance in general (Claessens et 
al. (2002)) and, more specifically it decreases banks’ profitability but also increases their risk 
and insolvency (Azofra and Santamaría (2011), Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi (2015)).      
The objective of this paper is to focus on the conflicts of interests between shareholders and 
debtholders within pyramids in the case of banking firms. More specifically, we examine the 
effect of the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights of ultimate owners in 
pyramids on the costs of borrowing of European banks and how this effect might be different 
during sound periods and distress periods.  
Conflicts of interests between controlling shareholders and debtholders arise from moral 
hazard and risk-shifting induced by limited liability. Limited liability provides shareholders 
the incentives to divert wealth at the expense of debtholders by increasing asset risk and 
leverage, and creates the option value of equity (Merton (1974)). For instance, controlling 
shareholders can extract wealth from debtholders by investing in new projects that are riskier 
than those currently held in the firm’s portfolio. Shareholders capture most of the gains when 
high-risk projects succeed, while debtholders bear part of the costs when those high-risk 
projects fail (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). This moral hazard could be even more severe 
when controlling shareholders hold control rights in excess of cash-flow rights: the 
divergence between both rights may provide extra risk-taking incentives to controlling 
shareholders because they are able to use their effective control rights to divert the upside 
gains for private benefits while leaving the costs of failure to debtholders. Anticipating such 
                                                     
62
 A pyramid is a multilayer ownership structure where an ultimate owner holds a firm through at least another 
corporation.  
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incentives, debtholders could ask for higher rents, leading to higher costs of debt capital. 
Empirically, Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) provide evidence for such a conflict of interests 
during normal times. Using a sample of non-financial firms during the 1992-2004 period, the 
authors find that the divergence between control and cash-flow rights is associated with 
higher bond spreads. However, the question of whether such conflicts of interests are present 
in the specific case of banking firms and especially during distress times is not addressed in 
the current literature.  
Banks are more opaque and more complex than other institutions (Morgan (2002)) and the 
nature of their assets influence their opaqueness (Flannery et al. (2004)). Unlike non-financial 
firms, banks are highly leveraged and benefit from external implicit and explicit supports and 
guarantees such as deposit insurance and too-big-to-fail policy. Taken all together, these 
features could either exacerbate or attenuate the conflicts of interests between shareholders 
and debtholders observed in the case of non-financial firms. For instance, the presence of 
safety net guarantees may weaken the debtholders’ incentives to discipline the bank by 
charging a risk premium proportionate to the bank’s risk level. In this case, debtholders may 
not charge a higher premium from banks controlled by shareholders with excess control 
rights. Alternatively, bank opaqueness and high leverage may provide a freer play to the risk-
shifting incentives of shareholders with excess control rights. Specifically, these shareholders 
can distort banks behavior by forcing them to lend at more favorable terms to other 
corporations wherein they have higher cash-flow rights (La Porta et al. (2003)). They could 
also push banks to lend to related firms merely to sustain them, without necessarily requiring 
guarantees or by collecting collateral but of bad quality. This related lending could weaken 
the value of collateral, which in turn reduces the recovery rates in the event of default, 
increasing the loss of debtholders. Under such conditions, just like for non-financial firms, 
debtholders could charge higher premiums for banks controlled by shareholders with excess 
control rights. 
Moreover, the effect of excess control rights on the cost of debt capital -especially in the 
banking industry- could be different across sound periods and distress periods. A crisis 
represents a shock (Friedman et al. (2003)) that may trigger a change in the behavior of 
shareholders with excess control rights, possibly shaping the pricing imposed by debtholders. 
Consistent with the expropriation view (Johnson et al. (2000), Mitton (2002), Baek et al. 
(2004)), a crisis shock could provide shareholders with excess control rights, extra risk-
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shifting incentives to be able to divert resources for their own benefits. The rationale behind 
such incentives is to compensate for the losses they might suffer in their other firms due to 
bad economic conditions, allowing them to smooth their revenues across good and bad times. 
In addition, the market view postulates that investors may pay less attention to weak 
governance during economic upturns, but they are likely to take it more into consideration 
during crisis periods (Rajan and Zingales (1998)). Assuming that debtholders anticipate such 
a behavior, they will require even a higher premium than they charge during a sound period, 
resulting in a higher cost of debt capital.  
Alternatively, according to the propping up view (Friedman et al. (2003)), shareholders with 
excess control rights may be willing to transfer even their private funds to their failing 
firms/banks among the pyramid to prevent them from distress during downturns. This 
propping up behavior is justified by the fact that those controlling shareholders can reap 
valuable earnings in the future, mainly from profit stealing, and therefore want to keep those 
entities in business and prevent their failure to be able to extract such opportunities in the 
future.  
More precisely, in this paper we use data on ultimate ownership of 89 publicly traded banks 
established in 16 Western European countries
63
 over the 2002-2010 period to test the effect of 
excess control rights on the cost of debt capital and how this effect might differ across normal 
times and distress times. We capture the cost of debt capital using bank bond yield spreads, 
i.e. the difference between bank bond yields and the risk-free rate. As an exogenous shock, we 
consider the distress period from the third quarter of 2007 to 2010 which is characterized by 
two subsequent events: the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis 
triggered late 2009.
64
 Our sound period then ranges from 2002 to the second quarter of 2007.  
By controlling for issuer and bonds characteristics, the results show that while bondholders 
disregarded the presence of excess control rights during the sound period of 2002 - Q2 2007, 
they required a lower spread from banks controlled by shareholders with excess control rights 
during the distress period of Q3 2007 - 2010. These results are consistent with the view that 
                                                     
63 We focus on European countries because the presence of excess control rights is known to be more prevalent 
in these countries than in other countries, for instance, the U.S. (La Porta et al. (1998)). 
64 According to the definition provided by the Bank of International Settlements, the financial crisis period is 
from July 2007 to March 2009 (Bank of International Settlements (2010a)). Moreover, the timeline provided by 
the Banque de France (2012) outlines that the European debt crisis started to affect some of European countries 
(the GIPS countries comprising Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) from late 2009. We hence define the period 
ranging from the third quarter of 2007 to 2010 as our distress period.    
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during good times investors and specially bondholders do not care about deficiencies in 
governance schemes and that they do react only during bad times. Particularly, our results 
show that bondholders anticipate the occurrence of the profit-sharing among all firms within 
pyramids which prevent the bank failure and, as a consequence, they charge a lower premium 
for banks controlled by shareholders with excess control rights compared to their peers during 
distress times. Our results are robust to alternative measures of ownership and risk as well as 
to the definition of the crisis period.  
Beyond this main analysis, we take a step forward and examine whether some bonds 
characteristics affect the behavior of bondholders. More precisely, we test whether the link 
between excess control rights and bond yield spreads depends on bonds ratings (i.e., high 
versus low ratings
65
) and their payment rank (i.e., unsecured/subordinated bonds versus 
secured bonds). Holders of bonds with downgraded ratings and holders of 
unsecured/subordinated bonds face a lower debt quality and a higher probability of default 
and, as a consequence, they should be more concerned about weaknesses in governance 
schemes. We hence expect the link between excess control rights and bond yield spreads to be 
more pronounced in these two cases. Coherently and consistent with this prediction, we find 
that bondholders charge a lower premium to banks controlled by shareholders with excess 
control rights only when they hold subordinated/unsecured bonds and bonds with low ratings. 
Holders of secured and high rated bonds do not price excess control rights either in sound or 
in distress periods.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several directions. First, our study extends the paper 
of Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) in two ways. While Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) address 
the conflicts of interests between controlling shareholders and bondholders in non-banking 
firms during normal times, our paper analyzes the same conflicts in the specific case of 
banking firms by concomitantly considering normal times and distress times. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study that builds a bridge between controlling shareholders and 
bondholders in pyramids for banks. Unlike the findings of Boubakri and Ghouma (2010), by 
focusing on banking firms we find that bondholders do not care about bank governance 
weaknesses during normal times. Furthermore, by considering a crisis period, our results 
reveal a negative association between excess control rights and bond yield spreads, implying 
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 In this paper, we consider bonds with high ratings if they are rated at issuance between Aaa and Aa2 for 
Moodys or AAA and AA for Fitch and Standards & Poor's, and bonds with low ratings if the grade is equal to or 
lower than Aa3 for Moodys and AA- for the other rating agencies. 
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that bondholders perceive banks controlled by shareholders with excess control rights as 
safer. This suggests that while the presence of excess control rights in non-financial firms 
conveys a bad signal for bondholders, its presence for banks is perceived as good news. This 
is potentially because bondholders are aware that bankruptcy costs inside a pyramid are 
higher for banks than for non-financial firms. Indeed, if banks fail all connected firms within 
the same pyramid may be negatively affected since they need to find other lending-banks 
outside the pyramid with potentially less favorable terms. Anticipating such bankruptcy costs, 
bondholders are almost certain that ultimate owners will intervene to bail out these banks and 
therefore require lower premiums for such banks.
66
 
Second, our study contributes to the various papers that attempt to explain differences in 
performance of banks during the 2008 turmoil by factors related to governance schemes.
67
 
Among these, the paper of Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi (2015) shows that European banks 
controlled by shareholders with excess control rights underperform during sound periods but 
outperform other banks during distress times. The results of our paper then corroborate those 
findings and provide a new channel to explain why these banks outperform other banks 
during crisis periods: they experience a lower cost of debt financing.  
Finally, our paper contributes to the post crisis debate on bank governance and market 
discipline. We show that bondholders perceive banks controlled by shareholders with excess 
control rights as safer because they benefit from strong links and interconnections within 
pyramids which prevent them from failure. Even though these banks are not necessarily too 
big to benefit from safety net guarantees and too-big-to-fail policies, bondholders do not price 
them during normal times and require lower premiums from such banks during distress times. 
This result suggests that not only the safety net guarantees and too-big-to-fail policies affect 
the effectiveness of market discipline but also interconnectedness of banks within complex 
ownership structures. Our findings are therefore consistent with the worries of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (Bank of International Settlements (2010b)) regarding 
governance mechanisms within complex ownership structures and recommending more 
disclosure of banking institutions’ ownership. 
                                                     
66
 Besides the paper of Boubakri and Ghouma (2010), another strand of the literature investigates whether cross-
variations in bond yield spreads can be explained by differences in governance mechanisms (see, e.g., Bhojraj 
and Sengupta (2003), Klock et al. (2005)). While these studies have mainly focused on the conflicts between 
managers and debtholders in non-financial firms, in our work we pay attention to banking firms and consider the 
conflicts between controlling shareholders and bondholders in complex ownership structures.    
67
 See for instance Gropp and Köhler (2010); Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011); Aebi et al. (2012); Beltratti and 
Stulz (2012); Erkens et al. (2012). 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and the 
empirical method. Section 3 presents the sample characteristics and some univariate analysis. 
In Section 4, we discuss the econometric results. Section 5 reports the robustness checks and 
Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
3.2. Data and model specification 
Before describing our variables and the model, we present our sample.  
3.2.1. Sample 
Our sample consists of publicly traded 89 banks (either commercial or not) headquartered in 
16 Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom.
68
 The sample period is from 2002 to 2010 which covers the sound and 
the distress periods. We obtain annual accounting data from Bankscope database. For each 
bank, we use consolidated statements. To collect ownership information of the sampled 
banks, we mostly use Bankscope and Amadeus databases and complete missing ownership 
information from annual reports disclosed on websites. We collect daily market data 
necessary to compute market-based risk indicators and data on bond issues and other related 
details such as issue date, maturity, amount issued, currency, coupon rates, and credit ratings 
from the Bloomberg database.  
We identify 114 publicly traded banks for which Bankscope reports information on the main 
accounting variables. We eliminate extreme observations on main financial variables as well 
as banks with discontinuously traded stocks and end up with a sample of 94 banks. These 
banks issued on the primary market 3,260 bonds that satisfy the following criteria: bonds with 
(i) fixed and annualized coupon rate, (ii) no-early redemption (bullet), (iii) no option features 
(non-callable, non-putable, non-sinkable and non-convertible), and (vi) bonds rated at the 
immediate neighborhood of issuance by at least one credit rating agency (Moody’s, Standards 
and Poors, or Fitch). Among these bonds, we exclude those for which a risk-free rate 
benchmark is not available to calculate bond yield spreads such as bonds with a very short 
                                                     
68 We do not include Luxembourg because no bank provides data consistent with the criteria we use to define our 
cleaned sample.  
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maturity,
69
 perpetual bonds and so forth. After eliminating extreme observations for the 
spread variable (1% lowest and highest values), we end up with a final sample of 2,800 bonds 
issued by 89 banks over the 2002-2010 period, including secured, unsecured and subordinated 
bonds, either matured or not (see Appendix 3.1 for some general descriptive statistics of the 
sample banks). 
 
3.2.2. Presentation of variables    
We now define our dependent variable reflecting bank bond yield spreads, our ownership 
variable of interest (excess control rights) and the different control variables introduced in our 
regressions. Statistics and other details on all the variables used in our regressions are 
reported in Table 3.1.  
3.2.2.1. Bond yield spreads   
We define bond yield spreads as the difference between the bank bond yield at issuance and 
the implicit yield at the same issue date and of a same currency and maturity Treasury Bond. 
In the case of bonds issued in Euros, we take the issuer's country as a benchmark. Whenever 
the time to maturity differs between the bank and the Treasury bonds, we interpolate the 
maturity of the risk-free rate benchmark to match it with the maturity of the bank bond yield 
before assessing spreads. To allow for easier comparison across countries and for robustness 
considerations, we also compute bank bond spreads by subtracting the yield on German 
government bonds from banks bond yields at issuance (i.e., we use a common risk-free rate as 
a benchmark).
70
 
 
3.2.2.2. Building control chains and measuring excess control rights  
Our variable of interest is excess control rights. This is a proxy of bank ownership which is 
defined as the difference between control and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner. 
Excess control rights could arise from the use of dual class shares (i.e., shares with superior 
voting rights) and/or from the use of pyramids (indirect control chains). Because Bankscope 
and Amadeus only provide information on control rights, we focus on excess control rights 
                                                     
69
 We exclude bonds with maturity lower than three months. This is because the corresponding risk-free rate of 
most countries included in our study is not provided, making interpolation impossible to compute a bond yield 
spread.  
70
 Results, not reported but available on request, are similar to those obtained using a domestic Treasury bond for 
each country.  
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arising from the use of pyramids and ignore the use of dual class shares which, in any case, is 
not a serious shortcoming of our study since prior studies find that the use of dual class shares 
is not widespread (Faccio and Lang (2002); Azofra and Santamaría (2011)).  
To measure excess control rights, as a first step we trace indirect control chains among 
pyramids in order to isolate the ultimate controlling owners for each bank. Indirect control 
chains imply the presence of at least one corporation, between the bank and the ultimate 
owner, who holds a pre-established minimum percentage of shares (i.e., a control threshold). 
We set this control threshold to 10% since previous studies on both banks (Caprio et al. 
(2007), Laeven and Levine (2009)) and non-financial firms (La Porta et al. (1999), Laeven 
and Levine (2008)) consider that 10% of control rights are enough to have an effective control 
over a firm.
71
 According to this threshold, we classify banks among two categories. We 
consider as widely held, banks for which ownership is dispersed among small shareholders 
(i.e., no shareholder holds at least 10% of control rights). We consider as controlled, banks for 
which at least one shareholder has control rights that sum up to 10% or more. In the latter 
case, we analyze the ownership structure of each identified shareholder. If this is not 
controlled by another shareholder (such as an individual, a family or a state), we consider him 
to be the ultimate controlling owner of the bank. However, if the identified shareholder is 
controlled by another corporation (e.g., a bank, a financial company and so on), we go deeper 
in tracing the control chain and repeat the process to identify their owners, the owners of their 
owners until we reach the ultimate owner of the bank. To build these control chains, we 
collect data on direct ownership from Bankscope that we complete with information from 
annual reports reported on banks’ websites and from Amadeus when shareholders at 
intermediate levels of indirect control chains are non-banking institutions. Because ownership 
structure is at some extent stable over time (La Porta et al. (1999), Laeven and Levine (2009)) 
and both databases (i.e., Bankscope and Amadeus) update ownership information only every 
18 months, we do not collect ownership for each year. Prior to the financial crisis, we build 
banks’ control chains for the years 2004 and 2006.72 We also build control chains for the year 
2010 to capture potential changes in ownership structure that may have come especially from 
government intervention during the financial crisis. 
                                                     
71
 As a robustness check, we also consider a 20% threshold. Our results, not reported but available on request, 
are insensitive to the control threshold we use. 
72
 Our starting point for ownership is 2004 instead of 2002 because Bankscope and Amadeus do not provide 
information on the types of shareholders before 2004. 
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As a second step, we identify ultimate owners of banks and assess control rights and cash-
flow rights to compute excess control rights. We classify the identified ultimate owners into 
five categories: a bank (Bank); a manager, an individual or a family (Family); a state or a 
public authority (State); a financial company, an insurance company, a pension fund or a 
mutual fund (Institutional); or a foundation (Foundation). An ultimate owner can hold a bank 
directly and/or indirectly. Direct rights (control and cash-flow rights) are the stake directly 
held by the ultimate controlling shareholder in the bank. According to the last link principle 
method proposed by La Porta et al. (1999), we define indirect control rights as the ownership 
stake held directly in the bank by the first intermediate corporation in the control chain. 
Indirect cash-flow rights are defined as the product of ownership stakes held indirectly by 
each corporation along the control chain. By summing direct and indirect rights held in the 
bank, we obtain aggregate control rights (CR) and aggregate cash-flow rights (CFR) of the 
ultimate owner. Aggregate control and cash-flow rights are set equal to zero for widely held 
banks. In the case of banks with several ultimate owners, we consider the one with the highest 
control rights.  
Finally, we measure excess control rights using two proxies: a continuous variable 
(ExcessControl) defined as the difference between control and cash-flow rights, and a binary 
variable [d(ExcessControl)] which is equal to one if the control rights are greater than the 
cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise. We then classify the sampled banks into two groups: 
banks without excess control rights (Absence of Excess Control Rights) and banks with 
excess control rights (Presence of Excess Control Rights). We classify a bank as without 
excess control rights if it is controlled by an ultimate owner with equal control and cash-flow 
rights or if it is widely held. We consider a bank as with excess control rights if it is controlled 
by an ultimate owner with greater control than cash-flow rights. 
To illustrate how we compute excess control rights within pyramids, Figure 3.1 provides an 
example of a control chain for a bank. We assume that this bank has two ultimate owners: C4 
and C5. According to the considered control threshold, C5 is identified as the largest ultimate 
controlling owner of the bank. Direct control and cash-flow rights of C5 are equal to 25%. In 
addition to his direct rights, C5 holds the bank indirectly through two intermediate 
corporations C1 and C3. His indirect cash-flow rights are equal to 0.4% (20% x 12% x 18%) 
and his indirect control rights are equal to 18% (i.e., the percentage of ownership stake held 
by C1 which is the closest corporation to the bank in the control chain). Aggregate control 
and cash-flow rights are then equal to 43 % (18% + 25%) and 25.4% (0.4% + 25%), 
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respectively. Finally, the difference between aggregate control rights and aggregate cash-flow 
rights (i.e., ExcessControl) is 17.57% (43% - 25.4%). 
 
Figure 3.1: Example of a control chain 
This figure reports an example of a control chain of a bank to explain the calculation of excess control rights. C 
denotes a corporation in each box. Arrows are ownership stakes held by each corporation either in the bank or in 
intermediate corporations along the control chain. CR and CFR are respectively the aggregate (sum of direct and 
indirect) control and cash-flow rights of the two identified ultimate controlling shareholders of the bank: C4 and 
C5. Direct rights, either control or cash-flow rights, are the ownership stake directly held by the ultimate owner 
in the bank. According to the last link principle method proposed by (La Porta et al., 1999), indirect control 
rights of the ultimate owner is the percentage of shares held in the first layer of the control chain. Indirect cash-
flow rights are the product of ownership stakes held indirectly along the chain. We define excess control rights 
(ExcessControl) as the difference between control and cash-flow rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2.3. Risk and Control variables  
Because bank risk-taking increases the likelihood of default, bondholders require a higher 
premium from riskier banks, leading to higher bond yield spreads (e.g., Elton et al. (2001), 
Krishnan et al. (2005), Driessen (2005)). As a proxy for bank risk, we include TotalRisk 
measured by the standard deviation of weekly bank stock returns computed on a moving 
window of 52 quoted weeks
73
. Campbell and Taksler (2003) provide evidences that this 
measure of stock return volatility is an important determinant of bond yield spread. They 
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 In addition to TotalRisk, we initially include the ratio of total equity to total assets (EQTA) as a proxy for 
default. However, the results (available upon request) show that EQTA is not significant. Hence, we include in 
our regressions only the TotalRisk variable as a proxy for bank risk.  
Bank 
C5 
C2 C1 
C3 C4 
18% 13% 
25% 12% 
20% 
25% 
CR (C5) = 25% + 18% = 43% 
CFR (C5) = 18% x 12% x 20% +25%= 25.43% 
ExcessControl (C5) = 43% - 25.43% = 17.57% 
CR (C4) = 13% 
CFR (C4) = 25% x 13% = 3.25% 
ExcessControl (C4) = 13% - 3.25% = 9.75% 
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report a strong positive effect of this volatility on the cost of debt. They first argue that a firm 
with more volatile equity is more likely to reach the boundary condition for default. Second, 
this proxy is a measure of firm's total risk that reflects both idiosyncratic and market risk and 
captures continuous and recent information that are not yet reflected in credit ratings or 
accounting data but which are particularly relevant for bondholders. Empirically, the total risk 
then matters at least as much as credit rating as a determinant of bond yield spread (its 
explanation being even better when they are considering together). Because of a lack of 
consensus in empirical studies about the accurate proxy to use as determinant of bond risk 
premium, we consider alternative proxies of bank risk for robustness considerations. Results 
remain unchanged. 
We also include in our estimations a set of control variables which are expected to affect bank 
bond yield spreads. As a proxy for bank profitability, we include the return on average assets 
defined as net income divided by average total assets (ROAA). Bank profitability should 
affect the level of bond spreads even if the sign is a priori unclear (Flannery and Sorescu, 
1996). On the one hand, higher values of ROAA indicate greater performance for banks, i.e. a 
good management of risk-taking. This should negatively affect spreads required by 
bondholders (Evanoff et al. (2011), Jagtiani et al. (2002)). On the other hand, a higher 
profitability goes along with a higher risk which risk-averse bondholders may dislike and then 
require higher spreads. We expect a positive sign in the latter case (Sironi (2003)). 
We include the natural logarithm of bank total assets [Log(Assets)] to account for bank size. 
Large banks benefit from implicit guaranties, have greater ability to diversify their activities 
and are generally safer than small banks and, as a consequence, they are expected to have 
lower spreads (Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011)). We hence expect a negative coefficient on 
the variable Log(Assets).   
Previous literature underlines the importance of liquidity for bondholders. Liquid bonds are 
more often traded, their information and transaction costs are lower compared to illiquid ones 
and bondholders are more prone to require lower spreads from issuers of liquid bonds. Many 
empirical papers consider the issued amount of bonds as a proxy of their liquidity (see 
Houweling et al. (2005) for a short review of these studies). We follow them by including 
Ln(Issuance), the natural logarithm of the issue, as a spread determinant. The existing results 
are inconclusive as both negative and positive coefficients are observed. Morgan and Stiroh 
(2001) and Sironi (2002) highlight that the amount of issue negatively affects bond yield 
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spreads, reflecting a possible liquidity benefit on larger issues. On the contrary, McGinty 
(2001) shows that large bonds are not necessarily the most liquid and, consistent with Sironi 
(2003) and Iannotta et al. (2013), finds that large issues are associated with higher spreads.  
Besides, we introduce in our regressions the Maturity variable which is defined as the 
difference between the issuance and maturity dates. Bond yield spreads should increase with 
the increase of the investment horizon and, as a consequence, we expect a positive link 
between the bond maturity and its spread (Morgan and Stiroh (1999)). 
Finally, we introduce in our regressions a set of dummy variables. We include a dummy 
[d(Subordinated/Unsecured)] which takes a value of one if the bond is subordinated or 
unsecured, and zero otherwise. Holders of such bonds are repaid after senior bondholders. As 
they anticipate higher losses for a given default risk than others, subordinated/unsecured 
bondholders may require a higher premium (Pop (2006)). Accordingly, we predict a positive 
coefficient on the variable d(Subordinated/Unsecured). To account for differences across 
issues such as economic conditions and cross-country institutional factors, we also introduce a 
set of currency and country dummies. 
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Table 3.1: Variables definition and summary statistics  
Variable Definition  Source  Mean Median 
Standard  
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Number of  
observations 
Spread 
Difference between the bond yield at issuance 
and the yield of a same currency and maturity 
Treasury Bond. 
Bloomberg 0.581 0.397 0.654 -1.380 4.062 2,800 
ExcessControl 
Difference between control and cash-flow rights 
(%). 
Bankscope, 
Amadeus and annual 
Reports 
2.254 0.000 8.055 0.000 63.900 2,800 
d(ExcessControl) 
Dummy equal to one if control rights are greater 
than cash flow rights, and zero otherwise. 
Bankscope, 
Amadeus and annual 
Reports 
0.113 0 0.316 0 1 2,800 
d(Crisis) 
Dummy equal to one if the observation is from 
the Q3 2007 to 2010, and zero otherwise. 
Bloomberg 0.446 0 0.497 0 1 2,800 
TotalRisk 
Standard deviation of weekly bank stock returns 
computed on a moving window of 52 quoted 
weeks (%). 
Bloomberg 5.358 3.900 3.759 0.761 25.425 2,800 
ROAA 
Return on average assets defined as the ratio of 
net income to average total assets (%). 
Bankscope 0.302 0.280 0.460 -2.420 2.230 2,800 
Log(Assets) 
Natural logarithm of bank total assets 
(thousands of Euros). 
Bankscope 19.398 19.273 1.100 13.912 21.674 2,800 
Log(Issuance) 
Natural logarithm of the issuance amount (in 
Euros). 
Bloomberg 18.300 18.421 2.019 11.995 24.437 2,800 
Maturity 
Number of years between the bond issue date 
and redemption (in years). 
Bloomberg 4.763 4.000 3.439 0.504 30.001 2,800 
d(Subordinated/Unse
cured) 
Dummy equal to one if the bond is either 
subordinated or unsecured, and zero otherwise. 
Bloomberg 0.735 0 0.441 0 1 2,800 
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3.2.3. Model specification  
We aim to investigate the effect of excess control rights on bank bond yield spreads, and more 
specifically how this effect differs according to the state of the banking system and the 
economy as a whole. The distress period of 2007-2010, which includes the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2008 and the European sovereign debt crisis (late 2009), enables us to look for 
differential effects of excess control rights on bank bond yield spreads depending on 
economic conditions. To differentiate sound and distress periods, we define a dummy variable 
d(Crisis) which takes a value of one if the observation is from the Q3 2007 to 2010, and zero 
otherwise.
74
 To test whether bondholders differently price bank governance, as measured by 
excess control rights, during sound and distress periods we allow for differential effects across 
both periods by interacting the dummy variable d(Crisis) with our ownership variable of 
interest ExcessControl. We hence specify the following model:  
Spread
j(it)
 =  α1 + α2 d(         ExcessControlit+  α3 d(         + α4TotalRiskit 
                     +  β
   + α0 +  
  d(          +  
  d(               +  j(it)
 
(3.1) 
where Spreadj is the dependent variable measuring bank bond yield spreads for bond j issued 
by bank i at time t; ExcessControlit corresponds to excess control rights defined as the 
difference between control and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the issuing 
bank i at time t; TotalRiskit is the risk of the issuing bank i at time t; X is a vector of the 
aforementioned control variables: ROAA, Log(Assets), Ln(Issuance), Maturity and 
d(Subordinated/Unsecured);
75
 d(Country) and d(Currency), respectively, denote vectors of 
country and currency dummies; and   is the error term. 
The coefficient α1  measures the effect of the shareholder’s excess control rights 
(ExcessControl) on bank bond yield spreads during the pre-crisis period 2002 – Q2 2007. As 
explained before, the literature on non-financial firms (Boubakri and Ghouma (2010)) 
highlights that bondholders perceive controlling shareholders with excess control rights as a 
potential risk and therefore they charge higher spreads from firms controlled via excess 
control rights. If such a behavior also applies to banking firms, we expect the coefficient α1 to 
be positive and significant. Alternatively, previous studies (Rajan and Zingales (1998)) argue 
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 To identify our distress period, we follow the definitions provided by the Bank of International Settlements  
(2010b) and the Banque de France (2012). 
75 Appendix 3.2 shows the correlation coefficients among the key explanatory variables used in our regressions. 
Overall, the correlation coefficients are low. 
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that market participants in general and bondholders in particular may pay less attention to 
weak governance during upturns. In the banking sector, this bondholders’ behavior may occur 
because market discipline is further weakened as banks are highly regulated and benefit from 
implicit safety net guarantees. In this case we predict the coefficient α1 to be non-significant. 
Hence, the effect of excess control rights on bank bond yield spreads is a priori unpredictable 
and depends on the prevailing bondholders’ behavior: the coefficient α1  should be either 
significant and positive or non-significant. 
The parameter α  α  measures the effect of the shareholder’s excess control rights 
(ExcessControl) on bank bond yield spreads during the distress period ranging from the third 
quarter of 2007 to 2010. The sign of the coefficient α  is also unclear. According to the 
expropriation hypothesis (e.g., Johnson et al. (2000)), entrenched controlling shareholders 
increase their propensity to expropriate during downturns. The rationale behind such a 
behavior is to compensate for the losses they are enduring in other firms, allowing them to 
smooth their revenues across sound and distress periods. In this case, we expect the 
coefficient α  to be positive and significant meaning that, during crisis periods, bondholders 
require higher spreads from banks controlled via excess control rights than from other banks. 
However, according to the propping up view (Friedman et al. (2003)), entrenched controlling 
shareholders may intervene during downturns to keep the failing bank in business and exploit 
its profits in the future. They can either bring their private funds or transfer funds from other 
related firms under their control. Bondholders anticipating such a behavior may charge lower 
spreads for banks controlled by shareholders with excess control rights. In this case, we 
expect the coefficient α  to be negative and significant.   
 
3.3. Sample characteristics and univariate analysis 
In this section, we first present the general characteristics of our sample. Then, as a first 
check, we analyze the relationship between excess control rights and bond yield spreads by 
simply conducting mean tests. 
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3.3.1. Sample characteristics and ownership pattern  
We report in Table 3.2 some general and ownership characteristics of our sample.
76
 The 
number of issuances is quiet evenly distributed across years (Panel A of Table 3.2). The 
number of bond issues is also equally distributed across sound (2002 – Q2 2007) and distress 
(Q3 2007 – 2010) periods: around 50% of the bonds are issued during each period. However, 
the number of issuers slightly differs according to the period: on average, 37 banks have 
issued bonds during the sound period while the number of issuers grows up to 51 banks 
during the crisis period. This highlights that banks of our sample go frequently to the bond 
market even if most of them issued bonds during the crisis period. The table (Panels B-D) also 
shows that German banks (48%) and commercial banks (62%) are predominantly the bond 
issuers in our sample and that issues are principally unsecured (69%). Furthermore, the table 
(Panel E) indicates that banks of our sample have mainly issued more than one bond during 
the whole period. Indeed, only 11 of the sample banks issued one bond between 2002 and 
2010 whereas more than 50% of the banks issued at least 10 bonds over the same period. 
To better emphasis the sample characteristics, we also look into the distribution of bond issues 
according to the bank ownership structure. Our data set indicates that 2,484 bonds were issued 
by banks without excess control rights whereas 316 bonds relate to banks controlled by a 
shareholder with excess control rights. Panel F of Table 3.2 shows that out of the 2,484 bonds 
issued by banks without excess control rights, 923 bonds were issued by widely held banks. 
Banks controlled by other banking entities and those controlled by institutional investors are 
the predominant bond issuers in our sample: they issued 623 and 502 bonds over the sample 
period, respectively. Banks controlled by states, industrial companies, and foundations are 
also frequent bond issuers. However, the table reveals that bonds are less often issued by 
banks controlled by families: they issued only 63 bonds over the whole period, of which 51 
were issued by banks without excess control rights and 12 bonds relate to banks with excess 
control rights. A deeper look to the descriptive statistics shows that in the presence of excess 
control rights family-controlled banks did not at all issue bonds during the crisis period, 
potentially because they substantially increased their equity to total assets ratio during the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 (Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi (2015)). 
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 We undertake a similar analysis for both sub-samples of banks with and without excess control rights. The 
results, not reported here but available on request, show almost a similar pattern as for the whole sample.  
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Table 3.2: Distribution of banks and bond issues 
This table reports the distribution of banks and bonds issues by year (Panel A), country (Panel B), bank type 
(Panel C), payment rank (Panel D), frequency of issues (Panel E), and ownership type (Panel F). We 
differentiate the sample banks according to the type of their ultimate owner: a bank (Bank); a manager, an 
individual or a family (Family); a state or a public authority (State); a financial company, an insurance company, 
a pension fund or a mutual fund (Institutional); or a foundation (Foundation). Widely Held refers to banks that 
are widely held, i.e. banks with no controlling shareholders. 
Panel A: Distribution of banks and bonds by year 
Year 
Number of 
banks 
Number of 
issues 
Percentag
e 
Cumulativ
e 
2002 32 212 7.57 7.57 
2003 34 277 9.89 17.46 
2004 34 292 10.43 27.89 
2005 41 297 10.61 38.50 
2006 43 254 9.07 47.57 
2007 49 361 12.89 60.46 
2008 50 341 12.18 72.64 
2009 55 478 17.07 89.71 
2010 50 288 10.29 100.00 
Panel B: Distribution of banks and bonds by country    
Austria 4 183 6.54 6.54 
Belgium 1 2 0.07 6.61 
Denmark 3 109 3.89 10.50 
Finland 1 16 0.57 11.07 
France 9 222 7.93 19.00 
Germany 10 1,342 47.93 66.93 
Greece 1 1 0.04 66.96 
Ireland 5 238 8.50 75.46 
Italy 15 271 9.68 85.14 
Netherlands 4 9 0.32 85.46 
Norway 6 15 0.54 86.00 
Portugal 3 22 0.79 86.79 
Spain 8 110 3.93 90.71 
Sweden 4 147 5.25 95.96 
Switzerland 5 28 1.00 96.96 
United Kingdom 10 85 3.04 100.00 
Panel C: Distribution of banks and bonds by banks type    
Commercial banks  44 1,742 62.21 62.21 
Cooperative banks  9 72 2.57 64.79 
Saving banks  6 61 2.18 2.18 
Bank holding and bank holding 
companies  
14 242 8.64 75.61 
Investment banks  5 135 4.82 80.43 
Real estate and mortgage banks  4 516 18.43 98.86 
Other non-banking credit institutions  7 32 1.14 100.00 
Chapter 3 - Control rights versus cash-flow rights, banks’ shareholders and bondholders conflicts 
130 
Table 3.2 (continued)    
Panel D: Distribution of banks and bonds by issue payment rank    
Unsecured  82 1932 69.00 69.00 
Secured 34 742 26.50 95.50 
Subordinated  35 126 4.50 100.00 
Panel E: Distribution of banks and bonds by the frequency of issues   
Frequency of issues      
1 10  11.24 11.24 
2 8  8.99 20.22 
3 4  4.49 24.72 
4 4  4.49 29.21 
5 6  6.74 35.96 
6 2  2.25 38.20 
7 7  7.87 46.07 
8 1  1.12 47.19 
9 2  2.25 49.44 
10 4  4.49 73.03 
[11, 20] 17  19.10 73.03 
[21, 30] 6  6.74 79.78 
[31, 40] 1  1.12 80.90 
[41, 50] 3  3.37 84.27 
[51, 100] 5  5.62 89.89 
[101, 465] 9  10.11 100.00 
Panel F: Distribution of banks and bonds by ownership type   
Bank 15 623 22.25 22.25 
Family 5 63 2.25 24.50 
State 12 272 9.71 34.21 
Institutional 23 502 17.93 52.14 
Industry 9 231 8.25 60.39 
Foundation 6 186 6.64 67.04 
Widely Held 43 923 32.96 100.00 
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3.3.2. Excess control rights and bank bond yield spreads: univariate 
mean tests 
We compare bond yield spreads in the absence and in the presence of excess control rights 
across sound and distress periods by conducting a test for the equality of means (t-test). The 
results are reported in Table 3.3. Overall, the table shows that the mean of bond yield spreads 
has substantially increased during the crisis period either in the absence or in the presence of 
excess control rights: the bond yield spreads mean is almost five times greater during the 
crisis period compared to the sound period. The results also show that during the sound 
period, on average, the bond spread is not significantly different in the absence and in the 
presence of excess control rights: bondholders seem to disregard the presence of excess 
control rights during sound periods. However, during the crisis period banks with excess 
control rights display lower bond spreads than banks without excess control rights. This result 
suggests that bondholders perceive banks controlled by shareholders with excess control 
rights as safer than other banks and, as a consequence, they require a lower bond spread for 
those banks during crisis periods. 
 
Table 3.3: Bond spreads by excess control rights, on average, across sound and crisis 
periods   
This table reports the mean of bond spreads during sound and crisis periods for the subsamples of banks with and 
without excess control rights. We consider a bank as with excess control rights if this bank is controlled by an 
ultimate shareholder with control rights greater than cash-flow rights. We consider a bank as without excess 
control rights if this bank is widely held or controlled by an ultimate shareholder with identical control and cash-
flow rights. T-statistics test for the null hypothesis: "bond spread is not different between banks with or without 
excess control rights during sound and crisis periods". 
***
,
 ** 
and 
*
 indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels.  
 Number of issues Mean Spreads T-statistics 
Sound period (2002 - Q2 2007) 1,552 0.253  
Presence of excess control rights 144 0.235 
0.508 
Absence of excess control rights 1,408 0.252 
    
Crisis period (Q3 2007 - 2010) 1,248 0.989  
Presence of excess control rights 172 0.892 
2.080
**
 
Absence of excess control rights 1,076 1.005 
  
Chapter 3 - Control rights versus cash-flow rights, banks’ shareholders and bondholders conflicts 
132 
3.4. Results 
We first examine the relationship between excess control rights and bank bond yield spreads 
across sound and distress periods. We then go deeper and analyze whether some bond features 
affect this relationship.   
3.4.1. Effect of excess control rights on bank bond yield spreads 
We estimate the coefficients of Eq. (3.1) using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method with 
robust standard errors. The estimation results are reported in Table 3.4. The two first columns 
report the results on the effect of the presence of excess control rights on bank bond yield 
spreads over the whole period. The two last columns include an interaction variable to 
differentiate its effect across sound and distress periods. We alternatively use the continuous 
(columns 1 and 3) and binary (columns 2 and 4) variables to capture the presence of excess 
control rights.
77
 
The results reported in regressions (3) and (4) show that before the crisis, bondholders pay 
less attention to bank governance: the coefficient α1 associated to our ownership variable is 
not statistically significant. Our results also indicate that the effect of the divergence between 
control and cash-flow rights is significantly different during sound and distress periods: α2 is 
negative and significant in both regressions. Specifically, the Wald test indicates that the 
coefficient associated to the continuous measure of excess control rights (column 3) is 
negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the divergence between control and 
cash-flow rights is associated with a lower cost of debt financing during the crisis period. 
Similarly, estimates from column 4 show that the average bond yield spreads of banks 
controlled by a shareholder with excess control rights [d(ExcessControl)=1] is significantly 
lower than the average bond yield spreads of banks without excess control rights 
[d(ExcessControl)=0] during the crisis period: the coefficient estimates associated with both 
dummies are respectively 0.571 and 0.687. Furthermore, the t-test (not reported in the table) 
indicates that the difference between these two coefficients (i.e., 0.571 and 0.687) is 
significantly different from zero. Overall, the results suggest that banks controlled by a 
                                                     
77 The standard deviation for the excess control rights variable on the whole sample is 8.05 which seems quite 
enough to accurately test our hypotheses. But nevertheless, to ensure that our results are not affected by the 
prevalence of bonds issued by banks without excess control rights (2,484 against 316 for banks controlled by 
shareholders with excess control rights), we perform our regressions using a continuous variable along with a 
binary variable to capture the presence of excess control rights.   
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shareholder with excess control rights experienced a lower cost of debt financing during the 
distress period of Q3 2007-2010
78
. This result is consistent with the propping up view under 
which banks controlled via excess control rights might benefit from private support from their 
ultimate controlling shareholders or their related-firms within the pyramid during a crisis, 
reducing their probability of failure. Bondholders anticipating such incentives charge lower 
spreads for banks controlled by these shareholders.  
Regarding the other variables, most of them, either related to issuer or issue characteristics, 
are significant with the expected signs. Coherently, bondholders price bank risk and require 
higher spreads form riskier banks. The coefficient on the binary variable d(Crisis) shows an 
increase in bank bond yield spreads suggesting that bondholders charge higher spreads during 
downturns. As predicted, the results also indicate lower spreads for larger banks. Consistent 
with the findings of Sironi (2003) and Iannotta et al. (2013), larger issue amounts are 
associated with higher spreads. Coherently, Maturity and the binary variable 
d(Subordinated/Unsecured) also enter the regressions positively and significantly.  
  
                                                     
78
 This result is in line with the findings of Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi (2015) during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
Whereas a larger divergence between ultimate shareholders' control and cash-flow rights is associated with 
higher default risk and lower performance before the crisis period, during this crisis period such a divergence has 
contributed to enhance banks' performance and no longer affects banks' default risk. Banks with ultimate 
shareholders with excess control rights appear as safer during turmoil and bondholders should accordingly 
require a lower yield spread. 
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Table 3.4: Excess control rights and bank bond spreads  
This table shows the Ordinary Least Square estimation results on the effect of excess control rights on bank bond 
spreads (Eq. (3.1)) for a sample of 2,800 bonds issued by 89 banks over the 2002-2010 period. In all the 
regressions, the dependent variable is bank bond spreads defined as the difference between the bank bond yield 
at issuance and the yield of a same currency and maturity Treasury Bond. We use two proxies of bank 
ownership: a continuous variable (ExcessControl) defined as the difference between control and cash-flow rights 
of the largest ultimate owner; and a binary variable [d(ExcessControl)] equal to one if the issuing bank is 
controlled by a shareholder with greater control than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise. d(Crisis) is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the bond is issued during the period Q3 2007 - 2010, and zero otherwise. TotalRisk is a 
proxy of bank risk defined as the standard deviation of weekly bank stock returns computed on a moving 
window of 52 quoted weeks. ROAA is the return on average assets defined as the ratio of net income to average 
total assets. Log(Assets) is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Log(Issuance) is the natural logarithm of 
the issuance amount. Maturity is the number of years between the bond issue date and redemption. 
d(Subordinated/Unsecured) is a dummy equal to one if the bond is either subordinated or unsecured, and zero 
otherwise. 
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
***
, 
**
 and 
*
 indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. Wald tests are performed to test the significance of some coefficients. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Ownership variable  ExcessControl d(ExcessControl) ExcessControl d(ExcessControl) 
Ownership variable (α1)  -0.003
**
 -0.063
*
 0.002 0.002 
 (-2.21) (-1.86) (1.11) (0.06) 
Ownership variable x d(Crisis) (α2) - - -0.008
***
 -0.118
**
 
 - - (-3.11) (-2.08) 
d(Crisis) (α3) 0.675
***
 0.671
***
 0.694
***
 0.687
***
 
 (28.33) (28.37) (27.95) (26.87) 
TotalRisk 0.029
***
 0.029
***
 0.028
***
 0.029
***
 
 (7.52) (7.63) (7.49) (7.63) 
ROAA -0.046 -0.043 -0.052
*
 -0.044 
 (-1.48) (-1.38) (-1.68) (-1.43) 
Log(Assets)  -0.034
***
 -0.031
***
 -0.032
***
 -0.032
***
 
 (-3.16) (-2.92) (-3.05) (-3.01) 
Ln(Issuance) 0.025
***
 0.025
***
 0.025
***
 0.026
***
 
 (4.12) (4.17) (4.15) (4.24) 
Maturity  0.027
***
 0.027
***
 0.027
***
 0.027
***
 
 (6.34) (6.36) (6.28) (6.33) 
d(Subordinated/Unsecured)  0.231
***
 0.231
***
 0.228
***
 0.229
***
 
 (10.15) (10.15) (10.02) (10.09) 
Constant  0.047 -0.014 0.017 -0.007 
 (0.20) (-0.06) (0.07) (-0.03) 
Currency dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 
R-Square 0.482 0.481 0.484 0.482 
Adjusted R-Square 0.475 0.474 0.477 0.474 
Wald tests      
α1  α2 - - -0.006
***
 -0.116
***
 
p-value  - - (0.001) (0.014) 
α1  α2  α3 - - - 0.571
***
 
p-value  - - - (0.000) 
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3.4.2. Effect of excess control rights on bank bond yield spreads: a 
deeper investigation 
Our main results show that banks controlled by shareholders with excess control rights 
experienced relatively lower spreads compared to their peers during the distress period. A 
potential explanation for such a finding is that bondholders regard strong links among 
shareholders within pyramids as a cushion against bank failure and therefore require lower 
spreads from such controlled banks. However, all bondholders are not identically concerned 
about bank default. More precisely, because holders of unsecured and subordinated bonds 
bear most of the costs in the event of default, they should pay more attention to weaknesses in 
bank governance during downturns compared to holders of secured bonds. Similarly, bonds 
with low ratings are perceived by rating agencies as more likely to default and, as a 
consequence, holders of such bonds should be more sensitive to deficiencies in bank 
governance. We hence expect our previous result to be mainly effective as long as unsecured 
and subordinated bonds are concerned as well as in the case of bonds with downgraded 
ratings. Our aim herein is then to test whether bonds’ ratings (high versus low ratings) and 
bonds’ payment rank (subordinated and unsecured bonds versus secured bonds) affect the 
incentives of bondholders to price the presence of excess control rights.
79
 
Consequently, we split the sample of bonds into subsamples according to their ratings and 
payment ranks.
80
 To test the effect of bond ratings, we classify bonds as high rated if they are 
rated at issuance between Aaa and Aa2 for Moodys or AAA and AA for Fitch and Standards 
& Poor's, and as low rated if the grade is equal to or lower than Aa3 for Moodys and AA- for 
the other rating agencies. To capture the effect of the payment rank, we separate the sample of 
bonds into two subsamples: unsecured and subordinated bonds versus secured bonds.  
Overall, the results reported in Table 3.5 show that before the crisis bondholders do not price 
                                                     
79
 We also would like to test whether the effect of excess control rights on bank bond spreads depends on the 
ownership type. The risk of expropriation of minority shareholders relates to the ownership type as previous 
literature highlights that this may occurs to a large extent by families who have an increased incentive to 
expropriate  (see Claessens et al. (1999), Villalonga and Amit (2006)). More specifically, family-controlled 
banks are likely to be benefit from support from their ultimate owners during distress times (Saghi-Zedek and 
Tarazi (2015)) and, as a consequence, we expect that the link between control rights and bond spreads to be more 
pronounced in family-controlled banks. However, as explained before, in our specific case family-controlled 
banks did not issue bonds during the distress period, making such investigations impossible.    
80
 For simplicity, we perform our regressions on subsamples of bonds instead of augmenting Eq. (3.1) using 
interaction terms.  
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bank governance, as measured by excess control rights, regardless of the bonds 
characteristics. This is consistent with the view that during upturns investors are less 
concerned about deficiencies in bank governance. Coherently, the results also show that the 
negative association between excess control rights and bond yield spreads during the crisis 
period is only relevant for low rated as well as unsecured and subordinated bonds. This result 
suggests that bondholders who face a lower quality of debt and therefore a higher default risk 
(i.e., holders of downgraded, subordinated and unsecured bonds) price excess control rights 
during distress periods. More precisely, bondholders charge a lower cost of debt during the 
crisis period when issuers of these bonds are banks controlled by shareholders with excess 
control rights. Bondholders perceive those banks as less likely to fail as they enjoy strong 
links inside their pyramid ownership structure and may benefit from the support of ultimate 
owners or other related-firms during distress periods. Otherwise, just like before the crisis, 
holders of secured bonds and bonds with upgraded ratings do not take into account the bank 
ownership structure, as measured by excess control rights, when they fix the bond premium.  
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Table 3.5: Excess control rights and bank bond spreads - Rating and Payment Rank categories 
This table shows the Ordinary Least Square estimation results on the effect of excess control rights on bank bond spreads (Eq. (3.1)) for sub-samples of rating and payment rank 
categories over the 2002-2010 period. We classify bonds according to their payment ranks into secured bonds (Secured) and subordinated or unsecured (Subordinated/Unsecured). 
To capture the effect of rating categories, bonds are classified as high rated (High Rating) if they are rated at issuance between Aaa and Aa2 for Moodys or between AAA and AA 
for Fitch and Standards & Poor's. We consider them as low rated (Low Rating) when the grade is equal to or lower than Aa3 for Moodys and AA- for Fitch and Standards & Poor's. 
In all the regressions, the dependent variable is bank bond spreads defined as the difference between the bank bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency and maturity 
Treasury Bond. We use two proxies of bank ownership: a continuous variable (ExcessControl) defined as the difference between control and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate 
owner; and a binary variable [d(ExcessControl)] equal to one if the issuing bank is controlled by a shareholder with greater control than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise. 
d(Crisis) is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is issued during the period Q3 2007 - 2010, and zero otherwise. TotalRisk is a proxy of bank risk defined as the standard 
deviation of weekly bank stock returns computed on a moving window of 52 quoted weeks. ROAA is the return on average assets defined as the ratio of net income to average total 
assets. Log(Assets) is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Log(Issuance) is the natural logarithm of the issuance amount. Maturity is the number of years between bond issue 
date and redemption. d(Subordinated/Unsecured) is a dummy equal to one if the bond is either subordinated or unsecured, and zero otherwise. 
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
***
,
 ** 
and 
*
 indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Wald tests are performed to test the significance of some 
coefficients. 
 Payment Rank  Credit Ratings 
 Subordinated / Unsecured Secured  High Rating Low Rating 
Ownership variable  ExcessControl d(ExcessControl) ExcessControl d(ExcessControl)  ExcessControl d(ExcessControl) ExcessControl d(ExcessControl) 
Ownership variable (α1)  0.003 0.030 -0.002 -0.017  -0.002 -0.018 0.004 0.023 
 (1.48) (0.67) (-0.27) (-0.30)  (-0.74) (-0.35) (1.59) (0.42) 
Ownership variable x d(Crisis) 
(α2) 
-0.009
***
 -0.137
**
 -0.001 -0.024  -0.001 -0.044 -0.012
***
 -0.231
**
 
 (-2.92) (-1.97) (-0.06) (-0.28)  (-0.26) (-0.73) (-3.04) (-1.99) 
d(Crisis) (α3) 0.762
***
 0.754
***
 0.470
***
 0.463
***
  0.560
***
 0.561
***
 0.799
***
 0.788
***
 
 (21.45) (20.50) (15.56) (15.14)  (16.95) (16.65) (20.16) (19.28) 
TotalRisk 0.029
***
 0.030
***
 0.007 0.006  0.021
***
 0.021
***
 0.032
***
 0.033
***
 
 (5.74) (6.03) (1.07) (0.95)  (4.57) (4.62) (5.52) (5.75) 
ROAA -0.050 -0.037 -0.138
***
 -0.139
***
  -0.027 -0.026 -0.206
***
 -0.185
***
 
 (-1.18) (-0.88) (-3.41) (-3.43)  (-0.71) (-0.68) (-4.22) (-3.84) 
Log(Assets)  -0.049
***
 -0.048
***
 -0.037
*
 -0.039
**
  0.039
**
 0.041
**
 -0.066
***
 -0.067
***
 
 (-4.03) (-4.01) (-1.84) (-2.00)  (2.22) (2.32) (-5.26) (-5.34) 
Ln(Issuance) 0.029
***
 0.030
***
 -0.016 -0.016  -0.007 -0.007 0.059
***
 0.061
***
 
 (4.15) (4.32) (-1.47) (-1.53)  (-0.76) (-0.72) (7.78) (8.10) 
Maturity  0.034
***
 0.034
***
 0.007 0.007  0.007
*
 0.008
*
 0.039
***
 0.040
***
 
 (6.24) (6.33) (1.13) (1.11)  (1.69) (1.70) (5.96) (6.16) 
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Table 3.5 (continued)           
d(Subordinated/Unsecured) - - - -  0.051 0.048 0.294
***
 0.299
***
 
 - - - -  (1.08) (1.02) (5.38) (5.45) 
Constant  0.423 0.393 1.128
***
 1.172
***
  -0.588 -0.635
*
 -0.093 -0.115 
 (1.54) (1.44) (2.66) (2.86)  (-1.61) (-1.72) (-0.29) (-0.37) 
Currency dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,058 2,058 742 742  1,188 1,188 1,612 1,612 
R-Square 0.497 0.494 0.419 0.418  0.487 0.486 0.565 0.561 
Adjusted R-Square 0.487 0.485 0.400 0.399  0.471 0.470 0.554 0.550 
Wald tests           
α1  α2 -0.006
**
 -0.107
*
 -0.003 -0.040  -0.003
*
 -0.063 -0.009
***
 -0.207
**
 
p-value  (0.013) (0.080) (0.211) (0.541)  (0.070) (0.185) (0.008) (0.042) 
α1  α2  α3  0.647
***
  0.423
***
   0.498
***
  0.581
***
 
p-value   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
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To summarize (see Table 3.6 for a summary of results), we find that the presence of excess 
control rights matters for bondholders but differently across sound and distress periods. 
Holders of secured or high rated bonds disregard the bank governance quality (as measured 
by the presence and the absence of excess control rights) during both normal times and 
distress times. However, holders of low rated and unsecured/subordinated bonds pay attention 
to deficiencies in bank governance schemes only during distress times. Particularly, they 
charge a lower premium for banks controlled by shareholders with excess control rights. 
These bondholders perceive the interconnectedness of shareholders among pyramids as a 
potential safety cushion against bank failure and therefore charge a lower premium from such 
controlled banks.  
 
Table 3.6: Summary of the results 
This table presents a summary of the results. We classify bonds according to their payment ranks into secured 
bonds (Secured) and subordinated or unsecured (Subordinated/Unsecured). To capture the effect of rating 
categories, bonds are classified as high rated (High Rating) if they are rated at issuance between Aaa and Aa2 for 
Moodys or between AAA and AA for Fitch and Standards & Poor's. We consider them as low rated (Low 
Rating) when the grade is equal to or lower than Aa3 for Moody's and AA- for Fitch and Standards & Poor's. 
 PaymentRanks  Bond Ratings 
 Secured 
Subordinated / 
Unsecured 
 High Rating 
Low 
Rating 
Sound period (2002 - Q2 2007) 0 0  0 0 
Distress period (Q3 2007 - 2010) 0 -  0 - 
 
 
3.5. Robustness checks  
In this section, we perform several regressions to examine the robustness of our findings in 
subsection 4.1.
81
 The results are presented in the Appendices.  
First, to ensure that our coefficients estimates do not suffer from the bias of omitted variables, 
we augment the model reported in Eq. (3.1) by some additional variables. In addition to 
premiums required for default factors, bondholders could also charge a tax premium (Elton et 
al. (2001)). We capture such a premium by introducing the coupon rate (Coupon). Since we 
focus on the primary market and because most of the bonds in our sample are issued and 
                                                     
81
 We also check the robustness of the results obtained in subsection 3.4.2. The results, available upon request, 
indicate that our main conclusions remain unchanged.    
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redeemed at par, the coupon rate is already the main component of the Spread variable. 
Hence, in our specific case including the coupon rate in the set of control variables may not 
bring additional information. But nevertheless, to be consistent with previous studies we 
ensure that our results are not driven by the omission of the coupon rate. Moreover, because 
the decision of banks to issue bonds depends on their probability of default and overall on the 
costs and the benefits related to debt issuance, riskier banks may be more reluctant to issue 
bonds (Covitz et al. (2004)). We control for this potential sample selection bias by including 
the inverse of the Mill's ratio (Mills) in the model (Eq. (3.1)).
82
 In both cases, the results 
reported in Appendix 3.3 remain unchanged.   
Second, because bank risk is the main determinant of bond yield spreads, we use alternative 
measures (accounting or market-based) for the risk variable instead of TotalRisk that we 
include in our equation until now: (i) the distance to default,
83
 (ii) the accounting based Z-
Score defined as the return on assets plus the ratio of equity to total assets, divided by the 
standard deviation of the return on assets, (iii) the bond rating at issuance date defined as the 
best rating attributed by one of the three rating agencies, and (iv) the ratio of bank loan loss 
reserves to total loans. Our results, reported in Appendix 3.5, remain mostly the same 
whatever the measure we include.  
Third, to disentangle the effect of excess control rights on bond yield spreads across sound 
and distress periods, we perform regressions separately on the two subsamples of distress and 
sound periods instead of using interaction terms as in Eq. (3.1). This check leads to similar 
conclusions (see Appendix 3.6).  
Finally, until now, our distress period, which ranges from Q3 2007 to 2010, includes both the 
financial crisis and the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis. To ensure that the sovereign 
debt crisis during which bond yield spreads and Treasury Bonds were affected did not drive 
our results, we consider an alternative measure of the crisis period. We now exclude the Q2 
2009 – 2010 period from our sample and focus on the acute financial crisis period which 
ranges from Q32007 to Q12009. The results yield similar conclusions (see Appendix 3.7).  
 
                                                     
82
 See Appendix 3.4 for more details about the estimation of this variable. 
83
 We compute the distance to default using both accounting and market variables: (i) debt of one year maturity 
defined as the annual total assets minus annual total equity and interpolated using the cubic spline method, (ii) 
daily market value of equity and (iii) the one year interbank risk-free rate. We measure the volatility of equity as 
the standard deviation of the daily stock returns multiplied by     . All data come from Bloomberg database. 
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3.6. Conclusion  
The objective of this study is to empirically test whether the presence of ultimate shareholders 
with excess control rights in pyramids affects banks bond yield spreads and whether this 
effect is different across sound and distress periods. For this purpose, we use a sample of 
2,800 bonds issued by 89 publicly listed banks based in 16 Western European countries 
during the 2002-2010 period.  
Our results indicate that, before the crisis, the presence of excess control rights does not affect 
banks bond yield spreads. However, our results also show that bank governance does matter 
for bondholders during downturns: the divergence between control and cash-flow rights was 
significantly associated with lower banks bond yield spreads during the distress period of Q3 
2007-2010. A deeper investigation reveals that such an effect is only prevalent in the case of 
bonds with downgraded ratings and subordinated/unsecured bonds. On the whole, our results 
show that while bondholders disregard bank governance, as measured by the presence and the 
absence of excess control rights, during normal times, they take it into consideration during 
downturns. 
Overall, we show that ownership structure and specifically the divergence between control 
and cash-flow rights does matter in explaining differences in banks bond yield spreads during 
crisis periods. Our findings suggest that bondholders perceive banks controlled by 
shareholders with excess control rights as safer and require from such banks lower premiums, 
possibly because they enjoy strong links and interconnections within pyramids which prevent 
them from failure. From a policy point of view, this finding suggests that besides the safety 
net guarantees and too-big-to-fail policies, interconnectedness of banks within complex 
ownership structures may also affect the effectiveness of market discipline. More disclosure 
on complex ownership structure of banks following the suggestions of the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (Bank of International Settlements (2010b)) are therefore 
encouraged.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 3.1: Table A1 - General descriptive statistics of the final sample over the 2002-
2010 period  
This table provides general descriptive statistics on some financial variables. Assets is the bank's total assets. 
ROAA is the return on average assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total equity. NLTA is the 
ratio of net loans to total assets. NPLNL is the ratio of nonperforming loans to net loans. LLPNL is the ratio of 
loan loss provisions to net loans. All variables are in percentages except Assets which is in billions Euros.  
 Assets ROAA LEVERAGE NLTA NPLNL LLPNL 
Mean 443.013 0.302 27.715 52.899 2.479 0.661 
Median 234.582 0.280 26.954 57.660 2.096 0.543 
Standard 
Deviation 
469.909 0.456 13.829 17.053 1.580 0.578 
Minimum 1.101 -2.420 4.684 0.630 0.007 0.000 
Maximum 2,586.701 2.230 125.000 91.530 9.505 5.073 
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Appendix 3.2: Table A2 - Correlations table  
ExcessControl is the difference between control and cash-flow rights. d(ExcessControl) is a binary variable equal to one if the issuing bank is controlled by a shareholder with 
excess control rights, and zero otherwise. d(Crisis) is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is issued during the period Q3 2007 - 2010, and zero otherwise. TotalRisk is a 
proxy of bank risk defined as the standard deviation of weekly bank stock returns computed on a moving window of 52 quoted weeks. ROAA is the return on average assets 
defined as the ratio of net income to average total assets. Log(Assets) is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Log(Issuance) is the natural logarithm of the issuance 
amount. Maturity is the number of years between the bond issue date and redemption. d(Subordinated/Unsecured) is a dummy equal to one if the bond is either subordinated 
or unsecured, and zero otherwise.
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ExcessControl (1) 1.000 
 
 
      
d(ExcessControl) (2) 0.785
***
 1.000  
      
d(Crisis) (3) 0.105
***
 0.071
***
 1.000 
      
TotalRisk(4)  0.006 -0.024 0.424
***
 1.000 
     
ROAA (5)  -0.045
**
 0.034
*
 -0.162
***
 -0.331
***
 1.000 
    
Log(Assets) (6)  -0.030 -0.009 0.144
***
 0.123
***
 -0.193
***
 1.000 
   
Log(Issuance) (7)  0.068
***
 0.119
***
 0.116
***
 -0.033
*
 0.078
***
 -0.016 1.000 
  
Maturity (8)  -0.048
**
 -0.029 0.008 -0.052
***
 0.067
***
 0.037
*
 0.038
**
 1.000 
 
d(Subordinated/Unsecured) (9)  0.074
***
 0.081
***
 0.058
***
 0.121
***
 0.116
***
 0.003
*
 -0.025 -0.094
***
 1.000 
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Appendix 3.3: Table A3 - Excess control rights and bank bond spreads: alternative specifications of the bond spread equation  
This table shows the Ordinary Least Square estimation results on the effect of excess control rights on bank bond spreads for a sample of banks over the 2002-2010 period. 
For robustness, we add some control variables to the baseline bond spreads equation: the bond coupon rate and/or the inverse of the Mill's ratio to control for a potential 
selection bias. In all the regressions, the dependent variable is bank bond spreads defined as the difference between the bank bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same 
currency and maturity Treasury Bond. We use two proxies of bank ownership: a continuous variable (ExcessControl) defined as the difference between control and cash-flow 
rights of the largest ultimate owner; and a binary variable [d(ExcessControl)] equal to one if the issuing bank is controlled by a shareholder with greater control than cash-flow 
rights, and zero otherwise. d(Crisis) is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is issued during the period Q3 2007 - 2010, and zero otherwise. TotalRisk is a proxy of bank 
risk defined as the standard deviation of weekly bank stock returns computed on a moving window of 52 quoted weeks. ROAA is the return on average assets defined as the 
ratio of net income to average total assets. Log(Assets) is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Log(Issuance) is the natural logarithm of the issuance amount. Maturity is 
the number of years between the bond issue date and redemption. d(Subordinated/Unsecured) is a dummy equal to one if the bond is either subordinated or unsecured, and 
zero otherwise. 
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Wald tests are performed to test the significance of some 
coefficients. 
Ownership Variable ExcessControl d(ExcessControl) 
Ownership Variable (α1)  0.000 0.002 -0.000 -0.046 -0.022 -0.065 
 (0.10) (0.74) (-0.01) (-1.13) (-0.49) (-1.43) 
Ownership Variable x d(Crisis) (α2) -0.007
***
 -0.008
***
 -0.007
**
 -0.082 -0.117
*
 -0.072 
 (-2.87) (-2.86) (-2.54) (-1.49) (-1.95) (-1.22) 
d(Crisis) (α3) 0.617
***
 0.730
***
 0.645
***
 0.606
***
 0.721
***
 0.630
***
 
 (25.24) (27.36) (24.47) (23.88) (26.40) (23.24) 
TotalRisk 0.036
***
 0.025
***
 0.036
***
 0.037
***
 0.025
***
 0.037
***
 
 (10.02) (6.26) (9.46) (10.17) (6.38) (9.60) 
ROAA -0.032 -0.065
*
 0.000 -0.023 -0.059 0.008 
 (-1.10) (-1.69) (0.01) (-0.80) (-1.53) (0.23) 
Log(Assets)  -0.037
***
 -0.050
***
 -0.039
**
 -0.035
***
 -0.045
**
 -0.033
**
 
 (-3.99) (-2.73) (-2.40) (-3.76) (-2.51) (-2.05) 
Ln(Issuance)  0.020
***
 0.024
***
 0.019
***
 0.021
***
 0.025
***
 0.020
***
 
 (3.63) (3.89) (3.24) (3.74) (3.97) (3.33) 
Maturity  0.006 0.029
***
 0.006 0.006 0.030
***
 0.006 
 (1.31) (6.28) (1.27) (1.40) (6.30) (1.32) 
d(Subordinated/Unsecured)  0.176
***
 0.266
***
 0.177
***
 0.178
***
 0.266
***
 0.177
***
 
 (8.24) (9.82) (6.98) (8.33) (9.82) (6.98) 
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Table A3 (Continued)       
Coupon 0.173
***
 - 0.180
***
 0.172
***
 - 0.179
***
 
 (12.49) - (14.25) (12.41) - (14.13) 
Mills - 0.025 0.204 - 0.073 0.261 
 - (0.09) (0.84) - (0.26) (1.11) 
Constant  -0.280 0.329 -0.264 -0.333 0.231 -0.391 
 (-1.28) (0.86) (-0.75) (-1.52) (0.61) (-1.13) 
Currency dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,800 2,482 2,482 2,800 2,482 2,482 
R-Square 0.551 0.490 0.556 0.548 0.487 0.553 
Adjusted R-Square 0.544 0.481 0.548 0.541 0.478 0.545 
Wald tests        
α1  α2 -0.007
***
 -0.007
***
 -0.007
***
 -0.128
***
 -0.138
***
 -0.138
***
 
p-value  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
α1  α2  α3    0.477
***
 0.582
***
 0.493
***
 
p-value     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Appendix 3.4: Table A4 - Bond issue decision model and the inverse of Mills ratio 
Based on a set of all listed European banks (issuing or not) which includes our 89 banks, we estimate banks' 
probability to issue bonds over the 2002 - 2010 period using this probit equation: 
d(Issue)
it
 = α0 + α1 NPLNLit + α2 VI it +α3 UNEMPLit   α4 Log(Assets)it+ α4 E TAit +  it
 
(3.2) 
where d(Issue) is a dummy equal to one if bank i decides to issue a new bond at time t, and zero otherwise. The 
set of explanatory variables includes: the ratio of non-performing loans to net loans (NPLNL); an index of 
market volatility (VI ); the country’s unemployment rate (UNEMPL); the natural logarithm of bank total assets 
(Log(Assets)) and finally the ratio of equity to total assets (EQTA). We extract the inverse of Mills' ratio from 
the residuals of the estimation results of Eq.(2). 
Z-Statistics are shown in parentheses. 
***
, 
**
 and 
* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively.  
 d(Issue) 
NPLNL 0.253 
 (0.162) 
VIX 0.019
***
 
 (2.628) 
UNEMPL -0.057
***
 
 (-4.409) 
Log(Assets) 0.815
***
 
 (19.083) 
EQTA -11.131
***
 
 (-8.360) 
Number of observations  5,295 
Mc Fadden R² 0.705 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic 2.099
***
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Appendix 3.5: Table A5 - Excess control rights and bank bond spreads: alternative measures of risk  
This table shows the Ordinary Least Square estimation results on the effect of excess control rights on bank bond spreads (Eq. (3.1)) for a sample of bonds over the 2002-2010 
period. For robustness considerations, we use alternative measures of bank risk: the bank distance to default (DD); accounting-based Z-score (ZScore) measured as the return 
on assets plus the equity to total assets ratio, all divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets; the bond rating at issuance date defined as the best rating attributed 
by one of the three rating agencies (Rating), and the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans (LLR). In all the regressions, the dependent variable is bank bond spreads defined 
as the difference between the bank bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency and maturity Treasury Bond. We use two proxies of bank ownership: a continuous 
variable (ExcessControl) defined as the difference between control and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner; and a binary variable [d(ExcessControl)] equal to one if 
the issuing bank is controlled by a shareholder with greater control than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise. d(Crisis) is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is issued 
during the period Q3 2007 - 2010, and zero otherwise. ROAA is the return on average assets defined as the ratio of net income to average total assets. Log(Assets) is the 
natural logarithm of bank total assets. Log(Issuance) is the natural logarithm of the issuance amount. Maturity is the number of years between the bond issue date and 
redemption. d(Subordinated/Unsecured) is a dummy equal to one if the bond is either subordinated or unsecured, and zero otherwise. 
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Wald tests are performed to test the significance of some 
coefficients. 
Ownership Variable  ExcessControl  d(ExcessControl) 
Risk variable   DD ZScore Rating LLR  DD ZScore Rating LLR 
Ownership Variable (α1)  -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001  -0.038 -0.023 0.010 -0.027 
 (-0.20) (0.79) (0.59) (0.46)  (-0.79) (-0.58) (0.27) (-0.62) 
Ownership Variable x d(Crisis) (α2) -0.008
***
 -0.009
***
 -0.008
***
 -0.008
***
  -0.143
**
 -0.127
**
 -0.171
***
 -0.111
*
 
 (-2.65) (-3.36) (-3.23) (-2.84)  (-1.97) (-2.23) (-3.06) (-1.89) 
d(Crisis)  0.702
***
 0.738
***
 0.791
***
 0.757
***
  0.688
***
 0.730
***
 0.789
***
 0.750
***
 
 (21.58) (30.75) (33.23) (30.90)  (20.50) (29.31) (31.85) (29.73) 
Risk variable  -0.050
***
 -0.001
***
 0.108
***
 0.008  -0.051
***
 -0.001
***
 0.107
***
 0.012 
 (-6.92) (-5.57) (11.77) (0.87)  (-6.97) (-5.51) (11.73) (1.35) 
ROAA -0.072
*
 -0.141
***
 -0.160
***
 -0.170
***
  -0.059 -0.134
***
 -0.153
***
 -0.159
***
 
 (-1.84) (-4.48) (-5.49) (-4.63)  (-1.50) (-4.27) (-5.26) (-4.37) 
Log(Assets)  -0.045
***
 -0.031
***
 0.002 -0.030
***
  -0.044
***
 -0.029
***
 0.004 -0.028
**
 
 (-2.95) (-2.85) (0.25) (-2.69)  (-2.90) (-2.73) (0.39) (-2.47) 
Ln(Issuance)  0.023
***
 0.027
***
 0.032
***
 0.025
***
  0.025
***
 0.027
***
 0.033
***
 0.025
***
 
 (2.80) (4.32) (5.59) (3.95)  (2.96) (4.40) (5.80) (4.04) 
Maturity  0.025
***
 0.026
***
 0.023
***
 0.026
***
  0.025
***
 0.026
***
 0.023
***
 0.027
***
 
 (4.58) (5.99) (5.40) (5.88)  (4.67) (6.04) (5.46) (5.89) 
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Table A5 (Continued)          
d(Subordinated/Unsecured)  0.199
***
 0.255
***
 -0.129
***
 0.272
***
  0.206
***
 0.257
***
 -0.127
***
 0.273
***
 
 (5.24) (11.28) (-3.39) (11.37)  (5.45) (11.39) (-3.35) (11.42) 
Constant  0.651
**
 0.113 -0.835
***
 0.062  0.600
*
 0.075 -0.888
***
 -0.007 
 (2.05) (0.47) (-3.66) (0.24)  (1.90) (0.31) (-3.90) (-0.03) 
Currency dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,586 2,788 2,777 2,647  1,586 2,788 2,777 2,647 
R-Square 0.452 0.476 0.505 0.474  0.448 0.473 0.503 0.471 
Adjusted R-Square 0.439 0.468 0.497 0.466  0.434 0.465 0.495 0.463 
Wald tests           
α1  α2 -0.008
***
 -0.007
***
 -0.007
***
 -0.007
***
  -0.182
***
 -0.150
***
 - 0.161
***
 -0.138
***
 
p-value  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
α1  α2  α3      0.506
***
 0.580
***
 0.628
***
 0.613
***
 
p-value       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Chapter 3 - Control rights versus cash-flow rights, banks’ shareholders and bondholders conflicts 
149 
Appendix 3.6: Table A6 - Excess control rights and bank bond spreads: regressions on 
subsamples  
This table shows the Ordinary Least Square estimation results on the effect of excess control rights on bank bond 
spreads for a subsample of bonds issued during the sound period (2002 - Q2 2007) and a sub-sample of bonds 
issued during the crisis period (Q3 2007 - 2010). In all the regressions, the dependent variable is bank bond 
spreads defined as the difference between the bank bond yield at issuance and the yield of a same currency and 
maturity Treasury Bond. We use two proxies of bank ownership: a continuous variable (ExcessControl) defined 
as the difference between control and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner; and a binary variable 
[d(ExcessControl)] equal to one if the issuing bank is controlled by a shareholder with greater control than cash-
flow rights, and zero otherwise. TotalRisk is a proxy of bank risk defined as the standard deviation of weekly 
bank stock returns computed on a moving window of 52 quoted weeks. ROAA is the return on average assets 
defined as the ratio of net income to average total assets. Log(Assets) is the natural logarithm of bank total 
assets. Log(Issuance) is the natural logarithm of the issuance amount. Maturity is the number of years between 
the bond issue date and redemption. d(Subordinated/Unsecured) is a dummy equal to one if the bond is either 
subordinated or unsecured, and zero otherwise. 
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. 
Ownership Variable ExcessControl d(ExcessControl) 
Sample period Sound period Crisis period Sound period Crisis period 
Ownership Variable  0.002 -0.007
***
 -0.033 -0.126
**
 
 (1.01) (-3.96) (-0.77) (-2.35) 
TotalRisk 0.027
***
 0.025
***
 0.028
***
 0.025
***
 
 (3.38) (5.68) (3.45) (5.87) 
ROAA 0.003 -0.120
**
 0.006 -0.102
**
 
 (0.10) (-2.29) (0.20) (-1.99) 
Log(Assets)  -0.040
***
 -0.061
***
 -0.042
***
 -0.056
***
 
 (-4.61) (-2.91) (-4.66) (-2.62) 
Ln(Issuance)  0.024
***
 0.012 0.024
***
 0.014 
 (3.81) (1.23) (3.76) (1.39) 
Maturity  0.044
***
 0.008 0.044
***
 0.008 
 (7.44) (1.38) (7.46) (1.46) 
d(Subordinated/Unsecured)  0.104
***
 0.431
***
 0.105
***
 0.430
***
 
 (4.54) (9.83) (4.60) (9.79) 
Constant  0.162 1.549
***
 0.192 1.391
***
 
 (0.64) (3.62) (0.75) (3.25) 
Currency dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,552 1,248 1,552 1,248 
R-Square 0.287 0.309 0.286 0.302 
Adjusted R-Square 0.270 0.288 0.270 0.281 
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Appendix 3.7: Table A7 - Excess control rights and bank bond spreads: alternative 
measures for the crisis period  
This table shows the Ordinary Least Square estimation results on the effect of excess control rights on bank bond 
spreads (Eq. (3.1)) for a sample of bonds issued between 2002 and Q1 2009. In all the regressions, the dependent 
variable is bank bond spreads defined as the difference between the bank bond yield at issuance and the yield of 
a same currency and maturity Treasury Bond. We use two proxies of bank ownership: a continuous variable 
(ExcessControl) defined as the difference between control and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner; 
and a binary variable [d(ExcessControl)] equal to one if the issuing bank is controlled by a shareholder with 
greater control than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise. d(Crisis) is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond 
is issued between Q3 2007 and Q1 2009, and zero otherwise. TotalRisk is a proxy of bank risk defined as the 
standard deviation of weekly bank stock returns computed on a moving window of 52 quoted weeks. ROAA is 
the return on average assets defined as the ratio of net income to average total assets. Log(Assets) is the natural 
logarithm of bank total assets. Log(Issuance) is the natural logarithm of the issuance amount. Maturity is the 
number of years between the bond issue date and redemption. d(Subordinated/Unsecured) is a dummy equal to 
one if the bond is either subordinated or unsecured, and zero otherwise. 
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. Wald tests are performed to test the significance of some coefficients. 
Ownership Variable ExcessControl d(ExcessControl) 
Ownership Variable (α1)  0.002 -0.004 
 (1.20) (-0.09) 
Ownership Variable x d(Crisis) (α2) -0.008
***
 -0.140
*
 
 (-2.82) (-1.94) 
d(Crisis) (α3) 0.762
***
 0.758
***
 
 (24.12) (22.88) 
TotalRisk 0.024
***
 0.025
***
 
 (4.06) (4.11) 
ROAA -0.039 -0.034 
 (-1.12) (-0.97) 
Log(Assets)  -0.031
***
 -0.032
***
 
 (-2.79) (-2.82) 
Ln(Issuance) 0.020
***
 0.021
***
 
 (2.84) (2.94) 
Maturity  0.037
*** 
0.037
***
 
 (7.61) (7.71) 
d(Subordinated/Unsecured)  0.168
***
 0.169
***
 
 (6.97) (7.03) 
Constant  0.095 0.088 
 (0.35) (0.33) 
Currency Dummies Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,171 2,171 
R-Square 0.467 0.465 
Adjusted R-Square 0.457 0.455 
Wald tests    
α1  α2 -0.005
***
 -0.143
**
 
p-value  (0.004) (0.021) 
α1  α2  α3 - 0.614
***
 
p-value  - (0.000) 
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Over the last decades, European banks have been affected by various changes that have 
occurred in the banking industry. The processes of deregulation, financial integration and 
innovation led to a transformation in banking activities and ownership structure that altered 
banks’ risk-taking behavior by notably increasing their incentives to take risks. The financial 
development has exacerbated banks’ financial fragility while the probability that this fragility 
adversely impacts the whole economy has increased. As financial market expanded, the place 
and role of banks have been strengthened in the economy. Ensuring their financial stability to 
prevent their failure is thus one of the main objectives of prudential regulation. Banks’ risk 
management plays a preeminent role to insure this objective. However, weak managerial 
skills or agency conflicts are likely to affect the way banks are dealing with risks. Because 
banks’ bondholders are mainly concerned about banks’ default risk, they may be directly 
impacted by the potential risk of insolvency ensuing from mismanagement. Hence, the new 
financial context has raised the debate on banks’ quality of risk management and ownership 
structure, among which, their effects on bondholders’ behavior. 
 
From this perspective, the aim of this thesis is therefore to assess the quality of banks’ risk 
management and to investigate how this quality and the effect of excess control rights of 
ultimate controlling shareholders affect the pricing of banking bonds. This conclusion 
summarizes the main findings and contributions of the three previous chapters.  
 
The purpose of the first chapter is to evaluate and to analyze the efficiency of banks while 
they manage their risks. To this end, we employ a structural model of production to estimate 
the expected return and risk that directly and exclusively stem from the ex-ante portfolio 
choices made by managers of a sample of 192 European banks. Using a stochastic frontier 
model, we produce the best-practice risk-return frontier and compute each bank’s risk-return 
efficiency by its distance from this frontier. The study shows that some banks operate at 
relatively low levels of efficiency, not solely because their management is potentially affected 
by a negative exogenous factor, but especially because they have an impaired ability to 
manage their risk-taking. We take care to ensure that this result is robust to different 
econometric choices relative to the estimation techniques of the best practice frontier. We 
then perform a statistical analysis to emphasize the stability of banks’ ranking through times. 
We infer from this analysis that the level of bank efficiency is relatively stable in the short 
term. In the long term, a large part of the most efficient banks were not adversely affected by 
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the financial crisis while low performing banks are not condemned to remain inefficient. We 
then conduct mean equality tests to highlight some common characteristics for the most risk-
return efficient banks. These banks are specialized on lending activities, are less capitalized. 
They better perform in terms of return and operational costs, and they are less risky without 
being more solvent, less opaque or bigger than less efficient ones. At last, when credit ratings 
do not account for potential extern support, we show that rating agencies assign a better rating 
for the most risk-return efficient banks.  
 
The second chapter of this thesis rests directly on the findings of the first one and examines 
the role that banks’ quality of risk management can play in the pricing of banking bonds. 
More precisely, on a sample of 1,924 bonds issued by European listed banks, we investigate 
whether the default premium required by bondholders is partly explained by the risk-return 
efficiency measure. We consider the risk-return efficiency measure as a proxy of bank 
managerial ability in terms of risk-return trade-off. Because of a lack of accurateness in 
traditional default risk proxies, we assume that adding this variable improves the explanation 
of the default risk premium. Our investigation effectively claims that bondholders require a 
higher yield spread when the bank managerial ability decreases, confirming the intuition that 
the default risk premium cannot be entirely explained by traditional default risk proxies. The 
quality of banks’ risk management turns out to be a relevant determinant of this premium. 
Bondholders tend to be less confident about the default measure of banks with low level of 
managerial ability. The premium for risk mismanagement may be considered as a premium 
that bondholders require to compensate for the lack of confidence they have in the measure of 
the effective level of bank default. More, the global financial crisis provides a timely case to 
explore how the effect of bank managerial ability on bank bond spread might differ depending 
on the soundness of the banking industry. We thus deepen our analysis and investigate 
whether bondholders’ pricing behavior is the same during the turmoil than before. We find 
that their incentive to account for banks’ managerial ability while pricing their debt have been 
strengthened during this period. Overall, we conclude that bondholders increase their 
monitoring and become more sensitive to this component when the banks’ default probability 
increases. 
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The third chapter deals with the agency problem between controlling shareholders and 
bondholders. Ultimate owners with control rights in excess of cash-flow ones could threaten 
the interests of minority shareholders as well as those of bondholders essentially by 
undertaking projects that increase the likelihood of bankruptcy. We then assume that the 
divergence between control and cash-flow rights of the ultimate owner influences 
bondholders’ pricing behavior. Specifically, we examine whether the presence of ultimate 
shareholders with excess control rights in pyramids affects bank bond yield spread and 
whether this effect is different across sound and distress periods. During normal times, one 
may think that controlling shareholders use their effective control rights to divert gains to 
themselves, leaving the cost of failure to bondholders, which in turn require a higher spread. 
Our results do not support this intuition as we find that the presence of excess control rights 
does not affect bank bond yield spread during this period. This result highlights that 
bondholders pay less attention to bank governance and confirms the finding of the previous 
chapter: bondholders are less willing to monitor banks during upturns. On the contrary, we 
find that banks controlled by a shareholder with excess control rights experienced a lower cost 
of debt financing during the financial crisis period. Such a result is consistent with the 
propping-up view: entrenched controlling shareholders intervene to refund banks in order to 
prevent all the firms in the pyramid from financial distress. Anticipating such a behavior, 
bondholders require a lower spread compared to sound periods for banks controlled by 
shareholders with excess control rights. For deeper insights, we also test whether bond ratings 
and payment rank affect the incentives of bondholders to price the presence of excess control 
rights. This investigation underlines that the impact of controlling shareholders on bank bond 
spread is only significant when banks experience a high default risk. Indeed, the results 
remain unchanged for the sound period and the negative effect of excess control rights on the 
bond spread during the crisis period is only significant for low rated as well as unsecured and 
subordinated bonds. 
 
Overall, this thesis highlights several challenges for banking institutions and supervisors. 
First, our result that some European banks are inefficient to manage their risk optimally 
supports the need for a prompt monitoring of banks’ ability to manage optimally the risk-
return trade-offs. We may wonder whether supervisors correctly take into account such ability 
when aiming to discipline banks. Consequently, this thesis raises some questions regarding 
General Conclusion 
155 
the ability of bank supervisors to differentiate between banks according to their efficiency at 
risk-taking and their incentives to discourage inefficient risk-taking in this context.  
Second, as the results confirm that the quality of risk management is a determinant of bond 
spread, this thesis brings evidences that bondholders accurately monitor banks and this 
finding turns out to be a key element for banks’ supervisors who may use the information 
contained in bond yield spread as a signal to indirectly discipline banks. Banks should 
anticipate this reaction and should have even more incentives to improve their risk 
management. 
Finally, the previous results suggest that bondholders do not consider the divergence between 
control rights and cash-flow rights of ultimate owners during upturns and even consider banks 
controlled by shareholders with excess control rights as safer during the financial crisis as 
they benefit from strong interconnections within their pyramid structure. These findings raise 
the question of the effectiveness of bondholders’ discipline in presence of complex ownership 
structure and support the need for banks’ supervisors and regulators to recommend more 
disclosure of banking institutions’ ownership. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of three empirical essays with an emphasis on bank risk-return efficiency and 
bond pricing. Chapter 1 aims at a better understanding of the quality of banks’ risk management 
by providing, for a set of European listed banks, a measure of each bank’s relative efficiency in 
terms of risk-return trade-off. We show that the level of bank risk-return efficiency is quite 
stable in the short term, whereas in the long term low performing banks are not condemned to 
remain inefficient. We also identify some common characteristics for the most risk-return 
efficient banks, which are assigned, by rating agencies, a more attractive financial strength rating. 
In chapter 2, we investigate the determinants of bank bond spread and we show that bank 
managerial ability, proxied by bank risk-return efficiency, improves the explanation of the default 
premium required by bondholders. Our results underline that standard default risk measures do 
not entirely reflect the default premium and banks’ managerial ability turns out to be a 
determinant of bondholders’ confidence in the measure of the effective level of bank default. 
Chapter 3 examines the effect of divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights of 
ultimate owners in pyramid ownership structure on the pricing of banking bonds. Whereas before 
the financial crisis such a divergence does not affect bank bond yield spread, during downturns 
bondholders require a lower spread from banks controlled by an ultimate owner with excess 
control rights. The investigation on more restrictive subsets underlines that this result is only 
significant when banks experience a high level of default risk. 
 Keywords: [European Banks, Risk-Return Efficiency, Bond Spread, Excess Control Rights]  
 
 
RESUMÉ 
Cette thèse est construite autour de trois essais empiriques centrés sur l'efficience rendement 
risque des banques européennes cotées et sur la tarification des obligations qu'elles émettent. 
Avec le premier essai, on mesure l'aptitude relative des banques à choisir efficacement le couple 
rendement / risque. On montre que cette aptitude relative est stable, surtout à court terme et que 
les banques les plus efficaces dans leurs choix rendement / risque partagent des caractéristiques 
communes et bénéficient d’une notation de solidité plus avantageuse. Le second essai apporte la 
preuve que l'introduction de cette mesure d'efficience du choix rendement / risque améliore de 
manière sensible l'explication de la prime de défaut qu'exigent les investisseurs sur les obligations 
émises par les banques et que les mesures traditionnelles du risque de défaut ne captent pas à elles 
seules l’intégralité de la prime de défaut. En outre, la capacité des banques à gérer efficacement le 
couple rendement / risque s’avère être un élément déterminant de la confiance que mettent les 
détenteurs d'obligations dans la mesure du risque effectif de défaut des banques. Avec le dernier 
essai on traite des conséquences d'une éventuelle divergence entre droits de contrôle et droits 
pécuniaires des actionnaires ultimes des banques sur la tarification des obligations qu'elles 
émettent. Si les obligataires ne semblent pas sensibles à une telle divergence avant la crise 
financière, les résultats montrent en revanche qu’ils le deviennent pendant la crise en exigeant un 
spread d'autant moins élevé que cette divergence est plus prononcée. Il est intéressant de noter que 
ce résultat ne tient que lorsque les banques font face à un risque de défaut élevé. 
 Mots clés: [Banques Européennes, Efficience Rendement-Risque, Spread Obligataire, 
Divergence entre droits de contrôle et droits pécuniaires] 
